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Abstract 
 
The efficient detection of information of negative valence in the 
environment is crucial to survival (e.g. to elicit an avoidance response). 
However, previous research remains inconclusive regarding the question of 
whether detection is more sensitive to information of negative compared to 
positive valence. In the present thesis I used a signal detection approach applied 
to an emotional-evaluation word task (requiring the participants to classify a 
briefly presented masked word into emotional or non-emotional categories) to 
address this question. The results established conclusively enhanced detection 
sensitivity to negative valence compared to positive valence of verbal 
information, under both supraliminal and subliminal conditions (Chapter 2) 
while ruling out any alternative accounts in terms of word frequency, 
idiosyncratic differences in valence ratings and different levels of arousal. The 
extent to which the enhanced negative valence detection depends on availability 
of attention was addressed in Chapter 3. Using a dual-task paradigm, 
participants performed the emotional detection task together with a letter-search 
task of either low or high perceptual load. A negative valence detection 
advantage was found in the low load but not high load conditions. These results 
established that attentional resources are critical for the enhanced detection of 
negative valence. The role of individual differences in trait anxiety in the 
effects of attention on valence detection was examined in Chapter 4. The results 
demonstrated that high trait anxiety was associated with enhanced detection of 
negative valence even under high load, whereas individuals with low trait 
anxiety were less sensitive to negative valence across both levels of load. The 
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effects of monetary reward were addressed in Chapter 5. The results indicated 
that while reward enhanced detection sensitivity, the negative valence detection 
advantage remained unaffected. Overall the results establish conclusively a 
negative valence detection advantage that interacts with attention, trait anxiety, 
but not with reward. 
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1.1 Preface 
 
Much literature has examined whether negative potentially threat-related 
stimuli have a processing advantage. Individuals appear to categorize stimuli as 
negative or positive on the basis of very little information (e.g. Murphy & Zajonc, 
1993). A main function of this immediate evaluation of stimuli is to enable 
individuals to quickly attend to stimuli that might produce negative consequences 
on one’s well-being. For evolutionary purposes, being able to quickly attend to 
threatening information is of high functional importance.  
However, danger to one’s survival is not the only form of threat. Negative 
social and psychological events (e.g. relationships, feedback, emotions) seem to 
have a greater impact on one’s well-being than positive events (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), and thus could also be considered 
psychologically threatening. Consequently, it would be important for individuals to 
be better at detecting negative over positive stimuli so that they would be better 
able to deal with (e.g. avoid where possible) their potential implications.  
The hypothesis that negative stimuli would receive preferential processing 
over neutral or positive stimuli has been explored in research conveying emotional 
information through pictorial images of scenes (e.g. Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, 
& De Houwer, 2004; Most, Chun, Widders, & Zald, 2005); faces with emotional 
expressions (e.g. Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Vuilleumier, Armony, 
Clarke, Husain, Driver, & Dolan, 2002; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 
2001) and words (e.g. Pratto & John, 1991; Kihara & Osaka, 2008). The present 
research focuses on the effects of negative emotional information conveyed with 
words. Although emotional scenes and faces can express rich emotional 
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information, it is often difficult to conclude that any processing advantage of one 
type of emotional stimuli (e.g. threat-related scenes conveying violent information) 
over another type (e.g. positive scenes conveying erotic information) is indeed due 
to the emotional valence of the stimuli rather than their different visual properties.  
In contrast, stimuli such as words can be equated in terms of their visual 
appearance as well as their familiarity and intensity of emotional meaning 
conveyed. In addition, orthographic verbal stimuli convey meaningful emotional 
information pertaining to the complex social environment of human interaction we 
live in today, beyond immediate implications for survival.  
To test the hypothesis that words conveying negative emotional information 
would have a detection advantage (over positive words), the effects of word 
valence on the accuracy and sensitivity of visual awareness were assessed in an 
emotional classification task for briefly-presented masked words. The results 
established a negative valence detection advantage. The interaction of the valence 
detection with attention was investigated in Chapter 3 to ask whether the enhanced 
detection of the negative valence can also be found in conditions of high perceptual 
load that exhaust all available attentional capacity in another task.  
The relationship between individual differences in anxiety levels was 
addressed in Chapter 4 to test the hypothesis that the negative valence detection 
advantage might be higher in individuals with high anxiety compared to those with 
low anxiety. Finally, the effects of monetary reward on the valence detection task 
performance were also investigated (Chapter 5) to explore whether the enhanced 
sensitivity to negative valence is ‘hard-wired’ and as such not affected by reward. 
Alternatively, the negative valence detection advantage could merely reflect a 
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prioritization strategy and would thus be minimized or even eliminated when 
reward is given to any correct detection irrespective of its valence.  
The existing literature on the processing of negative valence is reviewed 
next. The previous literature on negative versus positive word processing can be 
divided into two main strands: the first revolves around the potential processing 
advantage of negative words in visual awareness and mediating neural activity. In 
this domain, researchers have investigated whether unconscious negatively-
valenced stimuli are more likely than neutral or positive stimuli to produce effects 
on neural activity as well as on behaviour, and whether negative stimuli are more 
readily accessible to conscious report than neutral or positive stimuli. 
The second strand concerns the preferential effects of negative stimuli on 
attention. Work in this area has examined whether negative words are more likely 
to capture attention or interfere with a relevant task compared to positive or neutral 
words.  
However, it is still not clear from previous research on the link between 
perception and valence whether, for example, the findings truly reflect an 
enhancement of perceptual sensitivity to negative valence or instead reflect biases 
in prioritization or response criterion. Furthermore, do the effects of negative 
valence on detection sensitivity require full conscious awareness as well as the 
availability of attentional resources? How do internal factors such as individual 
differences in anxiety or external factors such as differences in stimulus value 
influence people’s sensitivities to emotional valence?1 
As the review demonstrates, while negative words (compared to neutral or 
positive words) seem to show greater capture of attention, increased physiological 
                                                
1 Note that throughout the review, negative stimuli will be referred to as threatening only if they 
were specified as such in the corresponding paper. 
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responses, and greater identification in terms of accuracy, the question of whether 
negative words exhibit a true perceptual sensitivity advantage remains open. In 
addition, although research has been conducted showing an attentional bias towards 
threatening information, whether or not any detection sensitivity advantage of 
negative valence requires attentional resources has not been directly explored. 
Though much research has addressed the attentional bias to threat in anxiety, this 
research has not as yet addressed the effects of individual differences in trait 
anxiety on the perceptual sensitivity of negative (vs. positive) valence detection nor 
how trait anxiety affects the interaction of attentional load and the negative valence 
detection advantage. Finally, the review of recent research investigating the effects 
of reward on attention and perception, demonstrates that no previous study has thus 
far addressed the effects of reward on negative compared to positive emotional 
valence detection. 
The review will begin by describing physiological and behavioural findings 
that reveal the conscious versus unconscious detection of emotional information. 
Next, the review will discuss the relevant research pertaining to the role of 
attention in the processing of emotional information from spatial cueing paradigms, 
to the Stroop task, and to neuroscientific evidence. An extension of these findings 
to the role of increased trait anxiety will be discussed, in addition to the relevant 
and recent theories of anxiety and cognitive processing. Finally, the role of reward 
in mediating perception and detection will be discussed, along with its implications 
on emotion processing. 
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1.2 Conscious vs. Unconscious Processing Advantage for Negative Words 
 
1.2.1 Physiological studies 
 The question of whether emotional information can be processed 
unconsciously has triggered much physiological research (e.g. with faces: Whalen, 
Rauch, Etcoff, McInerney, Lee, & Jenike, 1998; in high trait anxiety: Etkin, 
Klemenhagen, Dudman, Rogan, Hen, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2004; in a patient with 
blindsight: Morris, DeGelder, Weiskrantz, & Dolan, 2001). While some of this 
research involved emotional face processing in clinical populations (e.g. with 
blindsight), my focus here is on the processing of emotional words in the normal 
population. Bernat, Bunce, & Shevrin (2001) recorded the participants’ event-
related potential (ERPs) recordings in response to passively viewing words 
presented either at a subliminal duration of 1 ms (although unmasked), or in 
another condition, at a supraliminal duration of 40 ms (unmasked). Unpleasant 
words produced a larger amplitude than the pleasant words in the left hemisphere 
(known to be involved in language processing) in both the subliminal and 
supraliminal conditions.  
Although these findings might suggest both the preferential unconscious 
processing in addition to access to awareness for negative words, there are two 
caveats: Firstly, as the words were not masked, they were in fact available for 
visual processing for longer than their presentation duration due to the effects of 
visual persistence and iconic memory. Secondly, participants were asked to 
complete emotional ratings of the words every day over 28 days before the 
experiment. This is likely to have made the participants more primed towards the 
particular words used. However, although it may have sensitized the participants to 
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the specific words used, this priming should be similar for both the positive and 
negative words (as the words from both valences were rated prior to the 
experiment) and thus cannot explain the advantage found for the negative words 
over the positive words. In other words, the lack of masking and potential priming 
effects challenge the claim that the words were unconscious, but do not challenge 
the finding of the preferential processing of negative words.  
More convincing evidence suggestive of the unconscious effect of negative 
words comes from a study conducted by Silvert, Delplanque, Bouwalerh, Verpoort, 
& Sequeira (2004). Silvert et al. (2004) presented the words for 150 ms followed 
by a mask (supraliminal condition), or at a brief presentation duration (12 ms – 41 
ms) also masked. Presentation duration of the word in the subliminal condition was 
individually determined for each participant to satisfy the following criteria: 1) 
identification of the word was absent, 2) affective categorization of the word was at 
chance level (50%), 3) confidence ratings for correct and incorrect responses did 
not differ, and 4) the detection rates did not differ between negative and neutral 
words. Skin conductance responses (SCRs) were greater in response to negative 
words as compared to neutral words in general, as well as in the subliminal and 
supraliminal sessions when analyzed separately, reflecting similar reactions to 
aversive stimuli when the conscious identification of the stimulus is both present 
and absent (see Figure 1.1). It is not evident, however, whether the results show a 
general emotional response or if there is an advantage for negative words 
specifically, because there were no positive words to make such a comparison. 
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Figure 1.1: Mean SCRs to negative and neutral words in masked and unmasked 
presentation conditions (Silvert et al., 2004). 
 
 
In a study that involved intracranial recordings of the amygdala of epileptic 
patients, Naccache, Gallaird, Adam, Hasboun, Clemenceau, Baulac, Dehaene, & 
Cohen (2005) found compelling evidence for the advantage in unconscious 
perception of negative words over neutral words. The patients were required to 
make forced-choices for whether briefly-presented words (29 ms) were threatening 
or non-threatening. In the subliminal condition, the word was preceded and 
followed by a mask presented at a duration of 71 ms. In the visible condition, the 
post-mask was removed. Amygdala recordings revealed a large subliminal 
influence of emotional content in all patients as shown by a more positive response 
(however, in 5 of the 10 electrodes). The difference between negative and neutral 
words peaked at approximately 870 ms after word onset, which seems relatively 
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late, but still occurred much earlier than the motor response, and could be due to 
the necessary semantic processing stages before extraction of emotional meaning 
such as word recognition. It is important to note that both objective (null d’) and 
subjective (no explicit recognition of any masked word) measures of consciousness 
showed that the participants were unaware of the words.   
 
1.2.2 ‘Low road’ versus ‘high road’ 
 Taken together these results suggest that under conditions where conscious 
awareness of the words is absent, the emotional content of the words is still 
processed at some level (such as the amygdala) thus producing a physiological 
response. These findings are not surprising, especially if considered within the 
theoretical framework of the role of the amygdala in the processing of emotion in 
the brain put forward by LeDoux (1996). According to his work, there are two 
main pathways leading to the amygdala: the ‘high road’ or the ‘low road’. 
Emotional stimuli that go through the ‘high road’, in other words that are 
conscious, are first processed in the sensory thalamus, and from there are projected 
onto the sensory cortex for further, more detailed processing. Once the fine-tuned 
processing of the stimuli has occurred in the sensory cortex, the information is then 
sent to the amygdala, which then feedbacks into several other regions such as those 
responsible for autonomic regulation, resulting in an emotional response if the 
stimulus was an emotional one.  
At times, however, the organism does not have enough information from 
the stimulus (i.e. lack of awareness of the stimulus) or enough time before potential 
harm can occur to process it in such detail, and therefore the processing of the 
stimulus goes through the ‘quick and dirty’ route (i.e. the low road). Following this 
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route, information about the stimulus is relayed into the sensory thalamus where it 
is only superficially evaluated, and from there it is immediately projected into the 
amygdala. This route takes around 12 ms as opposed to around 30 – 40 ms for the 
‘high road’. If the stimulus is linked to or has an emotional component to it, the 
amygdala will then transmit the information to the relevant areas to produce an 
appropriate emotional response. A simplified model of the pathways involved in 
the processing of conscious and unconscious emotional stimuli is presented in 
Figure 1.2. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Illustration of LeDoux’s model.  
 
Although prefrontal areas do mediate the amygdala response at a later 
stage, it appears that full conscious awareness of the stimuli is not necessary for 
their emotional content to be perceived and thus produce a corresponding response. 
Previous findings of related brain activity as well as an increased physiological 
response to unconsciously-presented emotional and more specifically negative 
stimuli can be explained by this model. One can also extend this model further to 
explain resulting behavioural differences between negative and neutral stimuli – 
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the subsequent cognitive and emotional responses to unconscious negative 
information may in turn influence performance in terms of response times and 
accuracies in detecting threatening stimuli.  
Furthermore, cognitive-emotional interactions in the brain exist so that just 
as the amygdala receives input from the cortical sensory processing areas of the 
sensory modalities, so does it project back into those areas thus influencing the 
sensory processing occurring in these cortical regions (LeDoux, 2000). This 
amygdala regulation of the sensory cortex can consequently facilitate the 
processing of significant stimuli that signal danger even if those stimuli occur 
outside of the focus of attention.     
 
To summarize, studies have established that negative words (compared to 
positive or neutral words) are preferentially processed even in the absence of 
awareness. Previous research in this area supports LeDoux’s (1996) model that 
proposes a fast route for unconscious negative information into the amygdala as 
supported by findings of a larger amygdala response from intracranial recording. 
This results in the production of an emotional response (i.e. increased SCRs). 
Altogether these findings provide evidence of an unconscious processing of the 
negative information. 
 
1.2.3 Identification and affective categorization of words 
Behavioural evidence of facilitated processing of unconsciously-presented 
negative words that complement nicely the neural evidence found for the 
unconscious processing of negative words observed in the Naccache et al. (2005) 
study was provided by Gaillard, Del Cul, Naccache, Vinckier, Cohen, & Dehaene 
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(2006). In their experiment, participants were presented with a masked negative or 
neutral word for 33 ms, but the stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) duration between 
the word and the subsequent backward mask varied between five conditions from 
low conscious perception to high conscious perception (SOA = 33 ms, 50 ms, 67 
ms, 83 ms, or 100 ms respectively). The task was simply to attempt to name all the 
words and rate how visible each word was after each presentation.  
Negative words were both more accurately identified and rated as more 
visible compared to neutral words. Indeed, the visibility ratings of the words were 
similar to that of previously seen words. Estimating the threshold for conscious 
access from both the subjective and objective data gave a mean threshold of around 
33 ms. A final analysis of the experiment was made for error rates, and it was 
found that 32.5% of participants’ errors were made for the negative words, as 
opposed to 67.5% for the neutral words. Interestingly, participants made 
significantly more emotional error responses when the word was actually 
emotional than when it was neutral, suggesting that some information about the 
word’s semantic content was processed.  
However, it is not clear whether the results obtained were due to the 
emotionality of the words in general or their negativity per se, seeing that, again, 
there were no positive words to explore this issue further. Moreover, the negative 
words could have consisted of a more cohesive category than the neutral words, 
which could have led to more inter-trial semantic priming in the negative case. 
One study investigated the issue of perception of emotion in general using a 
forced-choice recognition task. Zeelenberg, Wagenmakers, & Rotteveel (2006) 
presented participants with a target word (either negative, neutral, or positive), 
followed by a backward mask, and then two words side by side, one of which was 
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the test word, and the other a foil. The presentation time of the target word was 
individually determined at the beginning of the experiment to produce 70% correct 
performance. This resulted in a mean target presentation time of 26 ms. The task 
was to indicate which of the two words was the previously-presented target word 
(see Figure 1.3).  
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Example of trial sequence of task used in Zeelenberg et al. (2006). 
 
 
Results showed that participants correctly identified negative (M = 75%) 
and positive words (M = 75%) more often than neutral words (M = 70%), 
irrespective of foil valence (negative, neutral, or positive), with no significant 
difference between the identification rates of negative and positive words. These 
results indicate that there was enhanced processing of emotional stimuli. However, 
Zeelenberg et al. (2006) failed to find an advantage for negative over positive 
words. In addition, a potential problem in interpreting these results is that because 
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the target word was presented again immediately afterwards, backward priming 
may have occurred. Furthermore, the emotional words may have formed a more 
cohesive category than the neutral words, which may have affected the results.  
An advantage for the detection of negative over positive words has been 
found in Dijksterhuis & Aarts (2003). In this study, they compared the 
presence/absence detection for negative versus positive words, presented for 13.3 
ms masked, on 50% of the trials. The absent trials remained blank in the 13.3 ms 
window. Negative words had higher detection rates as well as (in another 
experiment) more accurate emotional classification compared to positive words.  
The study by Dijksterhuis & Aarts (2003), however, is subjected to some 
criticism. The absence of neutral words as well as having negative and positive 
words intermixed within the same blocks did not allow for the assessment of 
separate false alarm (FA) rates for each word category. Therefore, analyses of 
sensitivity (signal detection) as well as of response criterion could not be 
performed (see also commentary in Labiouse, 2004). It is not clear, therefore, 
whether the advantage found reflected merely a response bias. These are issues that 
will be addressed in the present thesis.  
Snodgrass & Harring (2005) did measure the detection of emotional words 
in a task requiring participants to identify brief masked stimuli as words or random 
letter strings. Positive and negative words were presented in separate blocks. 
Somewhat surprisingly, results showed better sensitivity (measured by d’ scores) to 
positive than to negative words. No analysis of whether this sensitivity difference 
was accompanied by a difference in response bias was reported.  
The discrepancies between the results of the three studies mentioned above, 
despite their use of similar measures, may be due to their use of small word sets. 
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Dijksterhuis and Aarts (2003) used only fifteen words of each valence; Snodgrass 
and Harring (2005) used only fourteen and  Zeelenberg et al., (2006) used only 
sixteen words in each condition. Such small sets are more open to sampling biases 
such as one of the word categories forming more cohesive categories.  
Moreover, valence ratings in these studies were obtained either from 
separate pilot studies or published databases. Individual, idiosyncratic differences 
in valence attribution may therefore have either biased the results or reduced the 
experimental power to find an effect (e.g. in the case of Zeelenberg et al., 2006). 
Finally, arousal ratings of the words were not assessed in these studies. Thus 
differences in arousal between the valence categories used in the different studies 
may have thus accounted for the difference in the results.   
 
In summary, in addition to research on the effects of word valence on 
awareness showing that emotional words seem to produce a larger physiological 
response, previous research has shown that emotional words are more accurately 
identified than neutral words. Furthermore, enhanced detection as shown by greater 
hit rates for negative words compared to positive words has also been demonstrated 
(although this may merely reflect a response bias as there was no assessment of 
detection sensitivity). Clearly, the question of whether negative information has a 
detection sensitivity advantage remains unclear. Testing this was the first aim of 
the present thesis.  
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1.3 Emotional valence and attention 
 
Another aim of the present thesis was to address the role of attention in the 
detection sensitivity to emotional valence. Next I review studies that have 
investigated the preferential processing of negative information in attention.  
 
1.3.1 Research on spatial attention 
The enhanced capture of attention by negative words as well as their ability 
to engage focus of attention has been investigated by the attentional cueing 
paradigm. For example, in the dot probe task, participants are presented with a pair 
of stimuli, one of which is threatening, and the other neutral. Participants have to 
respond to a dot probe that is displayed after stimulus offset at one of the stimulus’s 
locations. Generally, it is expected that participants will respond faster when their 
attention is focused on the location where the probe will appear, and slower when 
attention is engaged elsewhere. The latter is often termed disengagement cost. As 
my review shows, many studies report that negative emotional processing causes 
such a disengagement cost.  
In a spatial cueing paradigm, Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton (2001) 
presented participants with a threatening, neutral, or positive word as a cue at one 
of two locations (left or right box), followed by a target circle on one of the sides 
(Figure 1.4). Responses were slower following a threat word compared to a neutral 
or positive word when the target circle appeared on the opposite side of the word. 
These results suggest that it might be difficult to disengage attention from 
threatening information. 
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Figure 1.4: Example of the spatial cueing task used in Fox et al. (2001). 
 
Many of the studies that have used probing paradigms in the study of 
attention to emotion have used non-word stimuli such as pictures or faces and are 
therefore less directly relevant to this thesis. Nevertheless, evidence for a difficulty 
in disengaging from threat has been shown in these studies (e.g. Koster et a., 2004; 
Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2006).  
 
1.3.2 Other selective attention tasks 
Further support for the privileged processing of emotionally negative words 
comes from evidence of interference from negative words even when they are 
deliberately ignored. Many studies have shown this interference effect using only 
negative and neutral words (without comparing negative to positive words), and 
therefore one can only infer a general emotionality effect rather than a specific 
negative valence advantage over positive valence. 
 29 
For example, Harris & Pashler (2004) investigated the issue of greater 
interference from negative unattended words using the digit-parity task. This task 
involved a brief (150 ms) and unmasked presentation of a word flanked by two 
digits. The participants had to indicate whether or not the digits were of the same 
parity (both odd, both even, or one of each) while ignoring the fixated word. Parity 
task response times (RTs) were longer both for negatively-charged words and for 
the participant’s name (compared to random neutral words) when they were 
presented infrequently among other neutral words, but this interference effect 
rapidly diminished when these words were presented more often. In addition, the 
interference by negative words was smaller than that by the participant’s name. 
Selective attention to unattended negative compared to positive words has 
been shown in a different study using a lexical decision task (Calvo & Castillo, 
2005). Participants were presented with a probe word that was either threat-related, 
positive, or neutral. The probe was preceded by a prime presented either to the 
right or left visual field that was identical or different to the probe. It was found 
that the processing of the probe was significantly facilitated (as shown by a 
reduction in lexical decision times) when the prime was threat-related, but not 
when it was positive or neutral. This finding reveals that threat words were more 
likely to capture attention in a parafoveal location and be semantically processed, 
thus leading to a priming effect.  
 
1.3.3 The emotional Stroop task 
A widely-used paradigm to investigate the attentional bias to emotion is the 
emotional Stroop, whereby participants name the colour of an emotional or neutral 
word while ignoring the content of the word itself. Much research has investigated 
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the attentional bias to negative information using the emotional Stroop (e.g. in 
children: Perez-Edgar & Fox, 2003; and in individuals with high trait anger in 
response to angry versus neutral faces: van Honk, Tuiten, de Haan, Van den Hout, 
& Stam, 2001). For the sake of relevance, only studies that have been conducted on 
normal adults using verbal stimuli will be reviewed. 
In one study using the emotional Stroop, greater interference (as shown by 
longer response latencies) from unpleasant words compared to neutral words was 
found with no difference between the response latencies of the pleasant and neutral 
words (White, 1996). However, this was only observed when the words were at 
fixation and not when they were spatially unattended (e.g. presented above 
fixation; see Figure 1.5). These findings suggest that negative valence does not 
necessarily capture spatial attention at a preattentive stage; rather the negative 
valence of words holds attention once the semantic properties are encoded. This 
conclusion is consistent with the disengagement cost found for negative 
information in the dot-probe paradigm. 
 
Figure 1.5: Example of a modified version of the emotional Stroop task (White, 
1996). 
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Interestingly, greater interference from negative compared to neutral words 
in the emotional Stroop task has been found even when the words were presented 
in Spanish-English bilingual speakers’ second language (Sutton, Altarriba, Gianico, 
& Basnight-Brown, 2007). Though the bilinguals in this study were highly 
proficient, demonstrating equal interference effects in both their first and second 
language provides compelling evidence of the automatic activation of the 
emotional component in words.  
As mentioned previously, only conclusions related to a general emotionality 
effect can be derived from studies that have compared negative versus neutral 
words. More relevant to this thesis are studies that have addressed the comparison 
between the negative and positive valence. For example, Gilboa-Schechtman, 
Revelle, & Gotlib, (2000) found Stroop-interference from negative words when 
participants participated in the negative mood-induction phase, whereas 
interference was found from positive words when participants were subjected to the 
positive mood-induction phase. Moreover, personally-relevant words produced 
greater interference than concern-irrelevant words. The results of this study 
therefore showed a mood-congruent attentional bias; the negative bias was only 
found when a negative mood was induced. 
Borkenau & Mauer (2006), on the other hand, obtained the longest colour-
naming latencies for pleasant words, medium response latencies from unpleasant 
words, and the shortest latencies for neutral words. However, hemispheric 
differences appeared such that unpleasant words produced longer response 
latencies compared to pleasant words when words were presented to the right 
hemisphere (or left visual field) whereas the latencies in response to the pleasant 
words were longer than unpleasant words when words were presented to the left 
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hemisphere (or right visual field). These findings suggest that, although no clear 
attentional bias to negative words was observed in terms of overall response 
latencies, a right hemisphere bias in the processing of negative words was found. 
Contrary to the findings of Borkenau & Mauer (2006), McKenna & Sharma 
(1995) found that response latencies to name the colour of the word were slower to 
negative words, compared to positive and neutral words, with no RT difference 
between the positive and neutral words. Subsequent measures of implicit (with a 
stem-completion task) and explicit memory (with a recognition task) revealed that 
the advantage found for negative words was restricted to RT findings. 
Further evidence of interference from negative words was also obtained in a 
study by Pratto & John (1991). In their study they presented participants with a 
word that was either a desirable (positive) or an undesirable (negative) trait and 
instructed them to name the colour of the word. Results showed slower responses 
to the undesirable traits compared to the desirable traits indicating an automatic 
vigilance to negative social information compared to positive information. In 
addition, this attentional bias to negative information increased subsequent memory 
for these traits as recall memory was enhanced for the undesirable traits as opposed 
to the desirable traits.  
 
 In summary, research on attention and emotion has shown that negative 
words appear to cue attention and make it difficult to shift attention away from 
them. In addition, despite a few failures from the emotional Stroop task in normal 
populations, previous research has provided evidence for greater interference from 
negative words even when deliberately ignored as shown by measures of response 
latencies. 
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1.3.4 Attentional blink and negative emotion 
Another widely used paradigm used to study the attention-grabbing powers 
of emotional words is Attentional Blink (AB) paradigm (see Figure 1.6). In the AB 
task, participants are usually presented with stimuli in a rapid serial visual 
presentation (RSVP) where they are required to detect two targets in the stream. It 
is usually found that the detection of a second stimulus is impaired after reporting 
the first one successfully when the second target is presented only a short interval 
(less than 500 ms) after the first target – what is known as the attentional blink 
(AB; Kawahara, Di Lollo, & Enns, 2001; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992; 
Shapiro, Raymond, & Arnell, 1997). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Example of an RSVP task used in AB studies (Arnell, Killman, & 
Fijavz, 2007). 
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A reduced AB effect for negative words was observed, for example, in a 
study conducted by Anderson & Phelps (2001). When participants were required to 
identify the two green targets in an RSVP task, healthy participants were better 
able to identify the second target when it was a negative compared to a neutral 
word, in line with previous findings. But as positive words were not included in 
this study, the results only reflect a general emotional advantage over neutral words 
and not a negative advantage specifically. The remainder of this section will 
therefore focus mainly on comparisons between negative and positive words. 
Ogawa & Suzuki (2004) provided further evidence for the preferential 
processing of negative stimuli using the AB paradigm. In their paradigm, they 
presented Chinese ideographs to Chinese participants and found that detection of 
presence or absence of the second target (defined by its colour) in the stream was 
impaired for both positive and neutral target ideographs presented shortly after the 
first target (i.e. within the ‘blink’), but no impairment in detection was found for 
negative ideograph targets (see Figure 1.7), suggesting that negative verbal 
information is more likely to capture attention and be available for conscious report 
than positive or neutral information. Furthermore, the lowest false alarm (FA) rates 
were found for the negative targets, suggesting that the higher detection rates could 
not be attributed to a response bias. In addition, a negative first target led to an AB 
for all valence types of the second target (neutral, positive, and negative) indicating 
that negative information engages attention for a longer period of time than 
positive or neutral information, thus leading to a reduced ability to process 
subsequent information presented shortly afterwards. 
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Figure 1.7: Mean proportions of correct responses in study by Ogawa & Suzuki (2004) as a 
function of target 2 (T2) position. Dotted line with square: Neutral-control; solid line with square 
neutral-experimental; dotted line with triangle positive-control; solid line with triangle positive-
experimental; dotted line with circle negative-control; solid line with circle negative-experimental. 
 
 
Kihara & Osaka (2008) compared the processing of negative and positive 
words in an RSVP task and found further support for a reduced AB for negative 
words but not for positive or neutral words. Furthermore, negative words were not 
only less affected by an AB, but they were also found to grab attentional resources 
thus interfering with the identification of a neutral subsequent target. An enhanced 
AB effect to a negative second target was also found when the first target was a 
negative word, suggesting that the conscious detection of negative information 
requires the availability of attentional resources.        
It seems that semantic processing of the words is required for the negative 
words to capture attention (Huang, Baddeley, & Young, 2008). In their study, 
participants viewed an RSVP task that included a distractor word (neutral or 
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negative) followed by a target word (type of fruit). Emotionality of the distractor 
word impaired the detection of the target when participants were required to 
process the words semantically (i.e. identify the fruit). When superficial 
(identification of the uppercase word) or grammatical (identification of word that 
rhymes with ‘pear’) processing of the words were required, negative words were 
not found to result in an enhanced AB effect. 
 
Overall, evidence from AB studies reveals that negative words, when 
semantically processed, can escape the attentional blink indicating that negative 
information may be perceived under conditions where high demands are placed on 
attention. Further evidence of the processing of emotion even when unattended 
comes from neuroscientific evidence reviewed below. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
1.3.5 Neuroscientific evidence 
Negative information has been shown to enjoy preferential access to 
processing resources (as indicated by its ability to escape the attentional blink). The 
amygdala has been shown to be necessary for the reduced AB effect for negative 
emotion to emerge. In the study by Anderson & Phelps (2001) which showed a 
reduced AB effect for negative words compared to neutral words in an RSVP task, 
a patient with bilateral damage to the amygdala did not show an advantage in the 
processing of aversive words as usually shown by a reduced AB (but showed 
normal AB results from early relative to later temporal lags). Further comparisons 
with patients with right or left lesions to the amygdala revealed that the enhanced 
perception of negatively valenced words depends mainly on the left amygdala. 
Thus the amygdala appears to play a crucial role in the processing of emotion.  
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Although no behavioural evidence of differences in RTs between threat and 
non-threat words was found in their study, Thomas, Johnstone, & Gonsalvez 
(2007) provided evidence from event-related potentials (ERP) for the preferential 
processing of negative words. Greater ERP amplitudes were found in response to 
threat words (compared to non-threat words) in the emotional Stroop task (see 
Figure 1.8). Threat words were also associated with greater right than left 
hemisphere amplitude as well as greater amplitude compared to neutral words in 
the right hemisphere. These findings provide direct evidence that threat was 
differentially processed even when it fails to affect RT. 
 
 
Figure 1.8: Average ERP waveforms to threat and neutral words in the word-
relevant and colour-relevant tasks (Thomas et al., 2007). 
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Implications for a relationship between emotion and brain activity can be 
drawn from the findings of the studies mentioned earlier. But as only negative and 
neutral words were used without any comparisons with positive words, one cannot 
conclude whether the neuroscientific evidence found in response to negative words 
in the emotional Stroop task by Thomas et a., (2007) and in the lesion study by 
Anderson & Phelps (2001) reflect a negative valence advantage per se or a general 
emotional advantage.  
In a recent ERP study that did present participants with negative, positive, 
and neutral words, Franken, Gootjes, & van Strien (2009) found an early, 
differential brain response to emotional words, namely the early posterior 
negativity (EPN) component – a component that has been shown to be modulated 
by emotional pictorial stimuli. The EPN response was present for both pleasant and 
unpleasant words. However, this finding did not affect the Stroop interference. 
Instead, the Stroop interference was associated with a later component (the late 
positive potential (LPP)) that reflects sustained emotional attention, as unpleasant 
words yielded a larger LPP compared to neutral words. In contrast, pleasant words 
showed no significant difference in LPP in comparison with neutral words. These 
results concur with the conclusion that negative emotion effects on Stroop may 
reflect a slow disengagement process (rather than an automatic bias). 
 
In summary, neuroscientific evidence revealed a significant role of the 
amygdala in the enhanced perception of emotion as well the differential processing 
of negative words even when they are unattended (as shown by greater ERP 
amplitudes in response to negative words compared to neutral words as well as 
larger later ERP components involved sustained attention for negative words). 
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1.4 Automatic vigilance to threat in anxiety 
 
Research on the perception and detection of emotion reviewed thus far has 
been established in the general population with no analysis of potential effects of 
individual differences in the processing of emotion. Individual differences in the 
way people attend to emotional stimuli, such as anxiety, have in fact been found 
(Yiend, 2010). The role of anxiety in the detection of emotional valence is 
addressed in Chapter 4. 
Anxiety is a psychological and physiological state characterized by several 
somatic, emotional, cognitive, and behavioural symptoms. Some of the 
physiological responses in anxiety are increased heart rate, deeper breathing, 
perspiration, and the secretion of adrenalin, among many others. Anxiety is also 
accompanied by emotional and cognitive symptoms such as having a sense of 
dread, restlessness and irritability, as well as the anticipation and exaggeration of 
danger and future-oriented worrisome thoughts. Behavioural responses to anxiety 
and potential danger are escape, avoidance, freezing, or aggression (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2004).  
These components typically result in anxiety being an unpleasant state. 
Although it is crucial for one’s survival to be able to efficiently detect danger, 
anxious individuals possess a hypervigilant threat detection system and seem to 
exaggerate the frequency and severity of potentially threatening situations 
(Eysenck, 1992).  
Studies investigating the issue of a hypervigilance to threat in anxiety have 
been conducted over many years. It is a well-established finding that individuals 
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with clinical or high trait anxiety show an attentional bias towards threatening 
information (for a review see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, 
& van IJzendoorn, 2007), even in children and adolescents (Dalgleish, Moradi, 
Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, & Yule, 2001). The present thesis focuses on effects of 
non-clinical anxiety on the processing of emotional information for two main 
reasons: one, clinical populations may show specific effects related to the disorder 
(such as phobia-specific effects) and therefore might not be generalizable to all 
populations; second, clinical populations may have a lower general functioning (i.e. 
greater difficulty performing the task) which therefore may affect the results in 
general. In the sake of relevance to the present thesis, I review only the studies that 
have been conducted on non-clinical populations investigating the role of anxiety 
in the preferential processing of negative information. 
Most of these studies concerned the interaction between anxiety and 
attention to emotional information. Only one study so far has directly addressed the 
effect of anxiety on emotional detection per se (Manguno-Mire, Constans, & Geer, 
2005). The task in their study was to classify words as either ‘safe’ or ‘dangerous’. 
The words were presented for either 14 ms and masked or for unlimited duration 
(until a response was made) and not masked. Responses were considered correct 
when negative words were classified as ‘dangerous’, and positive and neutral 
words as ‘safe’. The results showed that in the masked condition anxious 
participants had higher hit rates for threat words and non-anxious subjects had 
higher hit rates for neutral and positive words. In the non-masked (unlimited 
exposure) condition no differences were found.  
In order to assess whether this difference was due to anxious participants’ 
enhanced ability to detect threat or to a response bias, a signal detection analysis 
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was performed. Two detection sensitivity measures for the negative words were 
calculated – one for the detection of negative targets versus neutral distractors and 
another for the detection of negative targets versus positive distractors. Results 
showed that while the sensitivity measures to the negative words did not differ 
between the anxiety groups, high anxious individuals possessed a response bias to 
the detection of negative words (in other words to interpret ambiguous stimuli as 
threatening) compared to low anxious individuals. They concluded that individuals 
with high anxiety have a lower response criterion for categorizing unconscious 
stimuli as threatening rather than an increased ability to detect negative valence.  
I consider this study further in Chapter 4. For now I note that their results 
are confined to ‘safe’ versus ‘dangerous’ detection, whereas the present thesis 
considered a wider range of emotional connotations. Next I review the previous 
research on selective attention and processing of negative emotional information in 
anxiety. 
 
1.4.1 Evidence from spatial cueing paradigms 
Evidence exists suggesting that the attentional bias in anxiety reflects 
problems with disengaging from threatening material. This is reflected by faster 
responses to detecting a probe appearing in the same location of a threatening 
stimulus in the dot probe paradigm (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). Many studies 
that have investigated this attentional bias in anxiety with probing paradigms have 
not used verbal stimuli, but instead have used faces (e.g. Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 
2000; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000) or pictures (e.g. Yiend & Mathews, 2001). 
Although some will be described briefly in the next section as they indicate 
differences in anxiety on the processing of emotion, it is important to note that any 
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conclusion from studies using pictures or faces cannot be directly applied to the 
processing of words.  
In line with previous findings supporting an attentional bias to threat, 
Koster et al. (2004), for example, found that responses were faster when probes 
appeared at the location of previously-presented threatening pictures. This was 
found in all individuals, but the attentional bias increased with higher anxiety. In 
another pictorial dot-probe study using high-threat, moderate-threat, and neutral 
pictures, Koster et al. (2006) found that not only did individuals with high-trait 
anxiety (HTA) have increased attentional bias scores to all threatening information 
in general, but they also oriented significantly more to moderate threat pictures 
than low-trait anxiety (LTA) participants. LTA participants indicated some 
orientation towards high threat pictures, and significant avoidance to moderate 
threat. Considering the significance of being able to attend to extremely threatening 
information, it is not surprising to find that even individuals with low anxiety orient 
towards high threat. 
Mogg, McNamara, Powys, Rawlinson, Seiffer, & Bradley (2000) also 
found that the low anxious group showed significantly greater vigilance for the 
high threat compared to the low threat pictures. In addition, their findings 
suggested an effect of threat value of the stimuli in terms of greater vigilance to 
high compared to mild threat that was found across all participants (both high and 
low trait anxiety groups). 
 Increased vigilance towards threatening faces has also been found in high 
anxiety compared to low anxiety (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998). In a 
dot-probe of threatening, happy, or neutral faces that were presented for one of two 
durations (500ms or 1250ms), the high trait anxious participants showed a greater 
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attentional orienting bias towards threatening faces and increased avoidance of 
happy faces than the low anxious participants. The degree of attentional orienting 
bias was correlated with trait anxiety measures, whereas no relation between 
avoidance of happy faces and trait anxiety was found once measures of depression 
were partialed out, implying that avoidance of happy faces might be linked to the 
presence of dysphoria rather than to anxiety. The attentional bias to threatening 
faces in high anxiety was more robust in the shorter compared to the longer 
duration, suggesting that the increased vigilance towards threat in anxiety seems to 
operate mainly at the initial stages of processing. Though this study compared 
negative versus positive stimuli, one cannot conclude with certainty whether these 
findings obtained in response to faces would extend to verbal processing. 
Dot-probe studies using word stimuli have been conducted and have found 
further support both for the suggestion of an increased vigilance towards negative 
information and for the suggestion of a difficulty in disengaging from negative 
words. For example, MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata (1986) provided evidence for the 
first suggestion showing a shift of attention towards threat words versus neutral 
words in anxious participants compared to controls. In their probing paradigm, one 
word was presented above and one below the centre. Participants had to name the 
upper word and then respond to the dot-probe as quickly as possible. Results 
showed that anxious individuals were faster to respond to the dot when it appeared 
in the place of a threat word compared to a neutral word, whereas controls showed 
a pattern of shifting attention away from such stimuli as revealed by faster 
responses to the dot when the threat word was in the opposite location. 
The findings from a similar dot-probe study by Salemink, Van den Hout, & 
Kindt (2007) supported the disengagement cost hypothesis. Their results showed 
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that high anxious participants were slower in responding to the probe when the 
probes appeared at the location of the previously-presented neutral word when the 
word was accompanied by a threatening compared to a neutral word. However, 
given that only negative and neutral words were presented in these two studies, the 
conclusions remain linked to emotional valence in general. 
The attentional bias in anxiety to negative versus positive valence in words 
was investigated by Fox et al. (2001). As described earlier in the General 
Introduction, participants in general were slower following a threat word compared 
to a neutral or positive word when the target circle appeared on the opposite side of 
the word. When the word was presented at fixation followed by a target letter either 
above or below it, only high state-anxious participants as opposed to low state-
anxious participants revealed longer RTs to naming the letter when the word was 
threatening compared to when it was neutral or positive. 
 
To summarize, research from spatial cueing paradigms have shown that 
high anxiety (compared to low anxiety) is associated with an increased vigilance 
towards threatening pictures and faces. Evidence for greater engagement of 
attention as well as faster shift of attention towards negative words in high versus 
low anxiety has also been provided within dot-probe studies. Some of these 
conclusions have been drawn from paradigms where the participants attended to 
the stimuli. The next section will address research on individual differences in 
anxiety levels in the processing of negative words when their content is ignored. 
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1.4.2 Findings from the emotional Stroop  
A large body of research using the emotional Stroop task has shown 
pronounced interference from negative words in highly-anxious and clinical 
populations (e.g. those with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; for a review see 
Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996), as well as individuals with anxiety-
sensitivity (the tendency to fear and catatrophize anxiety-related sensations; Koven, 
Heller, Banich, & Miller, 2003). Responses to threat versus non-threat words (both 
positive and neutral) were also found to be longer for anxious participants with 
Generalized Anxiety compared to controls, with no differences between the 
positive and neutral words (Mathews, Mogg, Kentish, & Eysenck, 1995). This 
cognitive bias appears to show disorder-specific characteristics, for example while 
individuals with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) showed greater slowing of 
responses to all emotional words, Social Phobics (SP) showed greater interference 
to SP-related words specifically (Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001).  
More relevant to this thesis are findings related to the automatic processing 
of negative words in individuals with high trait-anxiety. Studies that have focused 
on non-clinical differences in anxiety will be reviewed next.  
Richards, French, Johnson, Naparstek, & Williams (1992) found that it took 
longer for participants with high trait anxiety to name the colour of anxiety-related 
words compared to happiness-related words. In addition, trait anxiety was 
positively correlated with the anxiety-related difference index (the difference in RT 
between anxiety-related words and matched neutral words).  
Similarly, significant differences in colour-naming response times were 
found between threat words (physical and social) and positive words for anxious 
individuals whereas no such differences emerged for controls (Mathews & 
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MacLeod, 1985). Interestingly, all participants showed interference from social 
threat words, whereas only those more concerned with physical worries showed 
equal disruption from physical threat words indicating an effect of concern-
relevance of the words on Stroop interference. 
Further evidence from the Emotional Stroop task revealed that individuals 
with high trait anxiety showed increased colour naming latencies for threat words 
(such as exam-related negative words) relative to non-threat words (that also 
included exam-related positive words) under unconscious conditions where the 
word was replaced by a mask after 20 ms. In addition, an opposite effect was found 
for low trait anxiety participants, demonstrating an increased ability to avoid 
threatening information. Under conscious conditions (i.e. word was presented until 
response), increased state anxiety was associated with faster responses to 
threatening words related to exams for both high and low anxiety subjects, and 
with increased interference from threatening compared to unthreatening exam-
unrelated material. High and low trait anxiety seem also to work in an opposite 
manner at a preconscious level, with high anxiety being associated with greater 
disruption from threatening information and the latter being associated with 
avoidance of threatening information (MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992). It is not 
clear, however, whether these findings would extend to general emotional 
information. 
Another colour-naming task tested these effects with words that, although 
were relevant to the participants’ concerns, encompassed more general emotional 
connotations. Anxious, depressed, and control participants were presented with 
anxiety-related, depression-related, positive, or neutral words on a background 
patch of colour and were required to name the colour of the background (Mogg, 
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Bradley, Williams, & Mathews, 1993). Words were presented either subliminally 
(for 1 ms followed by backward masked after 14ms), or supraliminally (until 
response with no mask). Awareness checks including a lexical decision task and a 
detection task confirmed that participants were unaware of the stimuli in the 
subliminal condition as shown by chance-level performance. Results showed 
increased colour naming latencies for negative words in anxious participants 
compared to depressed and control participants under both exposure conditions 
(see Figure 1.9), supporting the idea of a bias for negative information in anxiety. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.9: Mean interference scores for negative words in each group and 
exposure duration (Mogg et al., 1993). 
 
Similar interference from threatening compared to neutral words for 
participants with high anxiety (in contrast with the low anxious participants) was 
found in both the traditional and a separated troop task (Fox, 1993). Given that the 
separated Stroop involved presenting the words above or below the colour patch, 
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these findings suggest that individuals with high trait anxiety show increased 
distraction by unattended negative information outside the focus of attention. 
Interestingly, high anxious participants also showed greater distraction by colour 
words whereas the low anxious participants did not, suggesting that individuals 
with high anxiety might have a general difficulty maintaining attentional focus and 
ignoring irrelevant distractors. 
Further evidence of greater distraction by unattended negative words comes 
from a study by Mathews, May, Mogg, & Eysenck (1990). In a visual search task, 
participants were required to search for the words ‘left’ or ‘right’ as fast as 
possible. The location of the word was cued by fixation crosses in some trials and 
the target word was accompanied by a distractor word that was either physically-
threatening (e.g. crippled), socially-threatening (e.g. ashamed), positive (e.g. 
generous), or neutral (e.g. horizon). No significant differences were found between 
the positive and neutral words and so both types of words were combined into one 
‘non-threatening’ category. Similarly, responses to the physically-threatening and 
socially-threatening were combined into one ‘threatening’ category. Results 
showed that anxious and recovered participants were slower than controls when 
they were required to search for the target word among threatening distractors. 
Interestingly, only anxious individuals were slower than controls in response to the 
target word when it was accompanied by a distractor word of any type, possibly 
reflecting a general distractibility in anxiety disorders as also suggested by the 
findings in the study by Fox (1993). 
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1.4.3 Attentional blink 
Negative information has also been shown to have preferential access to 
processing resources in an AB study (Fox, Russo, & Georgiou, 2005). Participants 
were required to categorize a first picture T1 that was either mushrooms or flowers 
and a second target T2 that was either a happy or fearful face embedded in an 
RSVP stream of neutral faces. Two main findings were revealed: firstly, an AB 
effect occurred for the fearful faces even for the high state and trait anxiety group, 
producing further evidence that the processing of emotion is not automatic. 
Secondly, although still present, the degree of the AB to the fearful faces was 
attenuated for the high anxiety group, supporting the suggestion that anxiety is 
related to a hypervigilance of the fear-detection system. 
The study by Fox et al. (2005) suggests that threatening stimuli are better 
detected than positive or neutral stimuli. However, given that their results are based 
on the processing of facial expressions which may differ from those of verbal 
information, they are not directly relevant to the present thesis.  
 
In summary, one study has claimed that individuals with high trait anxiety 
possess a response bias to interpreting information as threatening rather than an 
enhanced detection sensitivity to negative words. Other research has demonstrated 
greater interference from negative words in colour-naming tasks (i.e. the emotional 
Stroop), a slowing of responses by negative distractors in individuals with high 
compared to low anxiety, and a reduced AB for fearful faces. Given that previous 
research has indicated that the processing of emotional information may be less 
modulated by attention in individuals with high anxiety levels, the effects of 
anxiety on attention in general will be reviewed next.  
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1.4.4 Anxiety and attentional capacity 
As some of the previously-mentioned studies indicated (e.g. Fox, 1993; 
Mathews et al., 1990), impaired attentional control in anxiety seems to extend to 
general processing and is not restricted to emotional processing per se. 
Considerable evidence for decreased cognitive performance in anxiety indeed has 
been provided (for a review see Eysenck, 1992). A recent and promising theory is 
the Attentional Control theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), 
which is developed from the Processing Efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 
1992). 
According to the Processing Efficiency theory, elevated anxiety does not 
predict decreased performance per se, rather reduced processing efficiency in terms 
of enhanced effort to perform the task adequately. It is assumed that anxious 
individuals are pre-occupied by task-irrelevant thoughts and worries that use up 
attentional resources, thus leaving fewer resources available for the processing of 
the current task. The crucial point is that these worrisome thoughts motivate such 
individuals to minimize the potential adverse effects of their intrusive thoughts on 
performance by utilizing additional processing resources. Processing efficiency is 
thus affected to a greater extent than performance effectiveness. Specifically, 
anxiety is assumed to primarily affect the central executive and to also have a small 
negative effect on the functioning of the phonological loop (involved in the 
rehearsal of verbal material). This assumption leads to the prediction that anxious 
individuals will show impaired performance in dual-task situations that place high 
demands on the central executive. 
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Research has supported this assumption (Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, 
2005). In this study, participants with either high or low anxiety performed the 
Corsi Blocks Test (a highly complex visuo-spatial task) as a primary task while 
performing a secondary task that involved the central executive (counting 
backwards from a two-digit number), the phonological loop (repeating the letters 
A, B, C, and D, out loud continuously), or the visuo-spatial sketchpad (tapping out 
a ‘z’ pattern on a tapping pad with their right index finger). When the secondary 
task involved the central executive, high anxious participants performed the 
primary task worse than the low anxious participants. Adverse effects of anxiety on 
performance of the secondary task were also observed when the task required the 
central executive. These findings imply that anxiety is related to a reduced capacity 
of the central executive. 
The Attentional Control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) suggests more 
specific effects of anxiety on control capacity. In the Attentional Control theory, 
anxiety affects performance through its adverse effects on a key function of the 
central executive – attentional control. Attentional control is defined as having two 
distinguishable processes: top-down goal driven or controlled processes, and 
bottom-up stimulus driven processes. According to the Attentional Control theory, 
anxiety disrupts the balance between those two systems by increasing the influence 
of bottom-up stimulus driven processes over those for efficient goal driven top-
down control. 
Functions that depend on the availability of working memory resources for 
efficient performance such as shifting and inhibition have been shown to be 
adversely affected by high anxiety (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). In one study 
examining the effect of anxiety on task-switching (Ansari, Derakshan, & Richards, 
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2008), participants performed antisaccade and prosaccade tasks in either a single-
task (separate blocks of antisaccade and prosaccade trials) or a mixed-task design 
(both tasks presented within the same block). In an antisaccade task, attentional 
control is exercised in order to suppress a reflexive saccade towards an abrupt 
stimulus and generate a volitional saccade to its mirror position, whereas in the 
prosaccade task, participants are required to look at the abrupt cue.  
Individuals are generally slower in making a correct saccade away from the 
stimulus in the antisaccade trials compared to the prosaccade trials where there is 
no competition between reflexive saccades and volitional responses. In the mixed-
task, participants are required to switch between antisaccade and prosaccade tasks 
and an improvement in antisaccade performance (i.e. reduction in antisaccade 
latencies) is generally found in the switching trials compared to repeat trials. 
Results of this study showed that high anxious participants showed no such 
improvement, contrary to low anxious participants who became significantly faster 
on antisaccade trials in the mixed-task blocks compared to the single-task block. In 
relation to the Attentional Control theory, these findings suggest that high anxious 
individuals have a reduced top-down attentional control for efficient shifting of 
attentional resources for the new task, implying a diminished working memory 
capacity.  
In addition to task-switching, high anxiety seems to also be linked to poor 
inhibitory functions. Introducing a delay before each of the antisaccade and 
prosaccade tasks showed that while the inhibition effect in the Delayed antisaccade 
and Delayed prosaccade tasks was present in both the high and low anxious groups, 
it was significantly greater in the high anxious group (Ansari & Derakshan, 2010; 
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see Figure 1.10 for trial displays). These findings suggest that inhibitory control 
and not volitional action generation is affected in anxiety. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.10: Example of experimental tasks used in Ansari & Derakshan (2010). 
 
 In summary, anxiety appears to be characterized by a reduced attentional 
capacity and processing efficiency as well as impaired attentional control. This has 
been implicated in tasks that involve executive control (e.g. in the case of 
distraction) and dual-task coordination. I note however that this reduced capacity is 
not manifested in all attentional tasks. Notice for example that the Fox et al. (2005) 
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study did not show a greater AB cost associated with anxiety. This point is 
discussed further in Chapter 4. 
 
1.4.5 Neuroscientific evidence 
Neuroscientific evidence provides support for the idea that individuals with 
high levels of anxiety have a general reduced attentional control in response to non-
emotional distractors. Bishop (2009) found that participants’ trait anxiety level was 
inversely associated with activity in prefrontal areas involved in attentional control, 
specifically in the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC), in response to 
incongruent (distractor letter N with target X or vice versa) versus congruent 
(distractor and target letters were the same) trials under low perceptual load 
conditions. More specifically, low trait anxiety was associated with increased 
DLPFC activity in the low load conditions. It seems, therefore, that the effect of 
anxiety on cognitive performance (i.e. reduced attentional capacity) is modulated 
by the level of perceptual load.  
As reviewed previously, highly anxious individuals have been shown to 
have a hypervigilant threat detection system as well as reduced top-down control to 
negative information specifically (e.g. Fox et al., 2005). In line with these previous 
studies, neuroimaging studies have shown that state anxiety involves a reduced 
effect of attention on the increased amygdala activity in response to fearful facial 
expressions (Bishop, Duncan, & Lawrence, 2004). In their study, participants were 
presented with two pictures of houses and two pictures of fearful or neutral facial 
expressions and were required to attend to either set indicating whether the pictures 
were the same or different. Across participants, there was a significant right 
amygdala response to fearful compared to neutral faces. Furthermore, state anxiety 
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was related to left amygdala activation in response to fearful versus neutral faces 
(Figure 1.11). When the faces were attended, both low and high state anxious 
individuals showed increased amygdala activity in response to fearful versus 
neutral faces. Crucially, high state anxious participants showed less attentional 
modulation of the amygdala response to fearful versus neutral faces as shown by a 
selective amygdala response to unattended fearful faces in the high but not low 
state anxious participants. 
 
 
Figure 1.11: Amygdala activity to fearful versus neutral faces in Bishop et al. 
(2004). 
 
 
Electrophysiological evidence has also been obtained providing further 
support for the idea of an early attentional bias in anxiety (Fox, Derakshan, & 
Shoker, 2008). Participants with either high or low trait anxiety were presented 
with a pair of angry-neutral or happy-neutral facial expressions for 150 ms 
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followed by a target after either a short target onset asynchrony (TAO; 150 ms) or a 
long TAO (600 ms). Participants were required to indicate when the orientation of 
the target matched that of the thicker arm of the fixation cross. The N2pc (an ERP 
component that consists of an early response originating in the parietal cortex and a 
later response originating in the occipitotemporal regions) has been shown to be 
elicited by task-irrelevant fearful faces (see also Eimer & Kiss, 2007). 
Interestingly, only high trait anxious but not low trait anxious participants 
demonstrated a significantly enhanced N2pc in response to angry faces, supporting 
the idea that high anxiety is related to an attentional capture by threat. No N2pc 
response was found for happy faces for either of the anxiety groups. 
However, it is possible that the results found in the studies by Bishop et al. 
(2004) and Fox et al. (2008) only extend to conditions where attentional load is low 
as the tasks performed did not exhaust attentional resources. The effect of 
perceptual load in relation to threatening stimuli has also been investigated in 
anxiety (Bishop, Jenkins, & Lawrence, 2007). Perceptual load was manipulated in 
a letter-search task that was superimposed on either a fearful or a neutral facial 
expression. Results showed that perceptual load modulated the amygdala response 
to the fearful faces (measured with fMRI) across all participants irrespective of 
their anxiety levels. High state anxious participants showed a selective amygdala 
response to fearful faces under low load whereas participants with both high and 
low state anxiety did not show any significant increase in the amygdala response to 
fearful versus neutral faces under high perceptual load. No differences in amygdala 
responses in either of the load conditions were found in relation to differences in 
trait anxiety.  
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Significant interactions with trait anxiety were found in the prefrontal areas. 
In the low perceptual load conditions, low trait anxiety was associated with 
increases in activity to fearful faces in all three regions of the Ventrolateral 
Prefrontal Cortex (VLPFC), the DLPFC, and the rostral Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
(ACC), whereas no such increase was observed for participants with high trait 
anxiety. Under conditions of high perceptual load, on the other hand, no significant 
increase in activity was observed for either anxiety group.  
Two main implications can be drawn from these findings: Firstly, the 
modulation of the prefrontal areas that are primarily involved with controlled 
processing by anxiety supports the view that elevated trait anxiety is associated 
with impoverished attentional control and an inability to prevent the processing of 
irrelevant distractors. Secondly, and contrary to the idea that anxiety should 
influence threat evaluation at a preattentive stage, these results suggest that, in line 
with Lavie’s (1995) perceptual load model, individual differences in processing 
will only emerge under conditions of low perceptual load. With respect to the 
present thesis, these findings suggest that no modulation by anxiety will be found 
in response to negative word valence under conditions of high perceptual load. This 
hypothesis is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
 
 To sum up, neuroscientific evidence showed increased related brain activity 
in response to threat for individuals with high compared to low anxiety. This was 
typically obtained for emotional information presented in pictures. The 
implications for emotion processing in words (as tested in the present thesis) are 
therefore somewhat indirect. Previous research also suggests that individual 
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differences in anxiety will only emerge under conditions of low but not high 
perceptual load. 
 
 
1.5 Reward, attention, and perception 
 
 The literature reviewed so far has described how factors such as allocation 
of attention, levels of awareness, and anxiety states mediate the perception of 
certain stimuli, specifically, of negative valence. Another factor that seems to 
influence the processing of information is the stimulus reward motivational value. 
This factor is investigated in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Though no study so far has 
addressed this question with regards to the detection of emotion in particular, 
research has been conducted on the effects of reward on perception in general 
(reviewed next). 
  
1.5.1 The effects of reward on visual attention 
 One study has investigated the effects of reward on visual selective 
attention by means of a negative priming (NP) paradigm (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 
2006). In NP paradigms, participants are typically presented with a prime followed 
shortly afterwards by a probe – a perceptual judgment is required for both. The 
prime usually consists of a task-relevant target and a distractor that can potentially 
interfere with the main task and should thus be ignored. Visual selective attention 
is therefore required to suppress the processing of the distractor and favour target 
processing. The probe display also typically involves a target and a distractor. 
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When the distractor in the prime display matches the target in the probe display is 
when NP occurs (reflected by lower accuracies and longer RTs). 
 In this study, participants were required to identify the number presented at 
either the global or local level for both the prime and probe displays. Primes were 
global numbers composed of local numbers that were congruent in half the trials, 
whereas probes were global Xs made of local numbers or global numbers made of 
local Xs. An example of the trial sequence and stimuli involved in the task is 
displayed in Figure 1.12. Participants were given a cue before the prime display 
indicating which level (G for global or L for local) to attend to and were required to 
indicate the number shown at the cued level. In another task, participants 
performed a same/different judgment between one of two differently coloured 
shapes presented to the left visual field and another shape presented to the right 
(both prime and probe displays contained a target and a distractor). Correct 
responses were rewarded by displaying the monetary reward amount (either high or 
low value) before the probe display.  
Results showed firstly that responses were faster after low rewards 
compared to high rewards. Crucially, a modulation of the NP effect by reward was 
also found. Specifically, a robust NP was observed when the prime was followed 
by a high reward, but this effect was eliminated under low reward conditions (that 
sometimes showed an opposite facilitation (positive priming-like) effect). These 
findings suggest that visual selective attention can be adjusted according to external 
feedback. Specifically, while the robust inhibitory effects applied to the distractor 
were consistent following highly rewarded trials, these effects were lifted when 
associated with low reward (indicating less successful performance). 
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Figure 1.12: Trial sequence of paradigm used in Della Libera & Chelazzi (2006). 
 
 
Additional behavioural evidence of an effect of reward on visual attention 
comes from a visual search paradigm in an EEG study (Kiss, Driver, & Eimer, 
2009). The paradigm involved searching for a coloured target singleton (either red 
among gray or green among gray) within the display and judging the location of a 
notch (at the top or bottom) in the singleton target. The critical manipulation was 
that some participants were rewarded (with more bonus points resulting in higher 
payment) for correct fast performance for red targets than for green targets while 
others were rewarded for green targets. Results showed that responses were faster 
to high-reward targets compared to low-reward targets. Moreover, performance 
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was more efficient for high-reward than for low-reward targets as indicated by 
combining RTs and error rates into the parameter of inverse efficiency.  
 
In short, modulating effects of reward on attention in terms of faster and 
more accurate processing have been established. More relevant to the present thesis 
is the potential effect of reward on detection and sensory process (reviewed next). 
 
1.5.2 The effects of reward on perception and detection 
Reward has also been shown to speed up responses in the detection of 
novelty (Bunzeck, Doeller, Fuentemilla, Dolan, & Duzel, 2009). More relevant to 
the present concern with effects of reward on perception is the effect of reward on 
sensory function; reward has been shown to facilitate somatosensory decision-
making and modulate responses in the primary somatosensory cortex (Pleger, 
Blankenburg, Ruff, Driver, & Dolan, 2008). Participants discriminated the relative 
frequency of two successive electrical stimulations applied to their index finger and 
signal which of the two frequencies was higher. Four reward levels were used and 
the potential monetary reward value was indicated to the participants. Participants 
were also informed via visual feedback six to eight seconds after the presentation 
of the somatosensory stimuli whether or not they have been rewarded. 
Interestingly, accuracy of the somatosensory judgments improved as reward value 
increased (see Figure 1.13). Moreover, receiving a reward on a preceding trial led 
to better performance on the next trial and had a larger influence as reward value 
received increased. 
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Figure 1.13: Illustration of the sensory discrimination improvement as a function 
of reward (Pleger et al., 2008). 
 
 
 Reward has also been found to improve performance on an orientation 
discrimination task (Baldassi & Simoncini, 2009). The experimental paradigm 
began with a cue line indicating the axis of a peripheral stimulus that yielded a 
higher probability of reward. Next the stimuli of the dual task were presented; in 
the attention task participants were required to count a foveal disk that was flashed 
several times (100 ms duration each time) and the attentional load was varied by 
adjusting the contrast of the disk. A peripheral target was displayed during 
presentation of one of the disks and its orientation was either coinciding or 
orthogonal to the cue line. Participants had a 90% chance (high reward) of earning 
credit (for obtaining a Scratch & Win ticket) when they correctly reported the 
orientation of the target tilt if it coincided with the cue, or had a 10% chance (low 
reward) if the orientation of the target was orthogonal to the cue. Orientation 
discrimination thresholds were measured and revealed that average thresholds were 
lower for reward versus no reward conditions and decreased substantially 
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according to low or high reward trials. This was found regardless of attentional 
load indicating that reward may act independently but similarly to attention by 
modulating the activity of early sensory stages such as V1. 
The effects of reward on detection of a target have also been investigated in 
a cued forced-choice localization task (Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007). In this task, 
participants were required to indicate the location of a peripherally cued target (a 
house or face either to the right or left of fixation). They were encouraged to report 
the location of the target as quickly and as accurately as possible and to win as 
much money as possible. A significant effect of incentive was found as detection 
sensitivity (d’) of the target increased linearly with incentive value, indicating that 
reward improves detection sensitivity. An enhancing effect of incentive on d’ 
values in response to targets was found in another similar cued target localization 
study (Engelmann, Damaraju, Padmala, & Pessoa, 2009). 
 
1.6 Summary and aims of the present thesis 
 
My review has demonstrated that negative words capture and engage 
attention, as shown by attentional cueing and AB paradigms. Evidence of 
interference from negative words with one’s ability to maintain attention on a 
specific task has been somewhat mixed in normal populations, but has been 
consistently shown in anxious populations.  
With respect to research on the effects of word valence on awareness, 
emotional words seem to produce a larger physiological response than neutral 
words. Enhanced identification for negative words has also been demonstrated (as 
shown by naming) as well as detection (as shown by greater hit rates). No study so 
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far has shown an advantage in sensitivity to the detection of the valence of negative 
words compared to positive words. The first aim of this thesis was therefore to 
establish an enhanced sensitivity to negative compared to positive valence by 
means of a signal detection measure of sensitivity (d’). This effect was investigated 
under both supraliminal and subliminal conditions as well as conditions of low 
versus high perceptual load (Chapter 3), while controlling for differences between 
the subjective valence and arousal ratings of the negative and positive words. 
Differences in anxiety in the processing of threat have been extensively 
researched and have consistently reported an attentional bias to threat in high 
anxiety compared to low anxiety as well as a selective related brain activity and 
electrophysiological response to threat in high anxiety states in contrast with low 
anxiety states. High anxiety seems to be characterized with a reduced attentional 
capacity and poor executive control compared to low anxiety. Although the 
processing of negative information seems to be less modulated by attention in high 
anxiety, individual differences in cognitive processing have been shown to be 
eliminated by high perceptual load. Another aim of this thesis was therefore to 
investigate individual differences in anxiety levels in relation to the negative 
valence detection advantage as well as the effects of load on valence detection. 
 Reward has been shown to modulate visual attention as reflected by 
increased NP effects as well as more efficient and faster detection of rewarded 
stimuli. Reward also enhances sensory detection and improves performance on 
subsequent trials, revealing a potential enhancement in sensitivity of the sensory 
function in response to reward. Though previous research on reward seems to 
indicate a facilitation of perception with the administration of reward, no study thus 
far has examined the effects of reward on the detection of emotional valence. 
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Therefore, the final aim of this thesis was to examine the effects of reward on the 
detection of emotional valence as well as on the negative valence advantage. 
 
General method 
To achieve the aim of establishing a negative valence detection advantage, 
the general task followed in all the chapters of the present thesis was to report on 
each trial whether a briefly presented word was emotional or neutral. Note that the 
task did not require word detection per se; words were presented on all trials. 
Rather, in order to report whether the word was emotional or neutral, participants 
had to detect its emotional valence. Thus this task will be referred to throughout the 
thesis as valence detection (as opposed to word detection).  
In the present thesis, I sought to establish a negative valence advantage 
using a method that is not subject to the criticisms that have been made towards 
previous studies. A signal detection analysis approach was used to allow for 
assessing whether any valence-detection advantage reflects enhanced sensitivity to 
negative versus positive valence, rather than a mere response bias. 
In order to allow for a signal detection and sensitivity assessment for both 
positive and negative words, each valence was presented with neutral words in the 
same block. Each block of trials comprised presentations of neutral words and one 
type of emotional word (either positive or negative). In this way, separate FA rates 
(misclassifying neutral words as negative or as positive) could be calculated for 
each of the word valences. Therefore, in Experiments 1 and 2 as well as all 
experiments in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, a signal-detection approach was employed and 
both sensitivity (d’ scores) and response bias (beta scores) to negative and positive 
words were measured.  
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Moreover, to achieve a robust and general method of the detection of 
emotional valence, a larger set of words (88 negative, 88 positive, and 176 neutral 
words) than previously used was employed in the present thesis. Finally, none of 
previous studies assessing the detection of negative versus positive words 
controlled for whether the intensities of the participants’ subjective pleasantness 
ratings differed between the negative and positive words. Therefore, in addition to 
controlling for the lexical frequency of the words, differences in the idiosyncratic 
valence ratings of the negative and positive words were corrected for in all of the 
experiments of the present thesis. The role of arousal was also addressed in all but 
the first two experiments. 
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Chapter 2: 
Enhanced Detection Sensitivity to Negative Emotional 
Valence: The Role of Awareness 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of Chapter 2 was to test the hypothesis that the detection of the 
emotional valence would result in enhanced accuracy and sensitivity for negative 
words (vs. neutral) compared to positive words (vs. neutral). On the basis of the 
research reviewed in the General Introduction that has shown a general processing 
advantage for negative emotional valence (e.g. Pratto & John, 1992; Kihara & 
Osaka, 2008; Fox et al., 2001), I predicted that this advantage will be expressed in 
detection sensitivity measures. 
 
2.2 Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-seven participants (mean age 26, range 18-44; 20 females), 
recruited from UCL’s online subject pool, took part in Experiment 1 and were paid 
£5 for their participation. All participants in all three experiments were native 
English speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
88 negative, 88 positive, and 176 neutral words (Appendix) were selected 
from the Handbook of Semantic Word Norms (Toglia & Battig, 1978). Words were 
chosen such that on a scale of 1 (most negative) to 7 (most positive) ratings were 
lower than 2.5 for negative words (M = 2.24, SD = 0.18); higher than 5.5 for 
positive words (M = 5.75, SD = 0.2); and mid-range for neutral words (M = 4, SD 
= 0.11, range= 3.82-4.19). Word length ranged between 3-8 letters. Mean word 
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lengths were 5.43 (SD = 1.39), 5.31 (SD = 1.51), and 5.15 (SD = 1.27) letters for 
negative, positive and neutral words, respectively.  
The experiment took place in a dimly-lit room. E-Prime 1 (Psychological 
Software Tools) was used to run the experiment on a PC with a 15” CRT screen 
(90 Hz refresh rate). A chin rest was used to maintain a viewing distance of 60 cm. 
Each trial began with a fixation cross, presented for 500 ms. A mask (eight hash 
characters) was then presented for 67 ms, followed immediately by a word, 
presented for either 22 ms or 33 ms (in different blocks). The word was replaced by 
another mask, again presented for 67 ms (Figure 2.1). All stimuli were presented in 
the centre of the screen in light grey (target word = 3.45 cd/m², mask = 5.58 cd/m²) 
on a black background (0.014 cd/m²). The words were presented in lower-case 
Arial Narrow font. Word length ranged between 0.67° and 3.15° and height ranged 
between 0.47° and 0.86°.  
Valence and word exposure duration were blocked. Participants were 
informed of the type of block prior to each block, and were requested to press one 
key if a word had emotional connotations (positive or negative, depending on the 
block), and another to report a neutral word. Following each response, participants 
were asked to rate their confidence by pressing one of the 1 (pure guess) to 5 
(absolutely sure) keys. Each block consisted of 44 trials, (22 emotional and 22 
neutral words, presented in random order). Each word was presented once during 
the experiment. The assignation of neutral words to negative or positive blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
Participants completed four practice blocks of 12 trials each (different 
words were used in the practice and experiment). This was followed by eight 
experimental blocks (four each for positive and negative valence; for each valence 
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there were two blocks with 33 ms and two with 22 ms presentation durations). 
Block order was counterbalanced across participants for both valence and exposure 
duration. Half of the words in each category (positive, negative and neutral) were 
used in each of the duration conditions; the combinations of word-list pairings 
(which neutral words were presented with which positive or negative words, for 
each duration) were also counterbalanced.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Trial sequence in Experiment 1. Trial onset was indicated by a 
fixation cross. The presentation of a word (in this example, a negative one) was 
preceded and followed by masks. Participants then indicated by key presses first 
whether the word had been emotional or neutral, and then how confident they were 
of that response. 
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Upon completion of the experiment participants provided subjective 
valence ratings for the words used in the experiment using a 1 (very negative) to 7 
(very positive) scale. These ratings were used to ensure that the valence of each 
emotional word category was comparable, by equating their average distance from 
the extreme. For each individual, whenever the mean for one category was closer to 
the extreme than the mean for the other category, the most extreme words from that 
category and least extreme words from the other category were removed from any 
further analysis, until the mean valence ratings of the word categories were at an 
equal distance from the relevant extreme and standard deviations were similar. This 
resulted in the removal of six (33 ms) and seven (22 ms) negative words, and seven 
(33 ms) and six (22 ms) positive words on average per participant. The remaining 
word lists had mean ratings of 2.19 for the negative words (SD = .87), and 5.76 for 
the positive words (SD= .84). No neutral words were excluded as their mean 
ratings did not significantly differ from 4 (M = 3.93, SD = .29).
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Results 
The results of Experiment 1 are summarized in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1. Experiment 1: Mean Percentages of Hits (False Alarms), Mean d’ and 
Beta scores, and Mean Confidence Ratings as a Function of Presentation Duration 
and Word Valence 
 
 
 
Correct categorizations were defined as hits, and used to calculate accuracy 
rates for each valence. The hit and false alarm (categorizing a neutral word as 
emotional) rates were used to calculate d’ and beta scores. Detection sensitivity, d’, 
is calculated by subtracting the z-score of the FAs from the z-score of the hits: d’ = 
(z(Hits) – z(FA)). Beta, a measure of response criterion, is also derived from the 
hits and FAs to assess response bias, through the following equation: In(β) = 
½[z(Hits)2 – z(FA)2]. A beta greater than 1 is considered conservative whereas a 
beta lower than 1 is considered liberal. Percentage accuracy (hit) rates, and d’ and 
beta scores were entered into 2 (valence: positive or negative) by 2 (duration: 22 or 
33 ms) repeated-measures ANOVAs. These analyses reveled a main effect of 
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duration both for hit rates (F(1,26) = 10.17, MSE = 351.21, p = .004) and d’ scores 
(F(1,26) = 50.15, MSE = .263, p < .001): Both accuracy and sensitivity were better 
under the 33 ms exposure than the 22 ms conditions. Importantly, there was also a 
main effect of valence for both hit rates (F(1,26) = 27.75, MSE = 248.51, p < .001) 
and d’ scores (F(1,26) = 9.04, MSE = .465, p = .006), indicating that valence 
detection and sensitivity were better for negative than for positive valence. This 
result supports the hypothesis of an emotional categorization advantage (or better 
detection of emotional valence) for negative words. The effect of valence did not 
interact with duration (F(1,26)  = 1.37, MSE = 95.66, p = .252 for the hits; F(1,26) 
= 1.34, MSE = .221, p = .257 for the d’ scores).  
Response criterion tended to be higher in the longer duration (although this 
effect did not reach significance; F(1,26) = 3.35, MSE = 5.96, p = .079) and lower 
for negative compared to positive judgments (F(1,26) = 9.02, MSE = 5.94, p = 
.006). As Table 2.1 shows, the effect of valence on criterion was larger for the 33 
ms than the 22 ms duration. Indeed, it was significant in the 33 ms duration (t(26) = 
3.08, SEM = .69, p = .005), but not in the 22 ms duration (t(26)  = 1.3, SEM = .5, p 
= .202). The interaction of duration and valence, however, only reached marginal 
significance (F(1,26) = 3.77, MSE = 3.88, p = .063). While the detection sensitivity 
of the negative valence was accompanied by a less conservative bias, this does not 
challenge the negative valence sensitivity advantage given that the two measures of 
d’ and beta are independent of each other. In addition, one must not disregard the 
fact that participants still showed a conservative bias in detecting the negative 
valence regardless of the difference found, as shown by beta scores that are greater 
than 1 (see Table 2.1). 
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Confidence Ratings 
Overall confidence ratings were significantly lower in the 22 ms conditions 
(M = 2.83) than in the 33 ms conditions (M = 3.75; Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, Z 
= 4.43, p < .001).  However, even at the 22 ms duration the mean confidence 
ratings were nowhere near the ‘pure guess’ score of 1. A closer inspection of the 
confidence rating data indicated that participants rated their responses as a pure 
guess (i.e. a response of “1”) on 33% of trials in the 22 ms condition, and on only 
12% of trials in the 33 ms condition. Thus, viewing conditions were not reliably 
subliminal under either exposure duration.  
 
2.3 Experiment 2  
 
The results of the confidence ratings in Experiment 1 revealed that the 
shorter presentation duration used did not result in potentially subliminal effects. 
This experiment attempted to investigate whether the advantage for negative 
valence detection would occur under subliminal presentation conditions, by 
degrading stimulus visibility. To this end, the words were presented for 22 ms and 
their luminance was reduced. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-three new participants (mean age 21, range 18-27; 17 females) 
participated in Experiment 2 and were paid £5 for their participation. 
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
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The stimuli and procedure of Experiment 2 were similar to those of 
Experiment 1 with the exceptions that the words were all presented for 22 ms and 
their luminance was reduced to 1.29 cd/m². Participants completed two practice 
blocks of 24 trials each prior to the experimental blocks. 
Individual valence ratings were also collected in this experiment, and the 
same procedure used in Experiment 1 to equate extremeness of valence was 
followed again here. This resulted in the removal of ten negative and seven positive 
words on average per participant. The remaining word list ratings were 2.05 (SD = 
.65) for the negative words, and 5.95 (SD = .65) for the positive words. No neutral 
words were excluded since their mean rating was 4 (SD = .2). 
 
Results 
The results of Experiment 2 are summarized in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2. Experiment 2: Mean Percentages of Hits (False Alarms), Mean d’ and 
Beta scores, and Mean Confidence Ratings as a Function of Word Valence 
 
 
Both accuracy (hit) rates and valence detection sensitivity (d’ scores) were 
again higher for negative than for positive words (t(22) = 2.43, SEM = 2.04, p = 
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.024 for hits; t(22) = 2.2, SEM = .07, p = .039 for d’ scores). In addition, sensitivity 
to negative valence was higher than chance (d’ scores were significantly higher 
than zero; t(22) = 3.87, SEM = .048, p = .001), but sensitivity to positive words did 
not differ significantly from zero (t < 1). 
These findings are not surprising if considered within the framework of 
LeDoux’s (1996) model, which describes that negative information can be 
unconsciously processed and reaches the amygdala through a quick route (the ‘low 
road’). This information then produces an emotional response that provides the 
individual with a ‘feeling’ indicating potential threat without full awareness of the 
source of information. This intuitive feeling is one plausible mediator of 
unconscious processing, namely what influenced participants’ responses when they 
were merely guessing. In addition, given that the amygdala projects back to the 
sensory cortex, it is likely that the sensory signal is enhanced as a result. Thus the 
negative words may have been detected even when processed subliminally.  
Critically, the enhanced accuracy and sensitivity for negative (compared to 
positive) words was not accompanied by a difference in response bias. Beta scores 
were identical for negative and positive words (Table 2.2). 
 
Confidence Ratings 
Confidence ratings were low overall (Table 2.2), and indicate that 
participants felt they were guessing on nearly all trials. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests 
showed no differences between the overall confidence ratings for neutral (M = 
1.55) versus negative (Z = 1.14, p = .254) and neutral versus positive (Z = 1.3, p = 
.194) words. Participants did, however, report slightly but significantly higher 
confidence for negative compared to positive words (Z = 2.96, p = .003).  
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To rule out the possibility that the enhanced hit rates and sensitivity were 
due to a differential residual awareness between negative and positive words, 
sensitivity only for responses with a confidence rating of 1 (‘pure guess’) was 
compared. Indeed, this comparison still showed an advantage in sensitivity to the 
negative (vs. positive) valence (mean d’ scores were .14 for negative words and -
.07 for positive words; t(22) = 2.21, SEM = .09, p = .038 for the difference). 
Moreover, the d’ scores of the ‘pure guess’ negative words remained significantly 
above the zero chance level (t(22) = 2.14, SEM = .06, p = .043), unlike the d’ 
scores of the positive words (t < 1). The response criterion remained 1 for both 
valence categories.  
Finally, a way of assessing participants’ awareness of the words is by 
examining whether or not participants were more confident on correct responses 
compared to incorrect responses. It follows that if participants were aware of what 
they saw on any given trial, this should be reflected in their confidence level, and 
therefore higher confidence would be expected, on average, when they perform 
correctly than when they do not. If participants were unaware of the words and 
were guessing, they would be expected to show not only low overall confidence 
ratings, but also similar confidence for the correct and the incorrect trials 
(indicating that they were still guessing on correct trials and any success they had 
was by chance). For all word types there was no difference between confidence 
ratings reported on correct and incorrect trials (negative: M correct = 1.75, M 
incorrect = 1.54; Z = 1.61, p = .107; positive: M correct = 1.64, M incorrect = 1.48; 
Z = 1.62, p = .104; neutral: M correct = 1.59, M incorrect = 1.55; Z = .51, p = 
.614).  
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It should be acknowledged that confidence ratings are not a foolproof way 
to assess awareness or its complete absence; self-reported confidence may be low 
for reasons unrelated to awareness (e.g. Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet & Yzerbyt, 
2007). Thus, one cannot rule out the possibility that some residual awareness 
remained under conditions of very brief presentation and self-reported guessing. 
Even with this caveat, however, the main result of this experiment is that a valence 
detection advantage for negative words was still evident under conditions in which 
participants reported they were guessing, and did not show a difference in 
confidence between correct and incorrect trials. Subliminal perception, construed in 
this limited sense, can therefore influence affective categorization despite the 
absence of subjective awareness. 
 
2.4 Experiment 3 
 
The interference effects of negative valence found in various experimental 
paradigms described in the General Introduction may, at least under some 
conditions, be due to arousal rather than valence (Zald, 2003). A recent study 
(Aquino & Arnell, 2007), for example, found that only highly-arousing sexual 
taboo words, but not less arousing threatening words or non-arousing neutral 
words, produced longer RTs in a version of the emotional Stroop task that required 
making number parity judgments while ignoring an irrelevant word. These findings 
are reminiscent of the ‘perceptual defense’ effects whereby taboo words produce 
longer RTs (e.g., McGinnies, 1949) and may result from greater attentional 
engagement as well as the recruitment of additional processes such as executive 
control by highly-arousing words. 
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Arnell, Killman & Fijavs (2007) investigated the role of arousal in an RSVP 
task. When the valence and arousal of distractor words appearing before the target 
(and therefore serving as an equivalent of the first target in the AB paradigm) were 
manipulated, only highly-arousing sexual-taboo (but not negative, positive, 
threatening or neutral) words caused reduced identification of targets (color names) 
that followed shortly after them.  
In another RSVP task that required participants to detect the colour of the 
first target word (T1) followed by the colour name of the second target word (T2), 
Mathewson, Arnell, & Mansfield (2008) found a significant reduction in T2 
detection when T1 was a sexual/taboo word compared to when it was a negative, 
positive, or neutral word (no other comparisons between the T1 types were 
significant). Moreover, taboo words were recognized more often than all other 
word types and the memory for these words mediated the relationship between the 
arousal ratings of the emotional words and the subsequent detection of T2.  
Anderson (2005) also found that although both pleasant and unpleasant 
words resulted in a reduced AB for T2 compared to neutral T2, arousal rather than 
valence was the most predictive dimension of the AB reduction. These findings 
suggest a mediating role of arousal in the attention to and encoding of the words. 
Considering the potential mediating role of arousal, Experiment 3 was 
conducted to examine whether any processing advantage for negative words would 
still be apparent independently of arousal. As in the previous experiments, 
participants were requested to classify the words into emotional or neutral. The 
effects of arousal were controlled for in two ways: First, it is possible that 
presenting positive and negative words in different blocks in the previous 
experiments caused a difference in the average level of arousal throughout blocks 
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containing different valences. Therefore, in Experiment 3 a mixed-block design 
was used in which positive, negative and neutral words were presented within the 
same blocks. Second, to control for any specific effects potentially induced within 
a block by the more arousing words, participants’ individual arousal ratings of each 
word (in addition to their valence ratings, as in the previous experiments) were 
collected and the word categories for each participant were matched for both 
attributes.  
 
Method 
Participants 
 Eight new volunteers (5 females, mean age 27, range 22-34) were recruited 
from the UCL online subject pool and paid £7 for participation. 
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
 The stimuli, procedure and experimental parameters were similar to 
Experiment 1, except words were presented for 22 ms in all blocks and all word 
categories (negative, positive, and neutral) were intermixed within each block. 
Participants were required to press a button on the keyboard if the word presented 
was neutral, or another button if the word was emotional (the same response was 
used for negative and positive words both to preserve the response characteristics 
of the previous experiments, and because the main interest in this experiment is 
whether the presence of emotional valence itself was better detected for negative 
than for positive words). Following this response, they were again required to rate 
their confidence level on a scale of 1 to 5, as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
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Participants first completed a practice block consisting of 36 trials (12 of 
each word type; these words were not used again in the experiment). This was 
followed by four blocks of 88 trials, each consisting of 22 negative-word, 22 
positive-word, and 44 neutral-word trials.  
Following completion of the categorization task, participants were asked to 
provide subjective valence ratings for the words used, as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Some words were then excluded from the negative and positive word lists in order 
to equate the two categories for extremeness of valence ratings. This resulted in the 
removal of an average of 10 negative and 9 positive words per participant.  
Following the valence rating blocks, participants were asked to rate how 
arousing they found each of the words used in the experiment. The words were 
again presented in random order, in four blocks of 88 trials preceded by one 
practice block (using new words) of 12 trials. Each trial began with a word 
presented in light grey over a black background until the participant pressed the 
Space bar, after which the Self-Assessment Mannequin (a widely-used rating scale 
with pictures displaying the relative emotion; Lang, 1980) was displayed on screen 
for the participants to use as a rating scale. The scale ranged from 1 (very calm) to 
9 (very aroused), with 5 being neither calm nor aroused. Once participants pressed 
the corresponding number, the next trial began.  
After equating the word-sets for valence, only three out of the eight 
participants rated the negative words as higher in arousal than the positive words, 
on average, making it unlikely that an advantage for negative words would be due 
to higher arousal caused by such words. However, to ensure that the word-sets 
were matched for arousal as well as valence, additional words were excluded from 
the negative and positive word lists for all participants until the mean arousal 
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ratings for these word categories were equal. This resulted in the exclusion of a 
further 31 negative and 31 positive words, on average, in addition to the words 
excluded to match valence (note that even after excluding these words, the average 
numbers of words were still 47 and 48 for negative and positive words, 
respectively – about three times the number of words used in the previous studies 
of Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003; Snodgrass & Harring, 2005; and Zeelenberg et al, 
2006). After matching the word categories for both valence and arousal the final 
mean valence ratings were 2.54 (SD = .81) and 5.41 (SD = .78) for negative and 
positive words, respectively. No neutral words had to be excluded as their mean 
valence ratings did not differ significantly from 4 (M = 3.95, SD = .32). The mean 
arousal ratings across all participants were 4.7 (SD = 1.11), 4.7 (SD = 1.09), and 
3.49 (SD = 1.21) for the negative, positive, and neutral words respectively. 
 
Results 
 The intermixed-block design employed in this experiment precluded the 
calculation of d’ scores (since false alarms – misclassifying a neutral word as 
emotional – could not be assigned to a specific valence). Therefore, the dependent 
measure used in this experiment was percentage accuracy (hit rates). Importantly, 
even after matching the two categories for valence and arousal, the mean hit rate 
for categorizing negative words as emotional (66%) was significantly higher than 
for positive words (50%; t(7) = 2.86, SEM = .058, p = .024). Interestingly, 
participants were significantly more accurate in categorizing the neutral words 
(77%) compared to both positive (t(7) = 3.73, SEM = .074, p = .007) and negative 
words (t(7) = 2.46, SEM = .045, p = .044). The higher hit rates for neutral than for 
emotional words most likely indicate that participants adopted a conservative 
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criterion for reporting emotional valence, which resulted in a high hit rate for 
neutral words. The fact that negative words had a higher hit rate than positive ones 
indicates negative valence was more likely to overcome this strict criterion. 
 
Confidence Ratings 
 Wilcoxon signed-rank tests revealed that confidence ratings did not differ 
significantly between the negative (M = 3.3) and the neutral (M = 3.05) words, or 
between the positive (M = 3.08) and the neutral words (both p values > 1). 
However, the difference between the confidence ratings of the negative and 
positive words was significant (Z = 2.03, p = .042). Participants were therefore 
slightly more confident when reporting negative valence. 
It should be noted that presentation conditions in Experiment 3 were not 
designed to be subliminal; therefore, the conclusion that the valence-detection 
advantage for negative words is evident when controlling for arousal is limited to 
consciously-perceived words. Attempting to assess whether the conclusion can be 
generalized to words that participants reported no subjective awareness of, only 
trials with a confidence rating of 1 (“guess”) were examined. The power of this 
analysis, however, was severely curtailed by the small number of guess trials: one 
participant had no such trials; the remaining 7 participants had an average of 9 
negative (SD = 3.4) and 12 positive (SD = 4.98) guess trials. There was a trend 
toward better valence detection for negative than positive words (M = 26% and 
20%, respectively), though unsurprisingly this trend did not reach statistical 
significance (t(6) < 1, ns). 
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Lexical frequency 
The Celex database (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Gulikers, 1995) was used to 
assess the lexical frequency of the words used in this experiment. The positive 
words were found to have a higher average frequency (M = 1529 per million) than 
the negative words (M = 720 per million), ruling out the possibility that the 
negative-word advantage found in all three experiments could have been due to 
such words being more familiar.  To rule out an alternative account in terms of 
potential effects of uniqueness (i.e. the frequencies of the neutral words being 
closer to those of the positive than of the negative words) the neutral and positive 
words with the highest frequencies were removed, so that the remaining words had 
similar frequencies to the negative words (Neutral words: M = 729, SD = 1062; 
Positive words: M = 724, SD = 646). This did not alter the direction of the results 
for either Experiment 1, 2, or 3, or their significance in Experiments 1 and 2. The 
significance of the negative-positive and negative-neutral hit-rate differences in 
Experiment 3 was somewhat reduced (p = .055 and p = .057, respectively). 
 
2.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
An advantage in detecting the emotional valence of negative (compared to 
positive) words was found in the present chapter. In an emotional categorization 
task that required participants to decide whether a briefly-presented word was 
neutral or emotional, better accuracy (hit rates) a well as higher sensitivity 
(measured with criterion-free d’ scores) for negative (compared to positive) words 
were found. The present chapter extended this result to conditions under which 
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participants reported they were guessing and therefore showed no subjective 
awareness of the words’ valence.  
The negative-word advantage was found despite positive and negative 
words being equated for extremeness of emotional valence and arousal (as assessed 
by the participants’ post-experiment ratings), and despite comparing the negative 
words with positive words of the same or even higher lexical frequency. Except for 
the supraliminal presentation condition (33 ms) of Experiment 1 where the 
response criterion was more conservative for the positive compared to the negative 
valence, the negative detection advantage was not accompanied by differences in 
response criterion between the negative and positive valence. Note, however, that 
the response criterion has always been found to be conservative (greater than 1) for 
the negative valence including the 33 ms duration condition. Furthermore, this 
difference in response criterion does not challenge the negative valence detection 
advantage given that the two measures of d’ scores and beta are independent of one 
another. Thus the present findings are the first to show a clear detection sensitivity 
advantage for the negative valence per se compared to the positive valence under 
both supraliminal and subliminal conditions.  
The negative valence detection advantage found here extends the previous 
findings that showed a general emotional advantage for naming negative versus 
neutral words (Gaillard et al., 2006) and for detecting both negative and positive 
words compared to neutral words in a recognition task (Zeelenberg et al., 2007) to 
finding a negative detection advantage. This conclusion is consistent with previous 
findings that have shown a detection advantage for negative compared to positive 
words (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003). However, as discussed previously (in the 
General Introduction), this advantage was demonstrated on accuracy rates with no 
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measures of detection sensitivity or response bias. The present chapter established 
this negative advantage for the first time on detection sensitivity measures.  
The findings of the present chapter are inconsistent with previous research 
that found a detection sensitivity advantage of positive words over negative words 
(Snodgrass & Harring, 2005). No measures of response bias were reported, 
however, in this study. This discrepancy may be due to their use of a small set of 
words as small word sets are more prone to sampling biases (e.g. one of them could 
form more a cohesive category so that inter-category priming effects are more 
likely and could facilitate detection). In addition, Snodgrass & Harring (2005) (like 
all the other previous studies) have not corrected for differences in idiosyncratic 
ratings. Despite basing their corrections on established databases or on independent 
ratings from other pools of participants, it remains possible that the participants in 
the actual experiments may have evaluated the positive words as closer to the 
positive end than compared to the negative words.  
The results of the present chapter also suggest that less information is 
needed for the negative valence to be detected compared to the positive valence. 
The d’ scores of the positive words did not differ significantly from chance when 
the processing of the words was unconscious in contrast with the detection of the 
negative valence that was significantly higher than chance. This suggestion is in 
line with the implication found in the study by Gaillard et al. (2006) of a potentially 
lower threshold of conscious detection for negative words.  
The present chapter also verified that an advantage for detecting emotional 
valence in negative (compared to positive) words is evident even when differences 
in the arousal induced by negative and positive words are ruled out as an 
alternative account (Experiment 3): Higher accuracy was still found for negative 
 87 
words when controlling for individual participants’ valence intensity and arousal 
ratings, differences in lexical frequency, and despite negative and positive words 
appearing in the same blocks, ruling out both differences in individual words’ 
arousal ratings and differences in the overall levels of arousal in different blocks as 
alternative accounts for the negative valence detection advantage. Note that 
although some of the previous research has failed to find a negative processing 
advantage when differences in arousal between the negative and positive valence 
were corrected for (e.g. Aquino & Arnell, 2007; Arnell et al., 2007), the paradigm 
used in the present thesis was sufficiently sensitive to reveal the negative valence 
detection advantage despite correcting for differences in arousal between the 
negative and positive valence. 
The intermixed block design of Experiment 3 also allows for the ruling out 
of another potential alternative account for the effects of negative valence. When 
valence was blocked (as in Experiments 1 and 2) one might suggest that the 
enhanced accuracy and sensitivity found for negative valence was in fact the result 
of emotionally-neutral words being better categorized as such when the choice was 
between them and negative, rather than positive, words. If neutral words were more 
distinct from negative than from positive words, this implies that in the context of 
negative words they were perceived as being further away from that category – i.e., 
more positive; in contrast, in the context of positive words they were not perceived 
as more negative (or if they were, this difference was not as extreme as the 
difference in a negative-word context).  
This, however, cannot explain the negative valence advantage found in 
Experiment 3, in which neutral words were intermixed with positive and negative 
words in the same block. Furthermore, any general (non-context driven) bias 
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toward perceiving neutral words as more positive (and for such words to therefore 
stand out more amongst negative than positive words) may have also been 
manifested in the subjective valence ratings that the participants provided at the 
end of the experiment. Across all three experiments, however, all the participants 
consistently rated all of the neutral words as neutral (rather than as somewhat more 
positive). The exclusion procedure followed, based on the individual subjective 
valence ratings, also ensured that neither the positive nor negative valence 
categories used in our analysis was closer to the neutral category.  
The present findings may have implications for understanding the neural 
mechanisms of emotion perception. An ongoing debate (Pessoa, 2005) concerns 
the questions of whether emotional stimuli are processed automatically, and 
whether their processing may not even require awareness. Whereas some 
neuroimaging studies have found that emotional stimuli caused activation in brain 
regions known to process emotional information (e.g. the amygdala) regardless of 
attentional allocation and even when participants were not aware of the stimuli 
(Etkin et al., 2004; Morris, Ohman & Dolan, 1998; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; 
Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Whalen et. al., 1998), others have not found such activity 
in the absence of awareness and have in fact shown that the availability of attention 
is required for such activity to arise (Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez & Ungerleider, 
2002; Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2002; Pessoa, Japee, Sturman & 
Ungerleider, 2006).  
The present chapter has shown that emotional valence information can 
affect guessing behavior such that performance can exceed chance despite 
participants claiming they are unaware of the stimulus valence. Seeing that the 
findings of Chapter 2 only apply to words that are fully attended to, the next step 
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should therefore be to address the issue of whether the perception of emotion is 
dependent (or not) on attention by manipulating the attention directed at the 
presented emotional stimuli. 
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Chapter 3: 
Enhanced Detection of Negative Valence:  
The Role of Attention 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
In the highly demanding environment we live in today, humans are 
constantly bombarded with different sources of information. We thus face the 
challenge of focusing our attention on goal-relevant stimuli whilst being ready to 
detect potentially significant stimuli occurring simultaneously outside of that focus. 
Our attentional capacity is limited, leaving little or no space left to process goal-
irrelevant stimuli when full (Lavie, 1995; 2005). As reviewed previously in 
Chapters 1 and 2, there is broad evidence in the literature, however, for the 
prioritized processing of emotional stimuli over neutral stimuli (e.g. Pessoa, 2005; 
Phelps, 2006 for a review). But does this preferential processing survive even the 
most stringent attentional demands placed upon us everyday, or is some attentional 
capacity still required for the perception of affective stimuli?  
 The results of Chapter 2 showed a consistent and significant enhanced 
detection sensitivity to the emotional valence of negative words over that of 
positive words in both supraliminal and subliminal conditions. Importantly, the 
effect remained present after ruling out any idiosyncratic differences in valence 
intensity as well as any arousal effects, thus providing conclusive evidence for an 
enhanced sensitivity for negative valence detection. However, the findings so far 
are limited to stimuli that were fully attended to. Given that a task was used with 
only one stimulus presented on each trial, attention should have been fully focused 
on the valence detection task. In Chapter 3, I therefore tested the effects of 
attention on valence detection. To address the role of attention in valence detection, 
the framework of the Load Theory of Attention and Cognitive Control was 
employed. 
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Perceptual load theory 
According to Lavie’s perceptual load model (1995; 2005), the level of 
perceptual load involved in a task determines whether additional stimuli will be 
processed. Our attention has limited capacity; within this capacity, however, the 
perception of all stimuli, regardless of relevance, proceeds automatically. If a task 
occurs under conditions of high perceptual load, then the relevant task consumes 
most capacity, leaving little or none for irrelevant perception, thus preventing 
distractor detection and related neural activity. In contrast, low perceptual load 
leaves spare capacity which then spills over to the processing of irrelevant stimuli. 
Under such conditions distractors are perceived, elicit neural activity, and reach 
awareness. Perceptual load is conceptualized as either increasing the relevant items 
in the task or increasing the perceptual demands of the task with the same number 
of items. 
Various behavioral and neuroimaging studies supporting the perceptual 
load theory have been conducted (see Lavie 2005; 2010 for reviews). For example, 
Lavie (1995) found that interference from irrelevant distractors occurred only 
under low perceptual load conditions. This was observed when load was 
manipulated by increasing the relevant task set size (see also Lavie & Cox, 1997), 
by increasing the demands in the task requiring either to detect colour (low load) or 
conjunctions of colour and shape (high load), and by performing either a simple 
detection task or a more complex identification task.  
Other studies extended the effects to negative priming (NP). For example, 
Lavie & Fox (2000) requested participants to perform a letter search task under low 
and high perceptual load conditions while an irrelevant distractor that is to be 
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ignored appeared in the periphery. A negative priming effect is found when 
responses are slowed when the prime distractor is repeated as the probe target in 
comparison with trials that do not involve any repetition. They found that 
participants were distracted by response competing distractors showing both 
response competition effects and negative priming effects under low load but not 
under high load.  
The effect of perceptual load on distractor processing was extended to 
meaningful distractor objects (Lavie, Lin, Zokaei, & Thoma, 2009) and to 
measures of attentional capture by irrelevant distractors (Forster & Lavie, 2008). 
The neural processing of unattended stimuli also seems to depend on level 
of load, with high perceptual load diminishing distractor related activity in the 
brain (e.g. Schwartz, Vuilleumier, Hutton, Maravita, Dolan, & Driver, 2005; Yi, 
Woodman, Widders, Marois, & Chun, 2004; for a review see Lavie, 2005). For 
example, neural activity related to visual motion was found to be modulated by 
load as V5 response to moving dots was observed under low load but no increase in 
associated activity was found under high load (Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 1997). 
 
Perceptual load and conscious detection 
The conclusions drawn from the previous studies investigating the effects 
of perceptual load on the perception of task-irrelevant stimuli are based mainly on 
indirect measures of perception such as response times (RTs) and neural activity, 
with no direct measure of whether high perceptual load truly eliminates conscious 
perception of irrelevant stimuli. One cannot deduce with full certainty that 
participants consciously perceived the distractors based solely on their effects on 
RTs. Distractor effects on target RTs under low load could instead reflect 
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unconscious processing of stimulus-response associations rather than awareness of 
the distractor.  
In a study investigating the effects of perceptual load on conscious 
detection or conversely the lack of it (inattentional blindness, IB), Cartwright-Finch 
& Lavie (2006) found consistent evidence in support of a greater inattentional 
blindness rates to a critical unexpected stimulus under high load (detecting subtle 
differences in the length of the arms in a cross-task or a visual search task with 
highly similar letters) compared to low load (colour detection of the arms of the 
cross or a ‘pop-out’ visual letter search). However, inattentional blindness was not 
necessarily reflective of the absence of conscious perception. The results could 
instead be explained by memory effects (longer delays in responding in the high 
load or due to the processing of the surprise question may have lead to the rapid 
forgetting of the stimulus). Moreover, the unexpected nature of the critical stimulus 
could mean that it may have still been perceived but produced only a weak signal 
(see Barber & Folkard, 1972; Bashinski & Bacharach, 1980; Davis, Kramer, & 
Graham, 1983; Teichner & Krebs, 1974). 
More relevant to the present thesis is evidence of reduced detection 
sensitivity under conditions where attentional resources are fully engaged in 
another task (Macdonald & Lavie, 2008): a phenomenon termed “load-induced 
blindness”. In Macdonald & Lavie’s (2008) study, participants performed a letter 
search task in a visual search array composed of a letter circle. Perceptual load was 
either low or high, and was manipulated by varying the non-target letters. At the 
same time as the letter circle, a small meaningless distractor that participants were 
required to detect appeared in the periphery.  
 95 
The authors found an effect of perceptual load on the conscious detection of 
the critical stimulus (high perceptual load reduced the detection of the irrelevant 
stimuli), reporting this effect on both measures of detection accuracy and 
sensitivity, with no accompanying effect of response bias. 
 
Aims of the present chapter 
Based on these previous findings, this chapter aimed to investigate the 
question of whether the availability of attentional resources is required for the 
enhanced sensitivity to negative valence by examining the effects of perceptual 
load on valence detection. Considering all the evidence or reduced distractor 
processing under conditions of high perceptual load, I predicted firstly that the 
detection sensitivity in general (i.e. for both the negative and positive valence) 
would be reduced in the high load condition.  
The second and perhaps more important prediction at least here was that the 
negative valence detection advantage would also be reduced or even eliminated 
under conditions of high load compared to low load. Perceptual load has been 
shown to reduce amygdala activity related to fearful faces (e.g. Pessoa, Padmala, & 
Morland, 2005; Pessoa, et al., 2002). It is therefore possible that perceptual load 
would also reduce the negative valence detection advantage. On the other hand, 
there are cases of exceptions showing for example that famous distractor faces are 
unaffected by perceptual load (Lavie, Ro, & Russell, 2003). It is therefore also 
possible that the enhanced sensitivity to negative valence will not be affected by 
high perceptual load suggesting that the negative valence advantage is automatic. 
In order to test these predictions, an experiment was designed combining a valence 
detection paradigm with a perceptual load manipulation task.  
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Similarly to Chapter 2, a signal detection approach was employed 
measuring both sensitivity to negative and positive valence and response bias. The 
perceptual load design was adopted from Macdonald & Lavie (2008); in all 
experiments participants were presented with letters arranged in a circle including 
the target letter X or N and were asked to report the target letter. Perceptual load 
was manipulated by varying the remaining non-target letters; being small O’s in the 
low load condition or different angular letters in the high load condition. A word 
was also presented on each trial simultaneously with the letters in the centre of the 
letter circle at fixation. Word valence was either emotional (negative or positive 
depending on the block) or neutral, and participants were required to categorize the 
presented word according to its valence. By blocking emotional valence in this 
way, hits and false alarm rates could be assessed separately for each valence.  
Prioritizing the letter search was stressed to participants, while the valence 
detection task was instructed to be of secondary significance. Participants 
responded first to the letter search task and then to the valence task. 
 
3.2 Experiment 4  
Method 
Participants 
 Sixteen volunteers recruited from University College London’s online 
participant pool participated in the first experiment and were paid £6 for their 
participation. All participants in all experiments were native English speakers and 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Two participants were excluded from the 
analyses due to extremely low accuracy on the letter-search task in the high load 
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condition (less than 55% accuracy). The remaining fourteen participants had a 
mean age of 19 (range 18 – 21; 11 females). 
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
The word set applied was the same used in the experiments in Chapter 2.  
 
The experimental setting was similar to that in Chapter 1 except for the 
refresh rate of the monitor being 85 Hz. Each trial began with a fixation dot 
presented for 500 ms on a black screen, followed immediately by the presentation 
of a centrally located circle (2.8° radius circle; as measured from fixation to the top 
of the letter) for 212 ms. The letter display was made up of the target letter (equally 
likely to be either an X or an N in randomized order) and five other non-target 
letters (each opposing 0.7° by 0.5°), which were either small O’s (low load 
condition: Figure 3.1) or the angular letters Y, H, Z, K, V (high load condition: 
Figure 3.2). A word was also presented at the same onset of the letter circle but 
disappeared after 94 ms (eight refresh rates of 11.7 ms). Piloting tests indicated that 
this duration made the valence detection possible (i.e. not at “floor”) yet 
challenging. Following the offset of the stimuli, a blank screen was displayed 
during the response interval for the letter search; until response or until the 2-
second time-limit has passed. Finally, a question mark indicating the response time 
for the valence detection followed immediately after and remained on-screen until 
response. 
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Figure 3.1: Trial sequence in Experiment 4. Trial onset was indicated by a 
fixation cross. Then, simultaneously, the letter circle (in this case low load) and a 
word (in this case: positive) appeared. The word disappeared before the letter 
circle. Participants indicated by key presses the target letter (in this case: ‘N’) and 
then, after appearance of the question mark, whether the word was emotional or 
neutral. 
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Figure 3.2: Trial sequence in Experiment 4. Trial onset was indicated by a 
fixation cross. Then, simultaneously, the letter circle (in this case high load) and a 
word (in this case: negative) appeared. The word disappeared before the letter 
circle. Participants indicated by key presses the target letter (in this case: ‘X’) and 
then, after appearance of the question mark, whether the word was emotional or 
neutral. 
 
 
The instructions clearly emphasized the importance of prioritizing the letter 
search task and the secondary nature of the valence detection task. Participants 
were required to respond to the letter search as fast as possible while maintaining 
accuracy, by pressing ‘0’ on the numerical keypad for ‘X’ and ‘2’ for ‘N’. Auditory 
feedback (a short ‘beep’) was given if the time limit was exceeded or if an incorrect 
response had been made. Immediately following the letter search response 
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participants were required to press ‘A’ if the word was emotional – negative or 
positive, according to the block – or ‘S’ if the word was neutral when the question 
mark appeared. 
All word stimuli were presented in the centre of the screen in light grey on a 
black background (luminance of the target word and background were 2.51 cd/m² 
and 0.03 cd/m², respectively). The words were shown in lower-case Arial Narrow 
font size 12. The lengths of the words ranged between 0.5° and 2.3°, and the height 
ranged between 0.5° and 0.4°.  
The allocation of neutral words to negative or positive blocks was also 
counterbalanced across participants. Participants completed eight experimental 
blocks of 44 trials each (22 emotional and 22 neutral words, in randomized order). 
This resulted in having four positive blocks (two low load and two high load), as 
well as four negative blocks (again two low load and two high load). Before each 
block, participants were informed of the load and valence of the upcoming block. 
Load was ordered in an ABBAABBA manner, with A and B representing either 
low or high load, counterbalanced across participants; valence was run in an 
ABABABAB order with A & B representing positive and negative valence, also 
counterbalanced across participants. Before the experiment, participants completed 
four practice blocks of 12 trials each. Each word was used once throughout the 
experiment, and different words were used for the practice blocks and the 
experimental blocks. 
As in Chapter 2, participants were asked to provide subjective valence 
ratings using a scale from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive) upon completion of 
the experiment. Following the valence-ratings session, participants also rated each 
word on arousal using the Self-Assessment Mannequin (Lang, 1980; see Chapter 
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2). The scale ranged from 1 (very calm) to 9 (very aroused), and 5 being neither 
calm nor aroused. The valence and arousal ratings were assessed to ensure that the 
valence and arousal levels of both emotional word categories were comparable, 
using the same procedure followed in Chapter 2. 
The mean valence ratings of the emotional word categories were initially 
1.75 (SD = .5) and 5.84 (SD = .51) for the negative and positive words 
respectively. No neutral words had to be excluded as their mean valence ratings did 
not differ significantly from 4 (M = 3.95, SD = .29).  
 Most participants rated the negative words as higher in arousal (M = 5.94, 
SD = 1.88) than the positive words (M = 4.99, SD = 1.29). The mean arousal 
ratings of the neutral words was 4.49 (SD = 0.87). To address any potential role for 
arousal in the effect of valence, the emotional word categories were matched on 
arousal, using the same method as in Chapter 2.  
Matching the words on both valence and arousal resulted in a total of forty-
two negative and forty-one positive words remaining on average for the analyses 
per participant, with mean valence ratings of 1.93 (SD = .51) for the negative 
words and 6.09 (SD = .56) for the positive words and mean arousal ratings of 5.75 
(SD = .93) for the negative words and 5.75 (SD = .94) for the positive words2. 
 
Results 
 Incorrect responses and missed trials were excluded from the results of both 
the letter search RTs and the valence detection in all experiments in Chapters 3 and 
4. Furthermore, the results reported for all the experiments in this thesis from here 
on are those for words matched on valence intensity and arousal.  
                                                
2 Two participants were excluded from the analyses: one did not participate in the call-back session to provide 
arousal ratings, another one had no words left in one of the conditions after matching for arousal. 
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Letter search 
 Letter search RTs in the high load were significantly slower (M = 960 ms) 
compared to the low load (M = 797; t(11) = 3.872, SEM = 42.26, p = .003), and 
accuracy rates were significantly lower in the high load (M = 77%) than in the low 
load (M = 87%; t(11) = 7.34, SEM = .014, p < .001). These results confirm that the 
load manipulation was successful. 
  
Valence detection 
The results are summarized in Table 3.1. A 2 (load: low vs. high) x 2 
(valence: negative vs. positive) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was conducted on the hit rates, the d’ scores, and on the beta scores for all 
experiments in Chapter 3.  
 
Table 3.1. Experiment 4: Mean % Hit Rates, d’ and Beta scores as a Function of 
Load and Valence 
 
 
 
 
 103 
The ANOVA on the hit rates revealed a significant main effect of load (F(1, 
11) = 47.43, MSE = 94.561, p < .001) indicating greater accuracy in the low 
compared to the high load supporting the hypothesis that high perceptual load 
would significantly reduce the detection of emotional valence (Table 3.1). The 
main effect of valence was also significant (F(1, 11) = 14.45, MSE = 212.591, p = 
.003). As shown in Table 3.1, the accuracy was higher for the negative compared to 
the positive words. The interaction between load and valence was not significant (F 
< 1). Thus a negative valence advantage was found on accuracy and this did not 
depend on the level of load. The d’ analyses reported next addresses the important 
question of whether these effects reflect a true perceptual sensitivity advantage and 
whether perceptual sensitivity would also be unaffected by load. 
A similar ANOVA on the d’ showed that, as expected, d’ scores were also 
significantly higher in the low load compared to the high load (F(1, 11) = 7.79, 
MSE = .232, p < .001; see Table 3.1). Detection sensitivity was therefore higher in 
the low load compared to the high load, as one would expect since more resources 
are available for additional processing under conditions of low perceptual load 
compared to high perceptual load. This result is consistent with Macdonald & 
Lavie (2008) and extends it to the detection of emotional valence. The main effect 
of valence found on the hit rates was not replicated for the d’ scores (F(1, 11) = 
3.028, MSE = .241, p = .11).  
Crucially, the interaction between load and valence was significant (F(1, 
11) = 5.603, MSE = .239, p = .037). As shown in Table 3.1, this interaction 
revealed a detection sensitivity advantage for the negative compared to the positive 
valence under low load (t(11) = 2.57, SEM = .224, p = .025) but not under high 
load t(11) = .505, SEM = .173, p = .62). The enhanced sensitivity to the negative 
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valence in the low load is in line with the negative valence detection advantage 
established in Chapter 2. Note that the low load conditions of Chapter 4 are more 
akin to the experimental conditions in Chapter 2 as attentional capacity was more 
available to the valence detection task in the low load condition. These findings 
support the prediction of a modulation of the negative valence detection advantage 
by perceptual load contradicting the idea that the enhanced sensitivity to negative 
valence is automatic. 
The ANOVA on the beta scores revealed a main effect of load (F(1,11) = 
8.06, MSE = 1.954, p = .016). The higher beta scores in the low load compared to 
the high load (see Table 3.1) indicate that the participants had adopted a more 
conservative criterion in the low load condition compared to the high load 
condition. A possible account for this is that participants may feel that under the 
low load they can make more accurate decisions and therefore be more cautious in 
their decision criterion thus becoming more conservative under the low load 
conditions compared to high load conditions.  
There was no significant main effect of valence (F < 1) or interaction 
(F(1,11) = 1.151, MSE = 1.773, p = .306). While the main effect of load on 
detection sensitivity was accompanied by an effect on response bias, the interaction 
between load and valence was not. The absence of a significant interaction between 
load and valence on the beta scores is important as the load by valence interaction 
on the d’ scores is the crucial finding. Clearly the effect of perceptual load on 
detection sensitivity was not accompanied by an effect on response criterion. 
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These results are suggestive of a mediating role of attention in the enhanced 
detection sensitivity to negative word valence. Before this suggestion can be taken 
as conclusive evidence, however, an important factor needed to be addressed. 
 
Effects of search RTs 
The search task RTs were longer in the high load than in the low load 
conditions. This could have resulted in participants forgetting the word presented 
or their valence decision more often by the time they had to make their valence 
detection response in the high load compared to the low load conditions. Thus an 
alternative account in such terms can explain both the overall reduction in detection 
sensitivity in the high (compared to low) load condition (see Macdonald & Lavie, 
2008) and more importantly the reduction in the negative valence advantage in 
high (compared to low) load condition. In other words one may claim that the 
detection advantage for negative valence was no longer found in the high load 
condition because the participants were more likely to forget the word by the time 
they made their search task response in the high load condition. More precisely, 
one may attribute the findings to a form of inattentional emotional amnesia (Wolfe, 
1999).  
To address this alternative account, a median split analysis was conducted 
on the basis of the load RT effect. The difference in search RTs between the high 
and low load conditions was calculated per each individual and then the group was 
split across the median of these RT load differences. This resulted in splitting the 
data into two groups; one below the median (indicating a small difference in RT 
 106 
between the low load and high load conditions), and one above the median 
(indicating a larger difference between the low load and high load conditions).  
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-model ANOVA with group as a between-subjects factor 
and load and valence as the within-subjects factors revealed no significant main 
effect of group (F(1,10) = 2.017, p = .186). The interactions between group and 
load (F(1,10) = .107, p = .75) and between group and valence (F(1,10) = .046, p = 
.835) were also not significant. Finally, the three-way interaction between group, 
load, and valence was not significant (F(1,10) = .376, p = .553).  
These results rule out alternative accounts in terms of slower search RTs for 
the effect of load, valence or the interaction. 
 
Lexical frequency 
 In order to rule out the possibility that the effects of negative valence were 
due to the negative words having a lower frequency (e.g. being perhaps more 
unique), the average frequencies of the three word categories were matched 
following the same procedure in Chapter 2. After matching the mean frequencies of 
all word categories in addition to the valence intensity and arousal levels of the 
emotional word categories, the interaction between load and valence on the d’ 
scores remained significant (F(1,11) = 4.984, MSE = .268, p = .047), revealing 
again an enhanced detection sensitivity for the negative valence (M = 1.47) 
compared to the positive valence (M = .95) under low load (t(11) = 2.312, SEM = 
.225, p = .041) but not under high load (M negative = .35, M positive = .49; t(11) = 
.778, SEM = .187, p = .453) 
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Experiment 4 clearly demonstrated an advantage for the detection of 
negative word valence in the low load but not in the high load, indicating that 
attentional resources are required for an enhanced detection sensitivity of negative 
valence. 
 
3.3 Experiment 5 
 
Although no significant interactions with group were found in the median 
split analyses, a potential concern is that this lack of effect may simply be due to 
the lack of power (since a smaller number of subjects are included in each group. 
In order to more conclusively rule out an alternative account in terms of the 
potential confounds (e.g. memory) involved with the different search RTs under the 
different conditions of load, in Experiment 5 the search task procedure was 
changed in an attempt to match the search RTs between the high and low load 
conditions. A 1-second time-window was added after onset of the stimuli before 
participants made the letter search response to provide a wait that is longer than the 
RT of the high load condition (M = 960 ms) in Experiment 4, with the prediction of 
finding a similar pattern of results as in Experiment 4. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Fourteen participants took part in Experiment 2 (mean age 22, range 18 – 
33; 8 females). 
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Stimuli and Procedure 
Stimuli and procedure were the same as in Experiment 4, except that 
participants had to wait for 1 second between stimulus onset until any response 
could be made. Following this time-window, the presentation of “X/N?” response 
probe signalled the time to make the letter search response within the two seconds 
the probe remained on-screen. The instructions still emphasized the primary 
importance of the letter search task. Upon making the letter search response, a 
question mark indicating the time to make the valence detection response followed 
and remained on-screen until response as in the previous experiment. 
As before, the emotional word categories were matched on valence and 
arousal. Neutral words were not excluded as their mean ratings did not differ from 
4 (M = 4, SD = .1). The mean valence ratings of the emotional word categories 
were initially 2.12 (SD = .63) and 5.41 (SD = .59) for the negative and positive 
words respectively. Eight of the fourteen participants rated the negative words as 
higher in arousal (M = 5.33, SD = 1.68) than the positive words (M = 5.05, SD = 
.98) with the neutral words having a mean arousal rating of 4.77 (SD = .54).  
After the emotional word categories were matched on both valence and 
arousal, a total of forty-nine negative and forty-eight positive words remained for 
the analyses with mean valence ratings of 2.45 (SD = .66) for the negative words, 
and 5.57 (SD = .66) for the positive words and mean arousal ratings that were 
matched to 5.43 (SD = .56) for the negative words, and 5.43 (SD = .56) for the 
positive words3. 
 
                                                
3 One participant did not have any words left in at least one of the conditions after matching the words on both valence and 
arousal, and was thus excluded from the analyses. 
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Results 
 
Letter search 
Search responses were no longer significantly slower in the high load (M = 
411 ms) compared to the low load (M = 382 ms; (t(12) = 1.7, SEM = 17.02, p = 
.116). However, accuracy rates were significantly lower in the high load (M = 
80%) compared to the low load condition (M = 94%; t(12) = 6.36, SEM = .02, p < 
.001), confirming that the manipulation of load remained effective.  
 
Valence detection 
 Table 3.2 shows the results of Experiment 5. 
 
Table 3.2. Experiment 5: Mean % Hit Rates, d’ and Beta scores as a Function of 
Load and Valence 
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The ANOVA on the participants’ hit rates revealed a significant main effect 
of load (F(1, 12) = 4.773, MSE = 226.298, p = .049) reflecting greater accuracy in 
the low than in the high load as expected and in line with the findings of 
Experiment 4.  Accuracy was also significantly greater for the negative compared 
to the positive words (F(1,12) = 5.727, MSE = 399.651, p = .034: see Table 3.2). 
No significant interaction was found (F < 1). These results replicate the pattern 
found on the accuracy results in Experiment 4. 
Detection sensitivity was also higher in the low load compared to the high 
load (F(1, 12) = 12.106, MSE = .46, p = .005) in line with the prediction that the 
detection of emotional valence would be adversely affected by high perceptual load 
as in Experiment 4. Detection sensitivity was significantly higher for the negative 
valence compared to the positive valence (F(1, 12) = 8.574, MSE = .248, p = .013; 
Table 3.2).  
More importantly, the interaction between load and valence was also 
significant (F(1,12) = 5.258, MSE = .147, p = .041), revealing again an enhanced 
sensitivity to the negative valence compared to the positive valence in the low load 
condition (t(12) = 3.95, SEM = .164, p = .002) but not significant in the high load 
condition (t(12) = .875, SEM = .184, p = .399; Table 3.2). These findings replicate 
the results of Experiment 4 supporting once again the enhanced sensitivity to 
negative valence found in Chapter 2 under conditions of no perceptual load and 
show that this effect can also be found under conditions of low load where 
sufficient attentional resources are available while ruling out the potential 
confounds involved with the different search RTs in the different conditions of 
load. 
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The ANOVA on the beta scores revealed no main effect of load (F < 1) 
contrary to the results of Experiment 4. This suggests that the difference in 
response bias between the two conditions of load found in Experiment 4 might be 
due to differences in search RTs between the load conditions. Although Table 3.2 
shows a difference between the beta scores of the negative and positive words that 
appears to be larger under low load in comparison with the high load, no main 
effects of valence (F(1,12) = 1.535, MSE = 2.024, p = .239), or an interaction (F < 
1) were observed. Thus similarly to the previous experiment, the effect of load on 
valence detection was not accompanied by an effect on response bias. 
 
Lexical frequency 
Matching the three word categories on mean lexical frequencies in addition 
to matching the valence intensity and arousal levels of the emotional word 
categories weakened the interaction between load and valence on the d’ scores 
(Low load: M negative = 1.90, M positive = 1.30; High load: M negative = 1.03, M 
positive = .74; F(1,12) = 1.395, MSE = .229, p = .26), although in the same 
direction. The lack of an interaction found here is most likely due to the increase in 
the negative valence detection advantage under high load in the present experiment 
(mean difference of .29) compared to before the frequency levels were matched 
(mean difference of .14). The negative valence advantage did not markedly differ 
in the low load (mean difference of .60 after matching mean frequencies versus a 
difference of .65 before matching for frequency). The main effect of valence 
remained significant (F(1,12) = 9.551, MSE = .274, p = .009). 
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It appears therefore that when the mean frequencies of the word lists were 
matched, the negative valence detection advantage became stronger under high 
load. Bearing in mind that the overall response latencies were longer in this 
experiment relative to Experiment 4 due to the forced 1-second wait, this could 
lead to a greater likelihood of forgetting, and low frequency words are known to be 
more prone to forgetting than high frequency words. Given that the negatively 
valenced words were of lower overall frequency this would have disadvantaged the 
negative valence when attentional resources were scarce (under high load) so that 
the advantage was no longer found. Once the lexical frequencies were equated, this 
allowed the negative valence advantage to be reinstated even in the high load 
condition. In addition, this appears to be due to the greater detection of high 
frequency positive words in the high load which may have masked the negative 
valence detection advantage as shown by lower d’ scores for the positive valence in 
the high load when the frequency levels were matched (mean d’ = .74) compared to 
before matching the mean lexical frequencies (mean d’ = .85). This finding does 
not challenge the effect of load on the negative valence detection advantage found 
in Experiment 4, however, as it reflects potential effects of frequency on memory.  
 
 In summary, Experiment 5 ruled out potential confounds involved with 
different RTs in different load conditions and supported the results of Experiment 
4, providing further evidence of a modulation of the negative valence detection 
advantage by perceptual load. However, when frequency levels were matched, the 
negative valence advantage was unveiled in the high load suggesting a potential 
effect of frequency on memory that may have concealed the enhanced sensitivity to 
the negative valence in the previous experiment. 
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3.4 Experiment 6 
 
The results of Chapter 2 showed that the enhanced detection of negative 
valence occurs even in the absence of subjective awareness of the words. This 
raises the interesting question with regards to attention and whether the valence 
detection of words presented under conditions of unconscious processing would 
also depend on attention. In other words, when perceptual load is manipulated, 
would the detection of negative valence for subliminally presented words be 
modulated by load? Perceptual load has been found to also influence unconscious 
processing. For example, Bahrami, Lavie, & Rees (2007) provided support for 
modulation of neural activity by perceptual load in primary visual cortex (V1) in 
response to irrelevant neutral stimuli that were made invisible by continuous flash 
suppression (CFS). Responses to the presence of an invisible object were 
significantly reduced under high perceptual load. In another paradigm that involved 
a task-irrelevant oriented grating that was suppressed from awareness, perceptual 
load also modulated the orientation-specific adaptation (i.e. adaptation was only 
found in low load and not in high load; Bahrami, Carmel, Walsh, Rees, & Lavie, 
2008). The effect of perceptual load is therefore not limited to consciously-
perceived stimuli.  
Considering this evidence in addition to evidence of an enhanced sensitivity 
to negative valence in unconsciously presented words in Chapter 2, Experiment 6 
was conducted to investigate whether the effect of perceptual load on the negative 
valence advantage may extend to subliminally-presented emotional words. It was 
firstly predicted therefore that, as in Experiments 4 and 5, a reduction of detection 
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sensitivity in general would be found from low load to high load. In addition, based 
on the findings in Experiments 4 and 5 showing an elimination of the negative 
valence detection advantage under high load, the second and more critical question 
was whether perceptual load would also modulate the negative valence advantage 
even under conditions that produce more instances of unconscious processing. But 
given that the present experiment involves early processing, one might find 
alternatively that the enhanced sensitivity to negative valence may not be affected 
by attention.  
 
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty new participants were recruited and paid £7 for their participation. 
Three participants were excluded on the basis of adopting a constant response 
(having a 100% false alarm rate) and one participant was excluded due to 
extremely low accuracy on the letter search task (less than 55%) in the high load. 
This resulted in a final number of twenty-six participants (mean age 23, range 18 – 
40; 22 females). 
 
Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli and procedure were similar to those in Experiment 4. However, 
in order to achieve subliminal processing of the words a few crucial changes were 
made: the word was presented for only 35 ms, its brightness was reduced, and it 
was followed by a mask of eight hash characters for the remaining display duration 
(165 ms). After responding to the word valence detection task, a confidence rating 
scale represented by the phrase ‘How sure are you?’, to which participants 
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indicated from 1 (pure guess) to 5 (absolutely sure) how confident they were about 
their valence categorization of the word, was presented. Confidence ratings were 
collected to assess the level of awareness. 
Again, all word stimuli were presented in the centre of the screen in light 
grey (luminance: target word = 1.75 cd/m², mask = 2.08 cd/m²) on a black 
background (.03 cd/m²). The length of the mask was 2.5° and its height was 0.5°. 
As in the previous experiments, the valence and arousal ratings of the words 
were collected and matched. The neutral words’ mean valence ratings did not 
significantly differ from 4 (M = 3.93, SD = .41), and were therefore not excluded. 
The mean valence ratings for the negative and positive words were initially 2.15 
(SD = .81) and 5.41 (SD = .77) respectively. Across all participants, the mean 
arousal ratings were 4.98 (SD = 1.86) for the negative words, 4.48 (SD = 1.26) for 
the positive words, and 4.07 (SD = 1.44) for the neutral words.  
An average of thirty-eight negative and thirty-seven positive words 
remained in the analyses per participant after matching the word lists on both 
valence and arousal, resulting in mean valence ratings of 2.45 (SD = .81) for 
negative words and 5.57 (SD = .92) for positive words4, as well as a mean arousal 
rating of 4.81 (SD = 1.18) for each of the negative and positive word lists. 
 
Results 
  
Letter search 
 Response times were significantly slower in the high load (M = 969 ms) 
than in the low load (M = 838 ms; t(25) = 5.884 , SEM = 22.33, p < .001). In 
                                                
4 One participant was excluded from the analyses due to an insufficient number of words left in at least one of the conditions 
after matching the word categories on valence and arousal. 
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addition, accuracy rates were significantly lower in the high load (M = 75%) than 
in the low load condition (M = 89%; t(25) = 7.98 SEM = .018, p <.001).  
 
Valence detection 
 The results are summarized in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3. Experiment 6: Mean % Hit Rates, d’, Beta scores, and Confidence 
ratings as a Function of Load and Valence 
 
 
The ANOVA on the hit rates revealed no significant main effects of load, 
valence, or an interaction (all F’s < 1). This is not too surprising given that the hit 
rates were close to guessing level and did not differ from chance (50%) even in the 
low load (all p’s > .438; see Table 3.3) as commonly seen in the literature of 
unconscious processing. 
The d’ scores were reduced in the low load compared to the high load 
although this effect only reached marginal significance (F(1,24) = 4.149, MSE = 
.571, p = .053, Table 3.3). This finding goes in line with the results of Experiments 
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4 and 5 and supports the first hypothesis of a reduction of detection sensitivity 
under high load compared to low load.  
More importantly, there was a significant main effect of valence (F(1,24) = 
6.005, MSE = .279, p = .022), indicating an enhanced sensitivity to negative 
valence under both load conditions (Table 3.3) as shown by the lack of an 
interaction (F < 1). The lack of an interaction found here is in contrast with 
Experiments 4 and 5. I note that although the negative valence detection advantage 
in the present experiment is smaller than that found in the low load conditions of 
Experiment 4 and 5, these findings may indicate an early-level processing 
advantage. 
They suggest that early perceptual processing that has not reached full 
consciousness may show a negative valence advantage that is unaffected by 
attention. This conclusion is different to the previously established effects of 
perceptual load on the processing of non-emotional unconscious stimuli (e.g. 
Bahrami et al., 2007; Bahrami et al., 2008). It suggests that unlike other early 
perceptual processes (e.g. in the case of orientation, (Bahrami et al. 2008) or 
pictures of tools (Bahrami et al., 2007)) the early unconscious processing of 
negative valence may be automatic.  
Valence detection was significantly greater than chance in all conditions 
(low load: negative: t(24) = 3.624, SEM = .172, p = .001; positive: t(24) = 3.398, 
SEM = .13, p = .002; high load: negative: t(24) = 3.928, SEM = .1, p = .002) except 
for the positive words in the high load (t(24) = .522, SEM = .111, p = .606). Note 
that the low load conditions are more equivalent to the conditions in Chapter 2, but 
here the results showed that the d’ scores of the negative words were significantly 
greater than chance in the low load unlike in Chapter 2 where their d’ scores did 
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not differ from chance. This may reflect that the conditions in the present 
experiment were less successful in producing unconscious processing on as many 
trials as in Chapter 2. This effect is corroborated by the confidence ratings reported 
below. 
The ANOVA on the beta scores revealed no main effects of both load (F < 
1) or valence (F(1,24) = 1.286, MSE = .941, p = .268). As can be seen in Table 3.3, 
the difference between the beta scores of the negative and positive words appears 
to be in opposite directions in the low and high load conditions. This interaction, 
however, was not significant (F(1,24) = 3.402, MSE = 1.039, p = .078). The 
valence effects found were therefore not accompanied by effects of response bias.  
 
Lexical frequency 
After equating all word categories on frequency and the emotional word 
categories on valence intensity and arousal, the enhanced detection sensitivity for 
the negative words compared to the positive words under both load conditions 
became weaker (Low load: M negative = .66, M positive = .45; High load: M 
negative = .40, M positive = .13; F(1,24) = 3.779, MSE = .397, p = .064). The 
negative valence detection advantage increased slightly from .18 before matching 
the frequency levels to .21 after matching the mean lexical frequencies in the low 
load, whereas it decreased slightly in the high load from .33 to .27 respectively. 
The weaker valence effect found after the mean lexical frequencies were matched 
might be due to power issues (a weaker power of the analysis as a result of having 
less trials because of more exclusions) or of a contribution of frequency effects on 
valence detection. 
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Confidence ratings 
The overall confidence ratings were fairly low (2.12 for negative, 1.85 for 
neutral, 1.94 for positive words), bearing in mind that the scale ranged from 1 (pure 
guess) to 5 (absolutely sure). As confidence ratings were nearer to the ‘pure guess’ 
end of the scale, this indicates that participants were guessing on most of the trials. 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests showed no significant difference between the overall 
confidence ratings of the neutral words compared to the confidence ratings for 
positive words (Z = 1.802, p = .072). But confidence ratings were significantly 
higher for negative words compared to both neutral words (Z = 3.122, p = .002), 
and positive words (Z = 2.258, p = .024). Moreover, the confidence ratings of the 
negative words were significantly higher than those of the neutral words under both 
low load (M neutral = 2.12; Z = 2.971, p = .003) and high load (M neutral = 1.53; Z 
= 2.157, p = .031) conditions. Although the confidence ratings of the negative 
words appear to be slightly higher than those of the positive words under each of 
the load conditions (as shown in Table 3.3), neither these differences nor the 
difference between the confidence ratings of the positive and neutral words under 
low and high load were significant (all p’s > .136).  
The higher confidence ratings of the negative words suggest that some of 
the negative words had possibly accessed awareness more frequently than the 
neutral and positive words. It should be noted that both the overall confidence 
ratings and the confidence ratings in the low load were slightly higher in this 
experiment than the confidence ratings in Chapter 2 (recall that the mean 
confidence ratings were 1.62, 1.54, and 1.55 for the negative, positive, and neutral 
words respectively). This is in line with the results of the d’ scores suggesting that 
 120 
the presentation conditions of the present experiment may have been less 
successful than those of Chapter 2 in reliably producing subliminal processing.  
Similarly to Chapter 2 therefore, I sought to examine only the trials that did 
produce unconscious processing by comparing responses with a confidence rating 
of 1 (‘pure guess’)5. However, after excluding some trials to match for valence and 
arousal, a large number of participants did not have sufficient trials left in at least 
one of the conditions when only trials of a confidence rating of 1 were included. 
The power of these comparisons was therefore too weak for them to be conducted 
after discarding the data of so many participants.  
Finally, as in Chapter 2, an assessment of awareness of the words by 
examining whether or not participants were more confident on correct responses 
compared to incorrect responses was attempted. Once again, however, many of the 
participants had to be excluded as splitting the data into the correct and incorrect 
trials after excluding some words to match the valence and arousal levels left too 
few or sometimes even no trials in at least one of the conditions. These 
comparisons were therefore not conducted due to the consequent lack of power.  
 
In summary, a main effect of valence was observed in Experiment 6. No 
interaction between load and valence was found; indicating that the advantage for 
the detection of negative words over positive words was present in both load 
conditions. Though the confidence ratings were low overall suggesting that 
participants were guessing most of the time, the confidence ratings of the negative 
words indicate that some of the negative words had possibly accessed participants’ 
                                                
5 Eight participants had to be excluded for not having any trials with a confidence rating of “1” left in at least one of the 
conditions. 
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awareness more often than the positive words, reflecting perhaps a lower conscious 
threshold for the negative valence.  
It is clear that a negative valence detection advantage is still found when the 
words are presented for a shorter duration under conditions that produce more trials 
of reduced awareness, with no effect of load. Still, it is possible that with reduced 
processing time of the word task, participants were prioritizing the valence 
detection task and were consequently performing better in the high load than 
previously. This does not appear to be the case here, however, as high load did 
effectively reduce the detection sensitivity to the words.  
 
3.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
The present chapter investigated whether the negative valence detection 
advantage established in the previous chapter is modulated by attentional load and 
showed that under some circumstances attention is required for the enhanced 
sensitivity to negative valence. The findings of the present chapter were once again 
obtained after matching the emotional word categories on valence intensity, 
arousal, and frequency levels, and were not accompanied by a difference in 
response bias between the negative and positive valence. 
The results of this chapter demonstrated that perceptual load reduces 
conscious detection advantage for negative valence, but a small advantage remains 
irrespective of attentional load in conditions of subliminal presentations that are 
more likely to produce unconscious processing. This offers a possible resolution to 
previous controversies regarding the relation of emotional information to both 
attention versus automaticity and conscious versus unconscious processing (e.g. 
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Pessoa, 2005; Pessoa et al., 2002; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Whalen et al., 1998). 
Specifically, the results of Chapter 3 suggest that while unconscious processing of 
negative emotional valence may be automatic, the ‘full-blown’ conscious detection 
of emotional valence does require attention. I discuss each of these findings in turn. 
The negative valence detection advantage for consciously perceived words 
was modulated by the level of attentional load in the primary task, in line with 
Lavie’s (1995) perceptual load theory. Sensitivity to the negative valence was 
greater than to the positive valence under low perceptual load but the advantage 
was eliminated under high perceptual load even after ruling out differences in 
overall RTs as alternative accounts for the effect of load. These findings confirm 
the prediction that high load would modulate the negative valence detection 
advantage and are consistent with previous research showing a modulation of the 
processing of negative emotion by attentional load (e.g. to fearful faces; Pessoa et 
al., 2005). The present chapter thus extends the effects of perceptual load on 
perception established in previous research showing for the first time a modulation 
of the negative valence detection advantage by attention. 
Although relatively small (a .33 valence effect in the high load of 
Experiment 6 (Table 3.3) compared to a .58 effect in Experiment 4 (Table 3.1)), a 
negative detection advantage was still found under conditions of both low and high 
perceptual load for subliminal presentations. This finding indicates that the 
enhanced detection sensitivity to negative valence is not modulated by load when 
processed subliminally. The suggestion that unconscious processing is automatic is 
inconsistent with previous findings of a modulating role of perceptual load on non-
emotional subliminal stimuli (e.g. Baharami et al., 2007). This suggests that the 
effects of attention on unconscious processing established in previous research may 
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not extend to the case of negative emotional processing when processed at an early 
stage. However, differences in the methods used here and in the previous studies 
(e.g. Bahrami et al., 2007; 2008) preclude a firm conclusion. Future research can 
examine whether CFS suppression would lead to load modulation of the negative 
valence advantage. Finally, the results of the present chapter also implied an 
automatic processing of negative valence (and potentially a lower conscious 
threshold) even when attentional resources are scarce as indicated by sensitivity 
that was greater than chance performance in contrast with the positive valence. 
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Chapter 4: 
Emotion Detection and Attention: The Role of Individual 
Differences in Anxiety 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The present chapter examined the role of individual differences in anxiety 
levels in emotion detection under different levels of attentional load. Previous 
research has established that higher anxiety levels are associated with a greater 
processing priority for negative valence using a vast range of methods (for a review 
see Bar-Haim et al., 2007), but this negative advantage in anxiety has not been 
established with respect to detection sensitivity. As reviewed in the General 
Introduction, Manguno-Mire et al. (2005) examined the effects of anxiety levels on 
the detection of negative words but found a response bias for negative words in 
high anxiety compared to low anxiety with no difference in detection sensitivity 
between the two groups. The question of whether negative valence is truly better 
detected than positive valence in individuals with high anxiety levels thus remains 
open.  
The results of Chapter 2 clearly showed an enhanced detection sensitivity to 
negative valence (versus positive valence), however these findings apply to the 
general population and do not address any individual differences in anxiety. The 
first aim of the present chapter, therefore, was to ask whether individual differences 
in anxiety would affect the negative valence detection advantage. Specifically, 
would high anxiety be associated with a greater sensitivity to negative valence? 
Previous claims of an increased vigilance to threat in anxiety (e.g. Fox et al., 2001; 
MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Mogg et al., 1993) leads to the following 
predictions: High anxiety will be associated with higher detection sensitivity to the 
negative valence (as expressed in higher d’ scores) compared low anxiety and may 
also be associated with more extreme valence ratings for the negative words. It is 
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important to note that if any correlation is found between anxiety levels and the 
valence ratings, this will not affect the results concerning the valence detection as 
any differences in extremeness of valence ratings between the negative and positive 
valences was corrected for on an individual basis. I note that as the previous 
literature did not establish that high anxiety is associated with a greater detection 
sensitivity to negative valence, it remains an open question that this would be 
found with detection sensitivity measures. 
The second and perhaps most important aim of the present chapter was to 
ask how levels of trait anxiety interact with the effects of attention on valence 
detection. Chapter 3 has established that attentional load eliminated the detection 
advantage to negative valence. In the present chapter I therefore examined whether 
this holds regardless of anxiety levels. Alternatively, high anxiety levels would be 
associated with a reduced effect of attention on the negative detection advantage 
given that individuals with high anxiety are more tuned to negative valence (e.g. 
Richards et al., 1992; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Fox, 1993) and may remain 
more tuned to it even when less attentional resources are available (e.g. Fox et al., 
2005).  
As detailed in the General Introduction of this thesis, studies have shown 
using the attentional cueing paradigm that negative words capture and engage 
attention to a greater extent than neutral words (e.g. Salemink et al., 2007; 
MacLeod et al., 1986) and positive words (Fox et al., 2001) in high compared to 
low anxiety. In addition, a large body of research has shown that unattended 
negative words compared to positive words produce greater interference in 
individuals with high compared to low anxiety (e.g. Richards et al., 1992; Mathews 
& MacLeod, 1985; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Mogg et al., 1993) as shown by 
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longer response latencies to negative words in the emotional Stroop task. Negative 
words compared to positive or neutral words have also been found to cause greater 
disruption (as shown by slower responses) when acting as disractors in highly 
anxious participants (e.g. Mathews et al., 1990; Mathews et al., 1995).  
The findings of studies showing that trait anxiety is associated with greater 
interference and capture of attention from negative words are confined to measures 
of response times, as such they cannot inform about any advantage for the negative 
words in detection per se. In other words, one cannot conclude from previous 
research revealing effects on response latencies what would be the effect of anxiety 
on detection sensitivity. 
The effect of anxiety levels on the brain processing of emotion, however, 
has been found to be modulated by perceptual load. For example, Bishop et al. 
(2007) found that individuals with high trait anxiety showed no significant increase 
in DLPFC activity that is normally found in response to fearful faces under low 
load in contrast with the low anxious participants who did. No such increase was 
observed for either anxiety group under high perceptual load. As these findings 
revealed that high perceptual load eliminated individual differences in anxiety, one 
may expect that no modulation of the negative valence detection by anxiety will be 
found under high perceptual load in the present chapter. I note, however, that 
Bishop et al. (2007) did not measure detection sensitivity, and their study involved 
emotional faces (as opposed to words in the present thesis) that were entirely 
unattended (in contrast with the task in Experiment 7 where participants are 
required to detect the valence of the words while prioritizing the letter search). It is 
possible, therefore, that under these conditions, individual differences in anxiety 
will be associated with a modulation of the effect of load on valence detection. 
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Anxiety seems to have an effect not only on the processing of emotional 
stimuli, but also on the processing of information in general (for example, the 
attentional control system has been found to be affected in individuals with high 
anxiety; Eysenck et al., 2007). Of potential relevance to the present chapter is the 
Processing Efficiency theory of anxiety (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) that describes 
individuals with high anxiety as having a reduced attentional capacity (due to the 
presence of worrisome thoughts that take up most of the available attentional 
resources) that adversely affects processing efficiency of tasks. Taking this model 
into account, one would expect that the processing of additional stimuli would be 
greatly diminished in dual tasks under conditions where attentional capacity is 
taken up by another task (i.e. high load) in high anxiety, due to the lack of available 
attentional capacity. This suggests that detection sensitivity to emotional valence 
would be greatly diminished under conditions of high attentional load in 
individuals with high anxiety. However, previous research on the effects of anxiety 
on attentional capacity was mainly focused on higher level cognitive control 
functions such as working memory and dual-task coordination rather than 
perceptual load per se and so it is not clear whether similar effects would be 
established in conditions of high perceptual load. In fact, previous load studies 
showed opposite effects of cognitive load and perceptual load on distractor 
processing (e.g. Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004). 
To sum up, considering the literature showing an increased vigilance to 
threat as well as a reduced attentional capacity in anxiety, in this chapter I sought to 
establish firstly, whether differences in the enhanced detection of negative versus 
positive valence would be found between different anxiety groups. A second major 
aim of this chapter was to investigate whether individual differences in anxiety 
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would modulate the load effect found on the negative valence detection advantage. 
Experiment 7 was therefore conducted following the same paradigm used in 
Experiment 4 of Chapter 3 with the addition of collecting participants’ State and 
Trait anxiety levels.  
 
4.2 Experiment 7 
 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of one hundred participants recruited from University College 
London’s online participant pool participated in the study on a voluntary basis and 
were paid £7 for their participation. All except two participants (were excluded as a 
result) were native English speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
One participant reported the misattribution of the response keys on several trials 
during the experiment and was thus excluded from the analyses of the study and a 
final one was excluded from the analyses due to extremely low accuracy on the 
letter-search task in the high load condition (less than 50% accuracy). The 
remaining ninety-six participants had a mean age of 22 (range 18 – 46, 57 females).  
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
The procedure followed in Experiment 7 was identical to that of 
Experiment 4 in Chapter 3 with the following exception (Figure 4.1 and Figure 
4.2). Prior to commencing the experimental phase of the study, each participant 
completed a computerized version of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI). 
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Figure 4.1: Trial sequence in Experiment 7. Trial onset was indicated by a 
fixation cross. Then, simultaneously, the letter circle (in this case low load) and a 
word (in this case: positive) appeared. The word disappeared before the letter 
circle. Participants indicated by key presses the target letter (in this case: ‘N’) and 
then, after appearance of the question mark, whether the word was emotional or 
neutral. 
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Figure 4.2: Trial sequence in Experiment 7. Trial onset was indicated by a 
fixation cross. Then, simultaneously, the letter circle (in this case high load) and a 
word (in this case: negative) appeared. The word disappeared before the letter 
circle. Participants indicated by key presses the target letter (in this case: ‘X’) and 
then, after appearance of the question mark, whether the word was emotional or 
neutral. 
 
As in Chapters 2 and 3, participants provided subjective valence and 
arousal ratings for each of the words upon completion of the experiment. The mean 
valence ratings of the emotional word categories were initially 2.08 (SD = .57) and 
5.34 (SD = .5) for the negative and positive words respectively. No neutral words 
had to be excluded as their mean valence ratings did not differ significantly from 4 
(M = 3.86, SD = .39). Most participants gave the negative words higher arousal 
ratings than the positive words. The mean arousal ratings across all participants 
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were originally 4.99 (SD = 1.85), 4.33 (SD = 1.33), and 3.53 (SD = 1.51) for the 
negative, positive, and neutral words respectively. 
After matching the words on both valence and arousal, an average of fifty-
three negative and fifty-one positive words remained per participant for the 
analyses with mean valence ratings of 2.39 (SD = .52) for the negative words and 
5.69 (SD = .54) for the positive words and mean arousal ratings of 4.71 (SD = 1.42) 
for the negative words and 4.71 (SD = 1.41) for the positive words6.  
 
 
Results  
 
Overall group performance 
 
Letter search 
 Letter search RTs were significantly slower in the high load (M = 995 ms) 
compared to the low load (M = 811 ms; t(95) = 17.55, SEM = 10.486, p < .001) 
and accuracy rates were significantly lower in the high load (M = 77%) than in the 
low load condition (M = 90%; t(95) = 16.999, SEM = .007, p < .001), confirming 
that the load manipulation was successful. 
  
Valence detection 
 The results are shown in Table 4.1. A 2 (load: low vs. high) x 2 (valence: 
negative vs. positive) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted across all 
participants on the hit rates, the d’ scores, and the beta scores.  
                                                
6 Two participants did not have any words left for the analyses in at least one of the conditions and were 
therefore not included in the valence detection results. 
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Table 4.1. Experiment 7: Mean % Hit Rates, d’ and Beta scores as a Function of 
Load and Valence 
 
 
 The ANOVA on the hit rates revealed a significant main effect of load 
(F(1,93) = 47.292, MSE = 248.478, p < .001) indicating greater accuracy in the low 
compared to the high load condition. As seen in Table 4.1, accuracy was also 
significantly higher for the negative compared to the positive words (F(1,93) = 
45.502, MSE = 358.331, p < .001). No significant interaction between load and 
valence was observed (F < 1). These results replicate those found in Chapter 3. 
The d’ scores were significantly higher in the low load compared to the 
high load (F(1,93) = 85.658, MSE = .496, p < .001; Table 4.1). The main effect of 
valence was also significant for the d’ scores (F(1,93) = 20.365, MSE = .333, p < 
.001) reflecting an enhanced detection sensitivity to the negative compared to the 
positive valence. More importantly, the interaction between load and valence was 
also significant (F(1,93) = 9.461, MSE = .212, p = .003). As can be seen in Table 
4.1, this interaction indicated a greater enhancement of detection sensitivity to the 
negative valence compared to the positive valence in the low load than in the high 
load, in line with the findings in Chapter 3. While the negative word valence had 
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significantly higher d’ scores than the positive valence in the low load (t(93) = 
5.178, SEM = .08, p < .001), the numerical trend for higher detection sensitivity to 
the negative valence versus positive valence did not reach significance in the high 
load (t(93) = 1.704, SEM = .072, p = .092) as in Experiments 4 and 5.  
The pattern of these results replicates the pattern found in the same 
paradigm in Chapter 3, however, the load effect on valence detection found here 
appears to be smaller (a mean difference of .28 between the low and high load) 
than that found in Experiment 4 (mean difference of .67). A Mixed Factor ANOVA 
with the between-subjects factor of Experiment and within-subjects factors of load 
and valence showed no interaction with Experiment (F(1,104) = 1.755, p = .188), 
thus this difference was not significant. 
The ANOVA on the beta scores revealed a main effect of load (F(1,93) = 
21.413, MSE = 5.545, p < .001), indicating higher beta scores (and thus a more 
conservative criterion) under high load compared to low load. This could be due to 
the participants feeling they can perform more accurately under conditions of low 
load and thus adopt a more careful and conservative criterion. Similar results 
showing higher beta scores in the low load compared to the high load were 
observed in Experiment 4 (Chapter 3).  
The main effect of valence was also significant (F(1,93) = 4.25, MSE = 
4.496, p = .042; Table 4.1), showing that participants were more conservative with 
the detection of the positive words compared to the negative words. The interaction 
between load and valence was not significant (F < 1). This bias was not found in 
the previous chapter. While it is not clear why there is a difference between the 
present results and those of Chapter 3, it may be due to the inclusion of a greater 
variation of participants specifically those with extremely low or extremely high 
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anxiety. However, notice that these results go in line with those found in the longer 
exposure duration (33 ms) of Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) where participants showed 
a more conservative bias in response to the positive valence compared to the 
negative valence. While the negative valence sensitivity advantage may sometimes 
be accompanied by a less conservative criterion for the negative words, given that 
the two measures of d’ and beta are independent of each other, this clearly does not 
undermine the negative detection advantage established. Note also that although 
participants showed a more conservative bias in detecting the positive valence 
compared to the negative valence, the response bias for the negative valence was 
still conservative (mean beta > 1 indicating a conservative criterion: see Table 4.1). 
 
Lexical frequency 
 As in all previous experiments, some of the positive and neutral words with 
the highest frequencies were excluded from the analyses until the remaining words 
had similar average frequencies to the negative words. Matching the word 
categories on valence intensity, arousal levels, and mean frequencies did not 
change the direction or significance of any of the mean effects of load, valence, or 
the interaction between load and valence for the d’ scores (all p’s remained < .05). 
 
The role of trait anxiety 
 
 Participants’ Trait and State anxiety scores ranged from 27 to 70 (M = 44) 
and from 20 to 55 (M = 35)7 respectively. There was a significant positive 
correlation between participants’ Trait and State anxiety scores (r = .622, p < .001), 
                                                
7 The data for the state anxiety scores of five participants were lost and were thus excluded from these 
analyses. 
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which is expected since Trait and State anxiety are known to be highly correlated 
(Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Eysenck, 1992). State anxiety was not 
manipulated; therefore the analyses reported in the remainder of this chapter will 
focus on individual differences in Trait anxiety. 
 
In order to examine whether high anxiety is associated with a tendency to 
interpret the words more negatively, Pearson correlations were conducted on 
participants’ Trait anxiety scores and the individual mean valence ratings for each 
word category. These analyses revealed that Trait anxiety was negatively correlated 
with the valence ratings of the negative words (r = -.234, p = .023), in support with 
the prediction that high anxiety is associated with lower (i.e. more extreme) 
valence ratings for the negative words. No significant correlation was found 
between the Trait anxiety scores and the mean valence ratings of the positive words 
(r = .019, p = .856).  
Interestingly, Trait anxiety was also negatively correlated with the valence 
ratings of the neutral words (r = -.247, p = .016), implying that high anxiety is 
related to a tendency to evaluate neutral information more negatively. Considering 
that high anxiety is associated with a greater distance between the valence ratings 
of the positive words and the neutral words, and given that the ratings of the neutral 
words were not corrected for and thus remain closer to the negative end, one might 
expect to find a better ability to distinguish the positive valence from the neutral 
valence in high anxiety. As the results show below, however, this was not the case. 
I note that although high anxiety was associated with more extreme negative 
valence ratings, this correlation does not affect the results concerning the rest of the 
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analyses as the intensities of the subjective valence ratings between the negative 
and positive valences were matched for each participant. 
 
Valence detection results 
Pearson correlations were conducted across all participants on the Trait 
anxiety scores and the load effect on the hit rates (hit rates in the low load minus 
the hit rates in the high load) and on the d’ scores (d’ scores in the low load minus 
the d’ scores in the high load) and showed no significant correlations with either 
load effects (hit rates: r = -.162, p = .119; d’ scores: r = -.163, p = .115). These 
findings do not support the idea that high anxiety is associated with reduced 
attentional capacity (as one hypothesis is that high anxiety should be associated 
with a greater load effect). As discussed in the Chapter Introduction, this is not 
surprising given that previous research has implicated a reduced capacity for higher 
cognitive control functions rather than perceptual capacity.  
Pearson correlations between participants’ Trait anxiety scores and the 
valence effect on the hit rates (hit rates of the negative words minus the hit rates of 
the positive words) and on detection sensitivity (d’ scores of the negative words 
minus the d’ scores of the positive words) were also conducted. These analyses 
revealed no significant correlations with the valence effect on the hit rates (r = -
.004, p = .969), whereas a marginally-significant positive correlation between Trait 
anxiety and the valence effect on detection sensitivity was found (r = .199, p = 
.054). This indicates that the negative valence detection advantage increased as 
Trait anxiety increased, supporting the hypothesis that high anxiety is associated 
with an increased sensitivity to negative valence. Thus note that even when 
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detection sensitivity is matched for the valence ratings an increased sensitivity was 
still found in high anxiety.  
In order to investigate this correlation in more detail, Pearson correlations 
were conducted on the Trait anxiety scores and the valence effect on sensitivity 
under each condition of load separately. These revealed that although Trait anxiety 
did not correlate with the valence effect in the low load (r = .052, p = .619), it 
positively correlated with the valence effect in the high load (r = .273, p = .008), 
suggesting that the negative valence detection advantage was increased with higher 
Trait anxiety in the high load condition (as can be seen in Figure 4.1).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Correlation of Trait anxiety scores with the valence effect on d’ in the 
high load condition. 
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The association between Trait anxiety and the valence effect on sensitivity 
in the high load implies potential differences between anxiety groups in the 
sensitivity to emotion especially when less attentional resources are available to 
process the valence of the word. This is in line with previous research on anxiety 
that has found, for example, that high anxiety is associated with increased vigilance 
to negative valence in tasks where the word is unattended (e.g. emotional Stroop 
task; Williams et al., 1996; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992). But note that this is the 
first instance where this association is established for detection sensitivity.  
The implication that high Trait anxiety is associated with increased 
sensitivity to the negative valence under conditions of inattention is examined 
further in the following analyses comparing the high versus low anxiety groups. An 
ANOVA looking at the two groups was conducted in order to examine differences 
in valence processing and its modulation by attention between individuals with 
extreme levels of low or high anxiety. 
 
High versus Low Anxiety 
 
Participants whose trait anxiety scores lied in the bottom quartile of all the 
anxiety scores (38 and below; M = 34) were categorized as “low trait anxious 
(LTA)”, and participants having a trait anxiety score in the top quartile (50 and 
above; M = 57) were categorized as “high trait anxious (HTA)”. Anxiety scores 
were significantly higher for the HTA group compared to the LTA group (t(49) = 
19.541, SEM = 1.169, p < .001), as expected from this group selection. This 
resulted in having twenty eight LTA (mean age = 22, range 18 – 31, 12 females) 
and twenty three HTA participants (mean age = 22, range 18 – 46, 19 females). 
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The results are summarized in Table 4.2. A 2 x 2 x 2 Mixed Factor 
ANOVA with the between-subjects factor of Anxiety Group (LTA vs. HTA) and 
within-subjects factors of load (low vs. high) and valence (negative vs. positive) 
was conducted on the hit rates, the d’ scores, and the beta scores.  
 
Table 4.2. Experiment 7: Mean % Hit Rates, d’ and Beta scores as a Function of 
Load, Valence, and Anxiety Group 
 
 
 
 The main effect of group was not significant for the hit rates (F(1,49) = 
2.039, p = .16). Anxiety Group did not significantly interact with either load 
(F(1,49) = 1.267, p = .266) or valence (F < 1). Similarly, the three-way interaction 
between Anxiety Group, load, and valence did not reach significance (F < 1). As 
can be seen in Table 7, therefore, both LTA and HTA participants had greater 
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accuracy in the low compared to the high load condition, and for the negative 
valence compared to the positive valence.  
 No difference between the LTA (M = 1.19) and HTA (M = .96) groups on 
the overall d’ scores was observed (F(1,49) = 1.166, p = .286) indicating no 
difference between the LTA and HTA groups on detection sensitivity in general. 
Although the main effect of group on overall d’ scores was not significant, there 
appears to be a numerical trend for lower d’ scores in the HTA group even in the 
low load conditions (Table 4.2), possibly suggesting a reduced capacity in high 
anxiety (perhaps due to demands on cognitive control due to dual-task coordination 
in both conditions of low and high load). Note that the d’ values were lower for the 
HTA group than the LTA group in all conditions except for the negative valence 
under high load (Table 4.2). this effect is discussed further in relation to the three-
way interaction. 
Anxiety Group did not interact with load (F(1,49) = 1.072, p = .306), 
suggesting that, in line with the findings from the correlational analyses, high 
anxiety was not associated with a greater load effect on detection sensitivity. As 
discussed earlier for the correlations with the load effect, this is inconsistent with 
the implication that individuals with high anxiety are characterized by a diminished 
attentional capacity (as suggested in the Processing Efficiency theory of anxiety, 
Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) and would thus show a greater effect of high attentional 
load. This is not surprising given that high perceptual load has been found to ‘make 
everybody equal’; individual differences in distractibility were observed under low 
load but not under high load (Forster & Lavie, 2009).  
However, a significant interaction between Anxiety Group and valence was 
found (F(1,49) = 5.294, p = .026). This interaction reflected an enhanced sensitivity 
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to the negative valence compared to the positive valence for the HTA group 
(F(1,22) = 10.097, MSE = .423, p = .004), but not for the LTA group (F < 1). This 
concurs with the correlation findings showing a positive correlation between Trait 
anxiety and the valence effect. Both of the correlation and the ANOVA findings 
suggest a hypersensitivity to negative valence in high anxiety as I predicted. 
This conclusion appears to be inconsistent with previous findings that 
showed no differences between the anxiety groups in detection sensitivity to 
negative words but instead showed a response bias to evaluating ambiguous 
information as threatening in high anxiety (Manguno-Mire et al., 2005). However, 
the results of the present chapter do not actually contradict those of Manguno-Mire 
et al. (2005) considering that the enhanced sensitivity to negative valence in the 
present thesis is defined in terms of an advantage in the detection of negative 
compared to positive information (rather than in terms of the detection of only 
negative words). In fact, the d' of the negative words in the present chapter are not 
higher for the HTA group (M = 1.17) than the LTA group (M = 1.21; Table 4.2), in 
line with the results of Manguno-Mire et al. (2005). The difference between the d’ 
scores of negative and positive d', on the other hand, is greater for the HTA group 
than the LTA group. What the present findings suggest, therefore, is that it is the 
ability to detect the negative valence over that of the positive valence that is 
enhanced in high anxiety rather than the detection of negative valence per se. 
The lack of a negative valence detection advantage for the LTA group is 
inconsistent with previous research that has showed some orientation towards 
highly threatening pictures in individuals with low anxiety (Koster et al., 2006) and 
greater vigilance to high compared to mild threat even in low anxious participants 
(Mogg et al., 2000). However, it is likely that threatening pictures may have greater 
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effects than words. In addition, given that previous research has found an effect of 
high (but not mild) threat in low anxiety, it is possible that no significant negative 
valence detection advantage was found for the LTA group in the present chapter 
because of the exclusion of the most extremely rated negative words. 
Crucially, a significant three-way interaction between Anxiety Group, load, 
and valence was also observed (F(1,49) = 4.574, p = .037). As Table 4.2 shows, 
this interaction reflected that whereas there was a greater enhanced detection 
sensitivity to the negative valence compared to the positive valence in the high 
versus the low load for the HTA group, a reversed pattern was observed for the 
LTA group (as indicated by a smaller, and in fact reversed, difference between the 
negative and positive valence in the high versus the low load; see Figure 4.2). The 
enhancement in the negative valence detection advantage from the low load to the 
high load for the HTA group was supported by a significant interaction between 
load and valence for the HTA group (F(1,22) = 4.899, MSE = .059, p = .038; see 
Figure 4.3). On the contrary, the reduction in the negative valence advantage from 
the low to the high load condition for the LTA group was not significant, as shown 
by a non-significant interaction between load and valence for the LTA group 
(F(1,27) = 1.888, MSE = .236, p = .181). Follow-up paired samples t-tests revealed 
a detection advantage for the negative valence compared to the positive valence 
under both low load (t(22) = 2.367, SEM = .135, p = .027) and high load (t(22) = 
3.524, SEM = .154, p = .002) for the HTA group (Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3). These 
findings are in line with the hypothesis predicting a reduced load effect on the 
negative valence advantage in high anxiety compared to low anxiety. 
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Figure 4.4: Interaction between Load and Valence on the d’ scores in the LTA 
group. 
 
Figure 4.5: Interaction between Load and Valence on the d’ scores in the HTA 
group. 
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The amplification of the negative valence detection advantage in the high 
load for the HTA group appears to be due to the fact that while a reduction in d’ 
scores from low load to high load was observed for both the negative and positive 
valences, the reduction was even greater for the positive valence for the HTA 
group compared to the LTA group (see Table 4.2; although this difference was not 
significant (t(49) = 1.843, p = .071). This finding reflects that highly anxious 
individuals are more tuned to the negative valence compared to the positive 
valence even in conditions where attentional resources are limited.  
This finding extends previous literature that suggests an early attentional 
bias to threat (e.g. Fox, 2008; Eimer & Kiss, 2007) and a hypervigilance of the 
threat detection system in anxiety (e.g. Bradley et al., 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998). Furthermore, the decreased modulation of the detection of the negative 
valence by load in comparison with the positive valence found in the HTA group 
concurs with previous research showing that the processing of negative emotion is 
less affected by attention in high anxiety (Fox et al., 2005; Bishop et al., 2004).   
 The main effect of group was not significant for the beta scores (F(1,49) = 
1.923, p = .172). The interactions between Anxiety Group and both load and 
valence for the beta scores were also not significant (both F’s < 1). In addition, no 
significant three-way interaction between Anxiety Group, load, and valence was 
found (F < 1) indicating that the difference in the load effect on valence detection 
between the LTA and HTA groups was not accompanied by a similar difference in 
response bias.   
 
 146 
Lexical frequency 
 After matching the mean frequencies of all word categories as well as the 
valence intensity and arousal levels of the emotional word categories, the direction 
and significance of the interactions between Anxiety Group and both load and 
valence on the d’ scores did not change. The three-way interaction between 
Anxiety Group, load, and valence became weaker (F(1,49) = 2.344, p = .132), 
although the d’ scores showed a similar trend for an enhancement of the negative 
valence detection advantage in the high versus the low load in HTA individuals 
compared to LTA individuals with a slight reversal in the high load for the LTA 
compared to the HTA group (LTA: low load: M negative = 1.68, M positive = 
1.53; high load: M negative = .78, M positive = .85; HTA: low load: M negative = 
1.42, M positive = 1.12; high load: M negative = .91, M positive = .43). 
 
4.3 Summary and conclusions  
 
The role of individual differences in anxiety on sensitivity to negative 
information and its interaction with attention was examined in this chapter. The 
results showed firstly a replication of the negative valence detection advantage 
established in the previous chapters and of the modulation of the negative detection 
advantage by load across all participants – an enhanced sensitivity to negative 
valence compared to positive valence was found in the low load but not in the high 
load.  
Participants showed overall a more conservative bias in response to the 
positive valence compared to the negative valence, possibly reflecting lower 
confidence in categorizing the positive words as emotional in comparison with the 
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negative words. This difference in response bias is similar to that found in the 33 
ms exposure condition of Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) but differs from the results of 
Chapter 3. This contrast is possibly due to a greater variance in participants’ 
anxiety levels in the present chapter. It is important to bear in mind that participants 
still showed a conservative criterion for the detection of the negative valence. 
While this bias was found to be less conservative compared to the positive valence, 
it does not challenge the negative valence detection advantage given that the two 
measures of d’ scores and beta and independent of one another. In addition, the 
effect of load on valence found for the d’ scores was not accompanied by a similar 
effect on response bias.  
The findings of the present chapter did not support the idea that high 
anxiety is associated with a diminished attentional capacity: According to the 
Processing Efficiency Theory of anxiety (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) that states that 
individuals with high trait anxiety have a reduced attentional capacity, it would be 
expected that the HTA group would suffer to a greater extent in the overall 
detection of valence in high load compared to the LTA group. Results showed, 
however, that anxiety levels were not associated with the effect of load on valence 
detection. Although a numerical trend for lower d’ scores was observed for the 
HTA group compared to the LTA group, no difference was found between the two 
groups with respect to the load effect on detection sensitivity. These results are not 
surprising considering that the present findings examined perceptual capacity as 
opposed to previous research that has established a reduced attentional capacity in 
high anxiety for higher cognitive control functions such as working memory. 
Importantly, differences in Trait anxiety on the evaluation of negative 
information and valence detection were found. Firstly, Trait anxiety levels were 
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associated with the idiosyncratic valence ratings of the negative words – lower (i.e. 
more extreme) ratings were given for the negative words with increasing anxiety, 
indicating that individuals with high anxiety evaluate negative information more 
negatively than individuals with low anxiety. This finding provides support for the 
cognitive-motivational model of anxiety that claims that high anxiety is associated 
with a tendency to evaluate mild threat as highly threatening (Mogg & Bradley, 
1998). According to this model, the Valence Evaluation System (which is 
responsible for the appraisal of a stimulus’s threat value) is more sensitive in high 
anxiety, resulting in mild negative information being interpreted as highly 
threatening. 
Secondly, individual differences in Trait anxiety levels were associated 
with the negative valence detection advantage, indicating an enhanced sensitivity to 
negative valence with higher Trait anxiety. A closer look at the results revealed that 
while individuals with low Trait anxiety showed no sensitivity advantage to 
negative information compared to positive information, individuals with high Trait 
anxiety demonstrated an enhanced sensitivity to negative valence not only when 
attentional capacities were available but also when attention was taken up by 
another task. This is adding to the vast evidence of a hypervigilance towards threat 
in anxiety when attention is focused on another task (e.g. Mogg et al., 1993; Fox, 
1993) now also providing a new line of evidence for a more sensitive threat 
evaluation system in high anxiety (e.g. Mogg & Bradley, 1998). These findings 
support the hypothesis of a hypersensitivity to negative valence in high anxiety.  
The negative valence advantage found in the present chapter in high anxiety 
versus low anxiety with no difference between the two groups in response criterion 
is inconsistent with previous research that revealed a response bias for the detection 
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of negative words in high anxiety compared to low anxiety with no difference 
between the anxiety groups in detection sensitivity to negative words (Manguno-
Mire et al., 2005). Although the results found by Manguno-Mire et al. (2005) seem 
to be inconsistent with those of the present thesis, they do not in fact contradict the 
conclusions of the present chapter. As mentioned previously (in the General 
Introduction and in Chapter 4), unlike the present chapter, no comparisons between 
the sensitivities of the negative and positive words were conducted in the 
Manguno-Mire et al. (2005) study. Instead, any group difference in sensitivity to 
negative information was assessed only by comparing the d' of the negative words 
of each anxiety group. On the other hand, the differences between the HTA and 
LTA groups found in the present chapter were defined in terms of differences 
between detection sensitivity measures of the negative and positive d' - in other 
words, it is not the detection of negative information per se that is elevated in high 
anxiety, but rather the ability to detect negative information over that of positive 
information.  
In addition, there are methodological differences between the Manguno-
Mire et al. (2005) study and the present thesis (see General Introduction for 
details). For example, the task in the present chapter could involve more 
connotations related to negative emotion due firstly to a greater number of words 
and secondly to the classification task (of emotional versus neutral) providing a 
wider scope for emotional connotations of negative valence. Future research using 
the present emotional classification task on their corpus of words or using their 
‘dangerous’ versus ‘safe’ classification task on the corpus of words used in the 
present thesis could reveal whether the critical factor for finding a detection 
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sensitivity advantage is in terms of the ‘emotional’ versus ‘non-emotional’ 
classification task of the present thesis. 
Another important finding of this chapter was the demonstration that this 
hypersensitivity to negative information in high anxiety was not dependent on 
allocation of attention. Given that no reduction of the negative valence detection 
advantage by high load was observed for individuals with high anxiety, the present 
findings support the prediction of a weaker load effect on the negative detection 
advantage in high anxiety compared to low anxiety. The present chapter extends 
previous research showing a reduced modulation of the processing of negative 
emotion by attention in high anxiety (e.g. Fox et al., 2005; Bishop et al., 2004) in 
establishing a reduced effect of perceptual load on the enhanced detection 
sensitivity to negative valence in high anxiety.  
In the end, the present chapter established a hypersensitivity to negative 
information in high anxiety as opposed to low anxiety that was not modulated by 
attentional load, indicating a preferential processing of negative information in high 
anxiety even under conditions of limited attentional resources. These conclusions 
reflect anxiety-related differences in intrinsic cognitive processing styles and 
sensory function. But how does this extend to differences in human behaviour such 
as motivation levels? Previous studies have shown that the prospect of reward can 
modulate human behaviour (e.g. Kiss, Driver, & Eimer, 2009; Pleger, 
Blankenburg, Ruff, Driver, & Dolan, 2008). Chapter 5 aimed to address this issue 
by investigating whether any effects of the prospect of reward on valence detection 
will be found, i.e., whether the enhanced detection will be influenced by changes in 
motivation. 
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Chapter 5: 
The Effect of Reward on Detection Sensitivity to 
Emotional Valence 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
 The motivating effects of reward on overt behaviour have been recognized 
for some time (Blake, Strata, Churchland, & Merzenich, 2002). Recent studies 
have focused on the influence of reward on cognition. As described in detail in the 
General Introduction, reward has been shown to have modulating effects on visual 
attention, for example by facilitating visual selection (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 
2006) and increasing search efficiency of a singleton target (Kiss et al., 2009). 
 Moreover, studies have found that rewarding participants leads to faster 
responses when detecting novel or familiar items that were rewarded (Bunzeck et 
al., 2009), as well as to enhanced detection sensitivity to a target (Engelmann & 
Pessoa, 2007; Engelmann et al., 2009). Interestingly, the discrimination of sensory 
stimulation improved as reward level increased (Pleger et al., 2008). Reward has 
also been found to reduce orientation discrimination thresholds regardless of 
attentional load (Baldassi & Simoncini, 2009) suggesting that reward acts 
separately but similarly to attention through mediating activity of early sensory 
stages such as the visual cortex.  
 In conclusion, though reward has been shown to have effects on the 
perception of neutral stimuli and on attention, no study has been conducted 
exploring the potential effects of reward on the detection of emotional valence. 
Based on the evidence that reward facilitates visual selective attention and 
enhances the detection sensitivity of visual targets possibly through magnifying the 
activity in sensory cortex mediating perceptual processing, one may expect to find 
that sensitivity to emotional valence would also be affected. The aim of Chapter 5, 
therefore, was to address this issue and test two alternative hypotheses: First, would 
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the negative valence detection advantage be reduced or eliminated when the correct 
detection of emotional valence in general (that is for both negative and positive 
valence) is rewarded? If the negative valence detection advantage reflects 
participants adopting a particular strategy in which they prioritize the detection of 
the negative valence over that of the positive valence, one would expect to find an 
enhancement of the detection of the positive valence when it is given a high 
priority (via reward) thus decreasing the negative valence advantage.  
On the other hand, it is also possible that the negative valence detection 
advantage would be unaffected by reward. If the enhanced sensitivity to negative 
valence is ‘hard-wired’ and does not simply reflect a prioritization strategy then no 
modulation of the negative valence advantage by reward should be found.  
Chapter 5 thus aimed to investigate the effects of reward on the detection of 
emotional valence by varying whether or not participants were rewarded for correct 
performance on the valence detection task. In order to test this effect, a valence 
detection experiment similar to that used under supraliminal conditions in Chapter 
2 was designed while manipulating the presence versus absence of monetary 
reward. Similarly to Chapters 2, 3, and 4, a signal detection approach was 
employed measuring both sensitivity to negative and positive valence and response 
bias. In half the blocks (for each valence) participants were informed that correctly 
classifying the valence (emotional/neutral) of the words would result in earning 
points which then increases payment.  
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5.2 Experiment 8 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Twelve participants who were recruited on a voluntary basis from UCL’s 
Psychology online Participant Pool took part in this experiment and had a mean age 
of 24 (range 19 – 32, 8 females). All participants in Experiments 8 and 9 were 
native English speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were paid 
between £5 and £7 depending on their performance (as described below).  
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
 The experiment was similar to Experiment 1 in Chapter 2 with the 
following exceptions (Figure 5.1): The word was presented for only 33 ms, and the 
brightness of the masks was reduced. This was due to the fact that a different 
monitor was used for this experiment and piloting work revealed lower d’ scores 
relative to Experiment 1 (Chapter 2). Therefore, the brightness of the masks was 
reduced in order to enhance performance. The crucial change was the addition of a 
‘reward’ condition: in the reward blocks, if participants made a correct response, 
they got 1 point. Four blocks were ‘no-reward’ blocks, whereas in the remaining 
four ‘reward’ blocks participants were rewarded for correctly categorizing the 
words. The order of the blocks was intermixed and counterbalanced in such a way 
that half of the participants received the order RNNRRNNR (R for reward and N 
for no reward), whereas the remaining half were presented with the reversed order. 
Order of the blocks was also counterbalanced for valence across participants in an 
ABBABAAB order with A & B representing positive and negative valence. 
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Stimuli were generated via Matlab software (MathWorks, Natick, Massachusetts) 
using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) and 
were presented on a 15” CRT monitor (60 Hz refresh rate). 
 Participants first completed two practice no-reward blocks (one negative vs. 
neutral block and one positive vs. neutral block). The instructions given at the start 
of the experiment described the main valence detection task without providing 
details about the reward condition – they were only told that they will be rewarded 
for their performance in some blocks. Before each reward block, participants were 
informed that they would be given points for correctly categorizing the valence of 
the words and that for every 35 points earned they would get paid an extra 50p. 
Participants were encouraged to earn as many points as they can. At the end of 
each reward block, they were told how many points they had earned in that block, 
and the total number of points they earned.  Instructions before the no-reward 
blocks explained that their performance in the coming block will not affect their 
points earned thus far. 
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Figure 5.1: Trial sequence in Experiment 8. Trial onset was indicated by a 
fixation cross. The presentation of a word (in this example, a negative one) was 
preceded and followed by masks. Participants then indicated by key presses first 
whether the word had been emotional or neutral, and then how confident they were 
of that response. 
 
As in all previous experiments, the valence intensities and mean arousal 
ratings of the negative and positive words were matched. The mean valence ratings 
provided by the participants were 1.91 (SD = .48), 5.10 (SD = .55), and 3.85 (SD = 
.39) for the negative, positive, and neutral words respectively. The mean arousal 
ratings were 5.01 (SD = 1.42) for the negative words and 4.94 (SD = 1.26) for the 
positive words. The neutral words had a mean arousal rating of 4.18 (SD = 1.29).  
An average of forty-five negative and forty-six positive words remained per 
participant after matching the emotional word categories on valence intensity and 
mean arousal levels. The negative and positive word lists had a final mean valence 
rating of 2.39 (SD = .66) and 5.59 (SD = .63) respectively. The mean arousal 
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ratings were matched to a mean rating of 5.11 (SD = 1.27) for both the negative 
and positive words. 
 
Results 
 The results are shown in Table 5.1. A repeated-measures ANOVA with the 
within-subject factors Reward (No-Reward vs. Reward) and Valence (Negative vs. 
Positive) was conducted on the Hit rates, the d’ scores, and the beta scores.  
 
Table 5.1. Experiment 8: Mean % Hit Rates, d’ and Beta scores as a Function of 
Reward and Valence (averages across valences in bold) 
 
 
 
The hit rate ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of valence (F(1,11) 
= 19.187, MSE = 242.93, p = .001; see Table 5.1), indicating higher accuracy for 
the negative compared to the positive valence, as in all previous experiments. 
There was a numerical trend for a 2.5% improvement with reward (see Table 5.1), 
but this effect was not significant (F < 1) and the interaction of valence and reward 
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was not significant either (F < 1). Thus reward failed to affect detection accuracy 
for both valences. 
The ANOVA on the d’ scores revealed that the main effect of valence on 
the d’ scores was significant (F(1,11) = 7.902, MSE = .202, p = .17): the greater 
sensitivity to the negative valence in comparison with positive valence (see Table 
5.1) thus replicates the detection sensitivity advantage for negative valence found 
in all of the previous chapters. There was no main effect of reward (F < 1) and 
although the difference between the d’ of the negative and positive words appears 
to be smaller in the reward condition (in line with the prioritization strategy 
hypothesis), the interaction was not significant (F < 1). Thus the experiment failed 
to show an effect of reward on detection sensitivity for both valences.  
The main effect of reward on the beta scores did not reach significance 
(F(1,11) = 2.105, MSE = 5.607, p = .175). No significant effect of valence was 
observed (F(1,11) = 2.828, MSE = 8.921, p = .121), suggesting that the enhanced 
sensitivity to the negative valence was not accompanied by a difference in response 
criterion as in all previous experiments except Experiments 1 (Chapter 2) and 7 
(Chapter 4). The interaction between reward and valence for the beta scores was 
not significant (F < 1).   
 
Lexical frequency 
 After matching the word categories on valence, arousal, and mean 
frequency levels, the main effect of valence was still found (F(1,11) = 5.837, MSE 
= .168, p = .034) while the effect of reward as well as the interaction between 
reward and valence were yet again not significant (both F’s < 1). 
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 In summary, Experiment 8 replicated the negative valence detection 
advantage over positive valence but failed to show an effect of reward on detection 
sensitivity in general for both emotional valences. 
 
 
5.3 Experiment 9 
 
 A possible explanation for the lack of an effect of reward in Experiment 8 
could be that the intermixed block design did not allow for the effects of reward to 
emerge – reward sessions were too short to have an effect and were followed by 
no-reward blocks where the participants’ motivation levels were lower. Experiment 
9 was therefore conducted to strengthen the effect of reward by blocking the 
reward and no-reward sessions separately and presenting the reward blocks either 
as the first or the last four blocks with the order counterbalanced across 
participants.   
 
Method 
Participants 
 Fourteen new participants took part in Experiment 9 and had a mean age of 
22 years old (range 18 – 30, 8 females). 
 
Stimuli and Procedure  
 The stimuli and procedure followed in this experiment were identical to 
Experiment 8 with the exception of the block order: the four reward blocks were 
given first in successive order to one half of the participants followed by the four 
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no-reward blocks, whereas the four no-reward blocks were presented first to the 
remaining half of the participants followed by the reward blocks. When the no-
reward blocks were presented first, no instructions regarding the reward 
contingency were given until right before the start of the reward blocks. 
 
 The mean valence ratings were 2.10 (SD = .59) for the negative words and 
5.33 (SD = .36) for the positive words. No neutral words were excluded as their 
mean valence ratings did not differ significantly from 4 (M = 3.91, SD = .25). Most 
participants rated the negative words (M = 5.19, SD = 1.56) as higher in arousal 
than the positive words (M = 4.58, SD = .87). The neutral words had a mean 
arousal rating of 4.31 (SD = 1.26).  
An average of forty-nine negative and fifty positive words remained per 
participant after matching the emotional word categories on both valence intensity 
and arousal levels. The final word lists had mean valence ratings of 2.35 (SD = .61) 
and 5.6 (SD = .60) and mean arousal ratings of 5.04 (SD = 1.06) and 5.03 (SD = 
1.06) for the negative and positive words respectively. 
 
Results 
 The results of Experiment 9 are shown in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. A 2 x 2 x 
2 mixed-factor ANOVA with reward (present vs. absent) and valence (negative vs. 
positive) as within-subjects factors and block order (reward first vs. reward second) 
as the between-subjects factor was conducted on the hit rates, the d’ scores, and the 
beta scores. 
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Table 5.2. Experiment 9: Mean % Hit Rates, d’ and Beta scores as a Function of 
Reward, Valence, and Block Order (averages across valences in bold) 
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Table 5.3. Experiment 9: Mean % Hit Rates, d’ and Beta scores as a Function of 
Reward and Valence (averages across valences in bold) 
 
 
 
The hit rates ANOVA revealed a main effect for valence; accuracy was 
higher for the negative compared to the positive valence (F(1,12) = 13.223, MSE = 
268.637, p = .003). The effect of valence did not interact with block order (F < 1), 
indicating that the negative valence detection advantage was once again replicated. 
There was also a main effect of reward block order (F(1,12) = 10.233, p = .008; see 
Table 5.2): accuracy was greater when the reward blocks were first (M = 73%) 
compared to when they were second (M = 49%). Although there was a numerical 
trend for higher hit rates in the reward blocks compared to the no-reward blocks (M 
difference =5.5%; Table 5.3), the main effect of reward was not significant 
(F(1,12) = 1.888, MSE = 230.196, p = .195). No significant interaction between 
reward and block order was found on the hit rates (F(1,12) = 3.356, MSE = 
147.887, p = .092) either. Thus the accuracy results did not show any robust 
modulation by reward. The effect of reward-block order and the numerical trends 
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for higher hits rates with reward than with no reward do hint however that reward 
may affect emotional detection accuracy but this is clearly not a robust effect. 
The d’ ANOVA showed significantly higher d’ scores for the negative 
valence than for the positive valence (F(1,12) = 8.511, MSE = .487, p = .013) and 
no interaction between valence and block order (F < 1). Thus the established 
enhanced sensitivity to the negative valence observed throughout the present thesis 
was once again replicated. 
There was also a main effect of reward on the d’ indicating that detection 
sensitivity was higher in the reward compared to the no-reward condition was 
significant (F(1,12) = 9.224, MSE = .141, p = .01; see Table 5.3). Thus the 
manipulation of blocking was successful in revealing an effect of reward. However, 
the effect of reward interacted with the block order (F(1,12) = 10.384, p = .007) 
reflecting an effect of reward on the detection sensitivity when reward was 
presented second (F(1,6) = 13.257, MSE = .208, p = .011; No-reward: M = .91; 
Reward: M = 1.54; Table 5.2). On the other hand, when the reward blocks were 
presented first, the effect of reward was not significant (F < 1; No-reward: M = 
1.81; Reward: M = 1.78; Table 5.2).  
Although at first instance it appears that no effect of reward was observed 
when the reward blocks were first, I note that there was a numerical trend for 
higher d’ scores when the reward blocks were first compared to when they were 
second (see Table 5.2; but the main effect of block order did not reach significance 
(F(1,12) = 4.193, p = .063). Moreover, a comparison of d’ of the first blocks 
between reward and no reward blocks (when both are presented first) showed that 
the d’ scores were significantly higher in the reward blocks (M = 1.78) compared to 
no-reward blocks (M = .91; t(12) = 2.75, p = .018 for the difference; Table 5.2). 
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Detection sensitivity was therefore higher in the first half of the experiment when 
the blocks were rewarded than when they were not rewarded.  
This finding reveals that reward did in fact enhance participants’ detection 
sensitivity even when reward was given first, and that this effect seemed to be 
maintained throughout the experiment; participants possibly had lower detection 
thresholds as a result of reward that allowed for better detection of the valence of 
the words (as supported by Baldassi & Simoncini, 2009). Thus the absence of a 
significant effect of reward when the reward blocks were first most likely reflects 
this carry-over effect onto the no-reward blocks rather than a lack of an effect of 
reward. 
There was no interaction between reward and valence and no three-way 
interaction between reward, valence, and block order (both F’s < 1). Thus even 
when reward was clearly effective in enhancing the d’ scores, it did not affect the 
negative valence detection advantage, supporting the ‘hard-wired’ hypothesis.  
These findings go in line with previous findings of an enhanced detection 
sensitivity for rewarded targets (Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007; Engelmann et al., 
2009), and extend them to the detection of emotional valence in words. Moreover, 
as reward has been shown to reduce orientation discrimination thresholds (Baldassi 
& Simoncini, 2009), these results suggest that the detection thresholds of emotional 
valence can also be decreased, resulting in higher d’ values. The paradigms used in 
most of the studies reported in this thesis that have examined the effects of reward 
most likely produced a high level of motivation that was maintained throughout the 
experiment. For example, in the study by Della-Libera & Chelazzi (2006), correct 
responses were immediately followed by a reward cue at trial level indicating the 
level of reward (low or high). Pleger et al. (2008) also presented reward on each 
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trial and grouped the different reward levels (0, 20, 50, or 80 pennies per correct 
trial) into miniblocks; therefore the majority of the blocks contained the possibility 
of reward thus requiring participants to be highly motivated to perform correctly 
and earn money throughout the experiment. Seeing that in previous studies reward 
was given on a trial-by-trial basis for correct performance and participants were 
informed that their task is to earn as much money as possible, it is not surprising 
that the effects of reward in the present chapter were only observed when a high 
level of motivation was maintained for a longer period of time (i.e. when the 
reward sessions were blocked rather than intermixed with no-reward blocks). 
 The main effect of block order on the beta scores was not significant 
(F(1,12) = 11.250, p = .181). The ANOVA on the beta scores revealed no 
significant effects of both valence (F(1,1n2) = 1.154, MSE = .966, p = .304) or 
reward (F(1,12) = 2.375, MSE = 3.16, p = .149). Interestingly, the interaction 
between reward and valence on the beta scores was marginally-significant (F(1,12) 
= 4.483, MSE = 1.841, p = .054). As can be seen in Table 5.3, this interaction 
reflects higher beta scores for the positive valence than the negative valence in the 
reward condition (but this difference was only marginally-significant: t(13) = 2.09, 
SEM = .503, p = .057), whereas there was a non-significant difference in the no-
reward condition (t(13) = 1.287, SEM = .377, p = .22). This difference in response 
bias found in the reward condition is replicating the same effect (with no reward) in 
Chapter 2 (Experiment 1) and Chapter 4 (Experiment 7). Reward did not affect 
beta scores, however, as no other comparisons were significant (interactions 
between block order and both valence and reward as well as the three-way 
interaction between valence, reward, and block order: all p’s > .068). 
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These results suggest that when participants were rewarded for correctly 
categorizing the valence of the words, they were less confident about the detection 
of the positive valence and thus adopted a more conservative criterion in response 
to the positive words in order to avoid making mistakes. Introducing block order as 
a between-subjects factor revealed no significant comparisons between the groups 
(all p’s > .092). 
 
Lexical frequency 
 After matching the word categories on valence, arousal, and frequency 
levels, the main effect of valence on the d’ scores remained significant (F(1,12) = 
6.456, p = .026) with no interaction with block order (F < 1). The effect of reward 
was still found to be significant (F(1,12) = 16.383, p = .002) as well as the 
interaction between reward and block order (F(1,12) = 8.127, p = .015). Finally, 
both the interaction between reward and valence and the three-way interaction 
between reward, valence, and block order were not significant (both F’s < 1).  
 
 In conclusion, a replication of the negative valence detection advantage 
established thus far in this thesis was found in both Experiments 8 and 9. However, 
the enhanced sensitivity to negative valence was not modulated by reward level, 
suggesting that the enhanced detection of negative valence does not simply reflect 
a prioritization strategy but rather a fixed characteristic of human cognition. A 
significant effect of reward was found when the reward blocks were presented 
second. In addition, it seems that even when participants commenced with the 
reward blocks, the d’ scores were increased throughout the experiment.  
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5.4 Summary and conclusions 
 
Considering previous research showing an improvement in perception, 
detection, and sensory function as a function of reward, Chapter 5 was conducted 
in order to examine the effects of monetary reward on the detection of emotional 
valence in words. The results showed firstly a replication of the negative detection 
advantage established in all previous chapters. In addition, the results suggested 
that participants adopted a more conservative criterion to detect the positive 
valence as opposed to the negative valence when correct performance on the 
valence detection task was rewarded, perhaps reflecting lower confidence in the 
detection of the positive valence when they were more motivated (through reward) 
to be accurate. 
The present chapter revealed an enhancement of detection sensitivity to 
emotional valence in general as a result of reward but only when the effects of 
reward were strengthened (by blocking the reward sessions compared to when the 
reward and no-reward blocks were intermixed). This was demonstrated by higher 
detection sensitivity rates to both the negative and positive valence as a result of 
reward. These findings are consistent with previous reports of a facilitation of 
selective attention (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006) as well as an enhanced 
detection of targets (Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007; Engelmann et al., 2009) and of 
orientation discrimination sensitivity (Baldassi & Simoncini, 2009) as a function of 
reward. The results of the present chapter also extend previous findings of an 
improvement of sensory judgements as reward value increases (Pleger et al., 2008) 
to an increase in perceptual sensitivity to emotional information by reward. As 
previous reports that have demonstrated that reward reduces orientation 
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discrimination thresholds (Baldassi & Simoncini, 2009), the present findings imply 
that reward enhances the detection of emotional valence possibly by reducing the 
sensitivity thresholds.  
Most importantly, the results of the present chapter suggest that the 
enhanced sensitivity to negative information does not simply reflect response 
strategies but rather may be ‘hard-wired’ as the negative detection advantage was 
not modulated by reward. In other words, if the negative sensitivity advantage was 
due to participants placing a higher priority for the detection of the negative 
valence versus the positive valence, then increasing the priority to detect the 
positive valence via reward would be expected to reduce the negative valence 
advantage. Given that reward did not affect the negative detection advantage, this 
suggests that the enhanced sensitivity to negative information is not a mere 
reflection of a prioritization strategy but rather a fundamental characteristic of 
human cognition.  
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Chapter 6: 
General Discussion 
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6.1 Overview of findings 
 
 The present thesis has established a detection advantage for negative 
emotional information presented in words. In an emotional valence detection task 
whereby participants classified a large corpus of words as having an emotional or 
neutral meaning, this advantage was demonstrated on both accuracy and detection 
sensitivity measures and was typically not accompanied by a change in the 
response criterion (except for two cases: the 33 ms duration condition in 
Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) and Experiment 7 (Chapter 4)). It is important to bear in 
mind firstly that given the independence of the d’ and response bias measures, any 
difference in response bias between the negative and positive valence does not cast 
any doubt on the sensitivity advantage found. Secondly, the response criterion for 
the negative valence was still always conservative. The detection advantage 
extended across both supraliminal and subliminal presentations, and alternative 
accounts in terms of lexical frequency, idiosyncratic differences in valence 
intensities, and arousal ratings were ruled out. The influence of arousal level during 
performance was also ruled out (Chapter 2) but only for accuracy. 
The research in the present thesis has also demonstrated that the detection 
advantage for negative valence depends on the allocation of attention to the words. 
Using the framework of perceptual load theory (Lavie, 1995), the results showed 
that enhanced sensitivity to the negative valence was found in the low load but not 
in the high load. Under subliminal presentations, however, a small detection 
advantage remained irrespective of the allocation of attention (Chapter 3). The role 
of individual differences in anxiety levels was also addressed (Chapter 4) and the 
results established a hypersensitivity to negative valence in high anxiety that did 
 171 
not depend on allocation of attention. Finally, a potential role of reward was also 
examined (Chapter 5). While reward improved detection sensitivity overall, it did 
not interact with the negative valence sensitivity advantage, suggesting that the 
negative detection advantage does not reflect response strategies but instead is 
more likely to be ‘hard-wired’: a fundamental characteristic of human perception. 
  
A true sensitivity advantage for negative information 
 The research reported in the present thesis provides the first demonstration 
of a clear advantage in the detection of negative versus positive emotional 
information that is expressed with detection sensitivity. This conclusion adds to 
previous research showing a processing advantage for negative words over neutral 
words (e.g. in terms of greater Stroop interference; White, 1996; Sutton et al., 
2007). However, as many of the previous studies have not directly compared 
negative to positive words, one cannot conclude whether their findings reflect a 
specific processing advantage for negative words rather than a general emotionality 
advantage. Although some studies that have addressed this issue have found a 
selective attention for negative words over positive words (e.g. McKenna & 
Sharma, 1995; Pratto & John, 1991), no detection advantage as such can be 
inferred from their conclusions given that the advantage was found on measures of 
response times and not on detection sensitivity per se. 
Previous research on the detection of emotional words has found not only a 
general emotion advantage shown for example by greater naming and recognition 
accuracy (for negative compared to neutral words, Gaillard et al., 2006; for both 
negative and positive words compared to neutral words, Zeelenberg et al., 2006) 
but also a detection advantage for negative words compared to positive words on 
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accuracy measures (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003). While the present thesis does not 
rule out a general emotional advantage overall, it highlights an additional 
advantage specifically for negative valence detection sensitivity. The results of the 
present thesis showing greater accuracy and detection sensitivity for the negative 
valence compared to the positive valence can accommodate the previous findings 
and suggest that the advantage for negative words in naming and accuracy has been 
mediated by an advantage in perceptual sensitivity rather than a response bias.  
The results of one previous study appear to conflict with the conclusion of 
the present thesis. Snodgrass & Harring (2005) found that detection sensitivity was 
better for positive words compared to negative words. The discrepancy between 
our conclusions may be due to their use of a smaller set of words (14 words of each 
category). Such small sets are more open to sampling biases such as forming more 
cohesive categories (allowing for more inter-category semantic priming effects). 
For example, if all the positive words were related to the concept of ‘love’ and thus 
resulted in priming effects, this would facilitate the identification of all other love-
related words. 
The negative sensitivity advantage seems to survive even subliminal 
conditions – an enhanced detection sensitivity to negative valence (compared to 
both positive valence and chance level) was observed even when the words were 
presented for very brief durations and surrounded by masks and participants’ 
confidence ratings indicated no awareness of the words’ emotional content. This 
finding suggests that less information is required for negative (versus positive) 
information to be perceived. This suggestion is consistent with previous findings 
indicating that information about the word’s valence can be extracted from a 
written word even if participants claim to be guessing the target valence (Gaillard 
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et al., 2006). Specifically, their results showed that participants were more likely to 
name a wrong negative word after a negative than after a neutral target. The 
absence of positive words in their study, however, precludes any conclusions 
regarding the present issue of sensitivity to negative valence rather than to any 
emotion. By also including positive words in this thesis, the results showed that the 
ability to extract valence information, distinguishing an emotional word from a 
neutral one even under subliminal conditions, is specific to negative valence.  
Taking LeDoux’s (1996) model into account, these results could potentially 
be explained by the idea that threatening stimuli are nevertheless unconsciously 
perceived through their effect of their processing in the ‘low road’ (including the 
subcortical pathways into the amygdala and the resultant autonomic response). 
Such ‘low road’ processing can allow for an emotional response to the stimuli even 
when these remain unconscious. The production of such an emotional response 
could in turn influence ‘guessing’ performance in such a way that participants get 
an ‘intuition’ about the word as a result of this emotional response, indicating it 
was negative without full awareness of the emotion of the word. Moreover, that the 
amygdala projects back to the sensory cortex possibly enhances the sensory signal 
resulting in negative stimuli being perceived even when presented unconsciously.  
The demonstration in the present thesis of an enhanced sensitivity to 
negative information under both supraliminal and subliminal conditions provides 
compelling evidence of a true negative detection sensitivity advantage. Additional 
strong evidence suggesting that the processing advantage for negative information 
appears to reflect a fundamental characteristic of human perception rather than 
simple response strategies was demonstrated by the findings of Chapter 5 where 
participants’ motivation levels were manipulated through presenting monetary 
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rewards for correct performance. Crucially, if the enhanced detection of negative 
valence was due to participants giving the detection of negative valence a higher 
priority than the detection of the positive valence, then increasing participants’ 
motivation to detect the positive valence as well through reward would be expected 
to reduce the negative advantage. However, reward did not affect the negative 
valence advantage suggesting that the enhanced sensitivity to negative information 
reflects a ‘hard-wired’ characteristic and not simply a prioritization strategy. 
Although reward did not modulate the negative detection advantage, the 
results did show an improvement in detection sensitivity to both negative and 
positive information overall by reward, in line with previous research that has 
shown a magnifying effect of reward on attention (e.g. Della-Libera & Chelazzi, 
2006; Kiss et al., 2009) and perception (e.g. Bunzeck et al., 2009; Pleger et al., 
2008; Baldassi & Simoncini, 2009). Based on previous suggestions of increased 
activity of sensory cortices such as V1 through reward, it is possible that a similar 
mechanism applies to the detection of emotional valence – the presence of reward 
in the current experiments may have amplified the perceptual processing of the 
words in visual cortex, thus leading to their enhanced detection. The present 
findings are the first to demonstrate that the effects of reward extend to sensitivity 
to emotional information overall without hindering the negative advantage. 
 
Hypersensitivity to negative information in anxiety 
Although the enhanced ability to detect the emotional valence in negative 
words is not modulated by reward, it appears to be mediated by anxiety levels. 
Previous research has indicated a hypervigilance to threat in high anxiety (e.g. 
Williams et al., 1996; Fox et al., 1993; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Richards et al., 
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1992; Mogg et al., 1993). The present thesis extends the previous literature in 
demonstrating hypersensitivity in anxiety to negative (compared to positive) 
information on both idiosyncratic ratings and detection sensitivity measures. 
Specifically, individual differences in anxiety levels were associated with the 
subjective valence ratings of the negative words revealing that individuals with 
high anxiety evaluated negative information more negatively than individuals with 
low anxiety. High trait anxiety was also associated with better detection sensitivity 
to the negative valence even under conditions of high attentional load. I discuss 
each of these findings in turn. 
The finding of the effects of anxiety levels on the valence ratings provides 
evidence for previous claims that high anxiety leads to interpreting mild threat as 
higher threat. According to the cognitive-motivational model of anxiety proposed 
by Mogg & Bradley (1998), a Valence Evaluation System appraises a stimulus’s 
threat value which includes both automatic and fast assessment of crude stimulus 
features (for example through the ‘low road’ proposed by LeDoux, 1996) and more 
fine-tuned details. In high trait anxiety, this Valence Evaluation System is more 
sensitive, resulting in mild negative information being marked as highly 
threatening. Output from this system is then sent to a Goal Engagement System, 
which is responsible for the allocation of attentional resources (allocating attention 
towards high threat and disrupting current task or avoiding low threat and 
maintaining current goals).  
The cognitive-motivational model of anxiety therefore predicts that 
increased sensitivity to mild threat in high anxiety leads to the interpretation of the 
threat as high. This prediction was supported by the association of anxiety levels 
with the negative valence ratings found in Chapter 4. Moreover, the cognitive-
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motivational model proposes that attentional resources will be allocated towards 
the source of threat in high anxiety as a result. On the other hand, in low anxiety, 
although the tendency to allocate attention towards a stimulus increases as the 
threat value of the stimulus increases, mild threat is ignored in favour of goal-
relevant information. 
Strong evidence for this prediction was provided in the present findings that 
high trait anxiety was associated with an increased negative detection sensitivity 
advantage. Particularly, a hypersensitivity to negative information was found in 
high anxiety in such a way that while individuals with low trait anxiety showed no 
negative valence advantage in either of the load conditions, individuals with high 
trait anxiety showed an enhanced detection sensitivity to negative information 
under both low load and high load conditions. I note that these findings also reveal 
that one exception to the negative valence sensitivity advantage established in the 
present thesis is for individuals with extremely low trait anxiety. 
The lack of a negative valence detection advantage for individuals with low 
anxiety in the present thesis is inconsistent with previous research showing a 
vigilance towards highly threatening pictures (compared to mild threat) even for 
low anxious participants (e.g. Koster et al., 2006; Mogg et al., 2000). However, 
considering that the highly negative words were excluded in the present thesis to 
match the valence intensities of the negative and positive valence, this may account 
for the lack of a negative detection advantage in the LTA group. Moreover, it is 
possible that threatening pictures may have a stronger effect than words.  
A previous claim has been made that anxiety is associated with a response 
bias to interpret ambiguous information as threatening rather than an enhanced 
sensitivity to negative information (Manguno-Mire et al., 2005). Careful 
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consideration of the findings suggests that this claim that at first sight appears to be 
contradictory to my claim can in fact be reconciled with my conclusion. While no 
difference was found between the anxiety groups on the sensitivity to the negative 
words when comparing the detection sensitivity measures of only the negative 
words both in the Manguno-Mire et al. (2005) study and in the present study, the 
results of the present thesis reveal that when detection sensitivity to the negative 
words is compared to that to the positive words, an advantage for negative 
information is observed that is amplified with higher levels of anxiety. The 
conclusion of the present thesis therefore is that high anxiety (compared to low 
anxiety) is associated with an enhanced sensitivity to negative information over 
positive information and not with a greater ability to detect negative valence per se.  
Although no differences in response criterion between the anxiety groups 
were observed in the present thesis (in contrast with the findings of Manguno-Mire 
et al., 2005), this may be due to differences in the tasks of the two studies with their 
task being to classify the words as ‘dangerous’ or ‘safe’. This particular 
categorization may be subject to response bias effects whereas the general 
classification of words as emotional or neutral in my task appears less susceptible 
to effects of response bias. An additional possibility is that no response bias was 
found for the high anxiety group in the present thesis because the negative words 
with the most extreme valence ratings were excluded to match the valence 
intensities of the negative and positive words. Given that individuals with high 
anxiety did in fact rate the negative words more extremely than individuals with 
low anxiety, it is possible that a response bias would have been found had these 
extreme negative words not been eliminated. 
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Relation to attention 
It is important to bear in mind that the suggestion of the present thesis that 
the sensitivity advantage for negative information is a fundamental characteristic of 
human perception does not necessarily mean that perceptual capacity is not 
required for negative valence perception. Previous research on whether emotional 
stimuli are processed automatically or whether their processing requires attention 
produced mixed conclusions (Pessoa, 2005) with many studies showing that the 
availability of attention is required for the processing of emotional stimuli (Pessoa 
et al., 2002; Eimer, Holmes, & McGlone, 2003; Holmes, Vuilleumier, & Eimer, 
2003; Hsu & Pessoa, 2007; Bishop et al., 2007).   
The present thesis provides further support for this conclusion and extends 
it to showing that attention is required for the negative valence detection advantage 
to emerge. By manipulating the allocation of attention through a manipulation of 
perceptual load (e.g. Lavie, 1995), an enhanced sensitivity to the negative valence 
compared to the positive valence was found under conditions of low load but not 
under high load. This demonstrated that conscious detection of the negative 
valence did require attentional resources. 
The conclusion that the detection advantage for negative (compared to 
positive) valence is dependent on attention is consistent with previous 
demonstrations that negative word perception does require attention. For example 
in an attentional blink paradigm, Kihara & Osaka (2008) showed that a negative 
first target led to an enhanced AB for a negative second target suggesting that the 
detection of negative information does require attention.  
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On the contrary, other AB studies have demonstrated that negative words 
(Anderson, 2005; Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Keil & Ihssen, 2004; Ogawa & 
Suzuki, 2004), as well as non-verbal, fearful face stimuli (e.g., Milders, Sahraie, 
Logan, & Donnellon, 2006) are more likely than the corresponding neutral stimuli 
to escape the attentional blink (Shapiro et al., 1997), indicating that negative 
stimuli may have preferential access to processing resources (although in some of 
these cases this could be due to arousal rather than valence; see Anderson, 2005).  
The discrepancy between these previous findings and those of the present 
thesis could be due to the fact that although the AB task is demanding on attention, 
it may be demanding on resources that are different to those that are in demand in 
the task of the present thesis. Specifically, while the present task loaded a visual 
search task presented concurrently with the word, each stimulus in the AB 
paradigm is presented alone on each trial and the demands are mainly placed on 
temporal processing resources due to fast presentations. 
In addition, results in other studies that have suggested that negative 
valence perception does not require attention (such as neuroimaging studies that 
claim that the processing of negative emotional stimuli is automatic; e.g. 
Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003; Bishop, et al., 2004) were 
obtained in tasks that did not place sufficient demands on attention, thus leaving 
spare attentional resources. For example, in one study, participants were presented 
with four pictures, each pair (either two houses or two faces) arranged either 
vertically or horizontally, and were instructed to attend to one of two pairs of 
stimuli while ignoring the other pair (Vuilleumier et al., 2001). However, research 
on the role of attentional load (e.g. Lavie, 2005; reviewed previously in Chapter 3) 
has shown that the mere instruction to ignore a stimulus does not automatically 
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prevent unattended stimuli from being processed – as long as there is spare 
attentional capacity, distractors will be processed. In this thesis, an established 
paradigm that has been proven to effectively manipulate attentional load was used 
(Lavie & Cox, 1997; Lavie & Fox, 2000; Beck & Lavie, 2005; Bahrami et al., 
2007; Pinsk et al., 2003; Yi, et al., 2004), in which the high load condition did 
appear to consume most capacity.  
 
Exceptions to the attention-dependent valence perception hypothesis 
While the negative valence advantage was found to be dependent on 
attention (for supraliminal presentations), an exception to this rule was observed – 
the enhanced sensitivity to negative valence does not appear to be dependent on 
allocation of attention when processed at an early subliminal stage. Chapter 3 
demonstrated a smaller but consistent negative detection advantage under both 
conditions of load when the presentations conditions increased the likelihood of 
subliminal processing of the words. The results showed not only an advantage in 
sensitivity to negative information over that of positive information, but also an 
ability to detect the negative valence that is greater than chance even in the high 
load, suggesting that for certain types of stimuli, in this case negative emotional 
information, subliminal perception may be automatic.  
Although high perceptual load did reduce the detection sensitivity to 
emotional valence in general under subliminal presentation conditions too, one may 
wonder why the negative detection advantage remained given that previous 
research has shown that high load eliminated the subliminal perception and the 
related primary cortex response to non-emotional visual stimuli (e.g. Bahrami et 
al., 2007;2008). Here, it is important to bear in mind that the task in the present 
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thesis did require the detection of the valence of the words (although with a lower 
priority than the primary letter search task), whereas previous effects of load on 
subliminal processing (e.g. Bahrami et al., 2007;2008 studies) were obtained in 
tasks that required participants to ignore the subliminal information. It is possible 
and highly likely that processing resources are allocated to the stimuli when 
participants are required to process the stimuli even as a secondary priority more so 
than when the stimuli are ignored. 
A second exception to the dependence of the negative valence sensitivity 
advantage on attention established in the present thesis is in relation to high levels 
of trait anxiety. Specifically, the present thesis demonstrated an enhanced 
sensitivity to negative (compared to positive) valence under both conditions of low 
and high load that was even augmented under high load in individuals with high 
anxiety (when compared to individuals with low anxiety).  
Notice that the modulation of the negative detection advantage by anxiety 
seems to conflict with the suggestion of Chapter 5 that the negative valence 
advantage is ‘hard-wired’ and is not amplified by reward. However, the lack of a 
modulation of the negative advantage by reward was obtained under conditions that 
were more akin to the low load conditions in Chapter 4, whereas the enhancement 
in the negative detection advantage in high anxiety was observed under conditions 
of high load. This suggests that presenting reward under conditions of high load 
could also amplify the negative valence advantage. Future research could 
potentially address this interaction. 
The results of the present thesis are thus the first to establish that the 
hypersensitivity to negative information in high anxiety is not dependent on 
allocation of attention. This conclusion is inconsistent with previous findings on 
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the effects of perceptual load on individual differences in anxiety. For example, as 
mentioned earlier (in the General Introduction), differences in DLPFC activity 
(suggesting differences in cognitive control) between the anxiety groups were 
found only under conditions of low load (Bishop, 2009). Further evidence of an 
elimination of individual differences in anxiety under conditions of high perceptual 
load was demonstrated in another study (Bishop et al., 2007). The results revealed 
that while an increase in activity of the DLPFC or the ACC is typically found for 
exercising attentional control to inhibit the processing of distractors, individuals 
with high trait anxiety showed no such increase in related brain activity under low 
load. Under high load however, no such differences between the anxiety groups 
were observed.  
Although these findings seem to be inconsistent with the results of Chapter 
4, the previous studies (Bishop et al., 2007; Bishop, 2009) differ methodologically 
from the present thesis: Specifically, while the earlier studies revealed neural 
imaging components in response to facial stimuli that were intended to be ignored 
(thus reflecting differences in cognitive control abilities), the results of the present 
thesis measured effects on behavioural performance in response to verbal 
information that was attended to a certain extent (I note that although detection of 
the word valence was required, attention to the words was secondary given that the 
letter search was prioritized).  
While previous findings that have shown a reduced ability to exert 
attentional control in individuals with high anxiety (e.g. Bishop et al., 2007) are in 
line with the Processing Efficiency theory of anxiety (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) that 
implies a diminished attentional capacity in high anxiety, the present thesis found 
no evidence of a similar effect of anxiety on perceptual capacity in terms of a 
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greater effect of load on detection sensitivity in high anxiety. This is not surprising 
considering that previous research implicating a reduced attentional capacity in 
high anxiety examined differences in higher cognitive control functions rather than 
perceptual capacity as such. That high perceptual load did not affect performance 
to a greater extent in high anxiety in the present thesis suggests that unlike working 
memory, perceptual capacity is not reduced in high anxiety.  
 
6.2 Implications for future research and daily life 
 
Speed of information accrual 
For the simple yet significant goal of deepening our understanding of the 
negative valence sensitivity advantage, further research will have to elucidate the 
mechanism underlying the present findings. One plausible mechanism may be via 
higher speed of information accrual for negative (versus positive) valence. 
Categorization of stimuli as negative or positive is made on the basis of very little 
information (e.g. Murphy and Zajonc, 1993). Assuming that the amount of 
information available about a stimulus is a monotonic function of exposure 
duration, the present findings suggest that negative (compared to positive) valence 
either increases the rate of information accrual or requires less information to be 
available for correct categorization. This conjecture is indirectly supported by the 
finding that attention speeds perceptual information processing (Carrasco & 
McElree, 2001) coupled with research showing that emotional stimuli attract 
attention (e.g., in emotional Stroop tasks: McKenna & Sharma, 1995; Pratto & 
John, 1991). For orthographic stimuli, the attention-grabbing effect of emotional 
stimuli may be limited to tasks requiring semantic analysis (rather than 
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phonological or graphic analysis; Huang et al., 2008), implicating the lexical-
semantic system and speed of accrual of semantic information in mediating the 
negative-word advantage.  
In addition, obtaining physiological evidence by conducting an ERP study 
and collecting EEG measures would strengthen the conclusions drawn from this 
investigation and would allow for the examination of potential temporal differences 
in the perception of negative versus positive words. Collecting both behavioural 
and neural components, therefore, will not only provide converging evidence from 
different methodologies in the exploration of potential differences in the speed of 
information accrual between the negative and positive valence, but can also clarify 
the psychological mechanisms involved (e.g. regarding speed of information 
accrual). 
 
Unconscious processing 
 Another issue that merits further investigation arises from the findings of 
the present thesis on the unconscious processing of emotional valence. The 
demonstrations of individual differences in anxiety levels on the sensitivity to 
negative information in Chapter 4 were obtained from supraliminal presentation 
conditions and therefore apply only to consciously-perceived words. Considering 
previous research showing greater interference from subliminally-presented 
negative words in high anxiety (e.g. MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Mogg et al., 
1993; Fox, 1996), it would be worthwhile to explore whether similar differences 
would emerge between the anxiety groups in the detection of negative versus 
positive valence when awareness of the words is precluded. 
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 The effects of reward on valence detection established in the present thesis 
are also only indicative of effects on words that were presented above subjective 
awareness levels (Chapter 5). Future studies should therefore seek to potentially 
extend these findings to unconsciously processed words. Reward has been shown 
to affect the subliminal processing of non-emotional visual stimuli (Seitz, Kim, & 
Watanabe, 2009). In this study, participants were deprived of food and water before 
each training phase and were then rewarded on some occasions with drops of water 
while passively viewing stimuli. The stimuli were rendered unconscious by 
continuous flash suppression and results showed an improvement of visual 
sensitivity (as measured by a psychometric function of the signal-to-noise ratio) to 
orientation when associated with reward even in the absence of awareness of the 
stimuli. Considering this finding of a modulation of subliminal processing by 
reward, one prospective relevant direction would be to examine the effects of 
reward on the detection of emotional valence under subliminal word presentations. 
 A final noteworthy potential direction in elaborating the findings on the 
unconscious processing of emotional valence is to obtain neural imaging data. The 
present thesis provided strong behavioural evidence of differences in the 
processing of negative versus positive information in terms of detection sensitivity. 
It would thus be extremely valuable to understand the differential brain activity in 
response to negative and positive information. Previous research has addressed this 
issue in relation to consciously-perceived words (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006). In 
an fMRI study investigating arousal-based and valence-based brain activity in 
response to viewing negative, positive, and neutral pictures or words presented for 
2500 ms, the results showed amygdala, dorsomedial PFC, and ventromedial PFC 
activity in response to all highly-arousing stimuli that was more left-lateralized for 
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words and right-lateralized for pictures. Valence differences (between negative and 
positive items) were strongest for pictures and showed a lateral PFC response to 
negative stimuli while the medial PFC showed increased activity to positive 
stimuli. Though these findings provide significant insight into the underlying 
neural response to emotional valence, given that they apply only to stimuli 
processed at a conscious level, it would be highly valuable to extend these findings 
and conduct an fMRI study on the detection of emotional valence for words 
presented under subliminal conditions. 
 
Trait versus state anxiety 
An extension of the current hypersensitivity to negative valence in anxiety 
to other anxiety states would have potentially significant implications for human 
behaviour. The present thesis established a hypersensitivity to negative information 
in high trait anxiety with no investigation of any mediating effects of state anxiety 
on the detection of emotional information (as state anxiety was not manipulated). 
Based on previous findings that have demonstrated that individuals with high 
compared to low state anxiety show greater vigilance to threatening words (e.g. 
Fox et al., 2001) as well as selective amygdala activity in response to negative 
stimuli (Bishop et al., 2004), a potential direction would be to see how inducing 
high state anxiety would affect participants’ sensitivity to negative valence. 
Alternatively, considering that previous literature has indicated a mood-congruent 
Stroop interference (e.g., Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2000), it would be interesting 
to see if inducing a positive mood would enhance the detection of positive 
information and thus reduce the negative valence advantage. 
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Implications for daily life 
Although the conclusions of the present thesis are derived from measures 
obtained from laboratory settings, the findings are based on word stimuli that are, 
in reality, often encountered in life. The results thus have some interesting 
implications for daily life; for example, one potential use of the findings is for 
marketing purposes. As this thesis established, negative information is detected to a 
greater extent than positive information, and even under conditions where the 
individual is not fully aware of the stimulus. This suggests that the attention-
grabbing power of negative words, although unpleasant, may have a more rapid 
impact than positive words and can thus be more effective in marketing campaigns. 
More controversial is the implication of the enhanced detection of unconscious 
negative valence in subliminal advertising. Market researcher James Vicary (1957) 
claimed that flashing messages on the screen during a movie in New Jersey about 
eating popcorn and drinking coke increased their prospective sales. Though he later 
admitted to the fabrication of his results, his claim triggered a massive interest and 
quite a number of studies investigating this issue (that have, however, produced 
little or no support). Interestingly, in 2000, George W. Bush was accused of 
employing suspicious campaigning techniques in the presidential elections by 
subliminally-presenting opponent Al Gore’s face in conjunction with the word 
‘RATS’ in one of the television ads (Dijkterhuis, Aarts, & Smith, 2005). Clearly, it 
is a fascinating suggestion that subconscious negative information can be more 
powerful than positive information.  
Finally, significant implications for personal safety (for instance while 
driving) can be elicited from the conclusions of the present thesis. For example, 
‘kill your speed’ would be more effective than a neutral ‘slow down’, but only 
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under conditions of low load. The results of Chapter 3 showed that the detection 
sensitivity to emotional valence in general is not only reduced under conditions of 
high perceptual load, but the advantage in detection for the negative valence is also 
eliminated. What these findings seem to suggest then is that potentially hazardous 
objects or warning signs alerting one to impending danger can be missed under 
conditions of high attentional load such as when driving through heavy traffic and 
being bombarded by roadside billboards. It would thus be highly recommendable 
to make roadside warning signs sufficiently salient, especially on highly loaded 
roads. 
 
6.3 Conclusions 
 
 In summary, the present thesis contributes to emotion research by firstly 
establishing a significant advantage in detection sensitivity to negative information 
in words compared to positive information. This advantage was typically not 
accompanied by differences in response bias or accounted for by differences in 
arousal, subjective valence ratings or lexical frequency. The enhanced sensitivity to 
negative information was observed for both supraliminal and subliminal 
presentations and was not affected by reward, indicating that it is a fundamental 
characteristic of human perception. Although ‘hard-wired’, sufficient attentional 
resources appear necessary for the negative valence detection advantage to emerge, 
except under subliminal conditions and for individuals with high trait anxiety who 
instead show a hypersensitivity to negative information. 
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Appendix 
 
Negative Positive Neutral 
ache 
agony 
anger 
army 
ashamed 
bad 
beg 
bitter 
bomb 
bore 
bored 
cage 
cancer 
casket 
cheat 
coffin 
cowardly 
crime 
cruel 
dandruff 
dead 
death 
debt 
decay 
deface 
defeated 
degraded 
despair 
despise 
destroy 
die 
dungeon 
fail 
failing 
flood 
fraud 
frigid 
grave 
greedy 
guilt 
gun 
hate 
hazard 
hell 
air 
amuse 
beach 
beauty 
bed 
blossom 
calm 
cheerful 
comfort 
cottage 
country 
dance 
dawn 
deer 
dinner 
dream 
eagle 
fantasy 
father 
feel 
flower 
forest 
free 
freedom 
friend 
fruit 
garden 
generous 
gentle 
glad 
grass 
happy 
home 
honesty 
honey 
icecream 
kiss 
lake 
laugh 
lemonade 
lips 
mermaid 
merry 
mother 
accord 
account 
adding 
after 
age 
aim 
allow 
also 
angle 
area 
author 
back 
banker 
bark 
basement 
beak 
bean 
belt 
blew 
blow 
booth 
bowl 
box 
brick 
building 
business 
cable 
capsule 
card 
cellar 
center 
chart 
choral 
clove 
coach 
cockpit 
collar 
combine 
cord 
course 
crawl 
cup 
custom 
deal 
note 
number 
oblique 
orderly 
ounce 
oven 
packs 
page 
paper 
pedal 
peer 
pen 
permit 
phase 
piece 
platter 
pliers 
point 
pole 
post 
pots 
pour 
powder 
prop 
pump 
quart 
ramp 
reason 
rocket 
roll 
roof 
rope 
rural 
sack 
said 
science 
seen 
sequel 
shape 
sidewalk 
since 
slang 
slice 
slide 
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hostage 
hurt 
ignore 
insult 
jail 
kill 
liar 
lice 
measles 
misery 
morbid 
morgue 
mosquito 
murder 
nag 
nervous 
never 
offend 
perish 
perjury 
pimple 
polio 
poor 
punish 
rancid 
rape 
rejected 
retard 
sewer 
shot 
sick 
sickness 
slavery 
slay 
soldier 
tragedy 
trash 
trouble 
ugly 
unjust 
vile 
vulgar 
weak 
wreck 
mountain 
music 
new 
nice 
ocean 
passion 
peace 
peaceful 
peach 
pet 
playing 
praise 
pretty 
pup 
quilt 
rejoice 
rose 
sail 
sailboat 
sea 
sex 
shower 
sing 
ski 
sky 
smile 
soft 
softly 
song 
spring 
spruce 
sun 
sunset 
sweet 
swimming 
tranquil 
travel 
tree 
trust 
truth 
wisdom 
wise 
woman 
youth 
deck 
dense 
dial 
docile 
drizzle 
duty 
ear 
eight 
engine 
exposure 
feet 
finite 
five 
foot 
form 
front 
gate 
glasses 
graph 
hairpin 
helmet 
highway 
ignition 
imitate 
ink 
jargon 
jump 
junction 
kettle 
lesson 
level 
lift 
load 
long 
loop 
magnet 
math 
meeting 
method 
mile 
molecule 
napkin 
nine 
nose 
some 
south 
spoke 
sponge 
stair 
stand 
state 
steel 
stone 
straight 
street 
string 
suit 
sweep 
table 
tail 
tape 
theory 
thick 
thing 
thread 
three 
threw 
throw 
ticket 
tooth 
trace 
tractor 
trailer 
tray 
trend 
triangle 
tube 
veil 
vertical 
vest 
vote 
waist 
wash 
watts 
work 
years 
zipper 
zone 
 
 
